Mingyue Xiao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mingyue Xiao has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yunkai Wei
School of Information and Communication Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
2 shared publications - Ning Yang
School of Information and Communication Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Sabita Maharjan
University of Oslo
1 shared publication - Supeng Leng
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
1 shared publication - Yan Zhang
University of Oslo
1 shared publication Yijin Chen
Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Chengdu, Peoples R China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 8, 134800-134816
Block Mining or Service Providing: A Profit Optimizing Game of the PoW-Based Miners
The Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus is widely used to maintain the security and consistency of the blockchain systems. In PoW, the miners have to consume tremendous computing resources to compete for generating a valid block and win the reward. However, in recent years, the revenue of the miners face a large oscillation, due to economic policy changes, virtual currency price fluctuations, etc. Some miners have to stop mining and exit the market, leaving large number of computing resources vacant. Whereas, vast computing resources are required outside the blockchain ecosystem, such as cloud/edge computing and artificial intelligence. In this paper, the traditional miners (T-miner) which concentrate on block mining are promoted to the evolutionary miners (E-miner) with additional ability to provide computing services. We propose a scheme for the E-miners to connect the blockchain ecosystem with external computation requirements, releasing the redundant computing power of the E-miners to provide computing services for extra profits. A two-stage Stackelberg game is presented to model the interaction between the computing service pricing and each E-miner’s computing power allocation. The details of the game are separately elaborated for both flexible and specified external computing requirements, in pure environment with only E-miners and hybrid environment with both E-miners and T-miners, respectively. We utilize two distributed iteration algorithms to find the equilibrium point of the Stackelberg game, where both sides can achieve optimal utility. Extensive simulation results demonstrate the effect of our proposed schemes, and show that the profits of the E-miners are considerably increased compared with the T-miners that devote all computing power to block mining.
- 21 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 8, 134800-134816
Open AccessBlock Mining or Service Providing: A Profit Optimizing Game of the PoW-Based Miners
The Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus is widely used to maintain the security and consistency of the blockchain systems. In PoW, the miners have to consume tremendous computing resources to compete for generating a valid block and win the reward. However, in recent years, the revenue of the miners face a large oscillation, due to economic policy changes, virtual currency price fluctuations, etc. Some miners have to stop mining and exit the market, leaving large number of computing resources vacant. Whereas, vast computing resources are required outside the blockchain ecosystem, such as cloud/edge computing and artificial intelligence. In this paper, the traditional miners (T-miner) which concentrate on block mining are promoted to the evolutionary miners (E-miner) with additional ability to provide computing services. We propose a scheme for the E-miners to connect the blockchain ecosystem with external computation requirements, releasing the redundant computing power of the E-miners to provide computing services for extra profits. A two-stage Stackelberg game is presented to model the interaction between the computing service pricing and each E-miner’s computing power allocation. The details of the game are separately elaborated for both flexible and specified external computing requirements, in pure environment with only E-miners and hybrid environment with both E-miners and T-miners, respectively. We utilize two distributed iteration algorithms to find the equilibrium point of the Stackelberg game, where both sides can achieve optimal utility. Extensive simulation results demonstrate the effect of our proposed schemes, and show that the profits of the E-miners are considerably increased compared with the T-miners that devote all computing power to block mining.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Network
- Vol. 34 (4) , 84-90
Protecting Machine Learning Integrity in Distributed Big Data Networking
A distributed big data network is the integration of big data and the underlying distributed network. This emerging paradigm brings the potential to divide big data processing tasks into smaller ones so that they can be intelligently processed in parallel with machine learning based on distributed network resources. Such a pattern requires strict system integrity, especially machine learning integrity against data tampering or network control by malicious nodes. In this article, we propose a secure architecture consisting of one HaSi scheme and two data tampering detection schemes for protecting the machine learning integrity in distributed big data networking. Illustrative results demonstrate the effect of our proposed schemes, and show that they can ensure the learning accuracy even when 30-40 percent of processing nodes are maliciously controlled. When the figure raises to 40-50 percent, the accuracy of our proposed schemes begins to fall visibly, but still outperforms the scenario without protection by up to 70-80 percent.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Network
- Vol. 34 (4) , 84-90
Protecting Machine Learning Integrity in Distributed Big Data Networking
A distributed big data network is the integration of big data and the underlying distributed network. This emerging paradigm brings the potential to divide big data processing tasks into smaller ones so that they can be intelligently processed in parallel with machine learning based on distributed network resources. Such a pattern requires strict system integrity, especially machine learning integrity against data tampering or network control by malicious nodes. In this article, we propose a secure architecture consisting of one HaSi scheme and two data tampering detection schemes for protecting the machine learning integrity in distributed big data networking. Illustrative results demonstrate the effect of our proposed schemes, and show that they can ensure the learning accuracy even when 30-40 percent of processing nodes are maliciously controlled. When the figure raises to 40-50 percent, the accuracy of our proposed schemes begins to fall visibly, but still outperforms the scenario without protection by up to 70-80 percent.