Anne Beyer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Anne Beyer has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ronald A. Dye
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, Illinois 60208
2 shared publications- Daniel J. Taylor
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
1 shared publication Ilan Guttman
New York University
1 shared publication- Iván Marinovic
Stanford University
1 shared publication - Jeremy Bertomeu
City University of New York
1 shared publication Junyoung Jeong
Stanford University, United States of America
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 78 (2-3)
The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 78 (2-3)
The unicorn quest: Deriving empirical predictions from theory
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (7) , 4283-4311
On the Disclosure of Half-Truths and the Duty to Update
We develop a model of a manager’s equilibrium voluntary disclosure policy to study how that policy changes depending on whether the manager is prohibited from disclosing, or allowed to disclose, a half-truth; we also examine how the disclosure policy changes depending on whether the manager has a duty to update past disclosures. Among our results, we show that if a manager is prohibited from issuing half-truths, the manager discloses a wider array of information than if the manager is allowed to issue half-truths, and investors view the absence of disclosure more skeptically; we also show that imposing a duty to update on the manager does not affect the manager’s initial disclosures, but it results in the manager disclosing uniformly more information over time. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (7) , 4283-4311
On the Disclosure of Half-Truths and the Duty to Update
We develop a model of a manager’s equilibrium voluntary disclosure policy to study how that policy changes depending on whether the manager is prohibited from disclosing, or allowed to disclose, a half-truth; we also examine how the disclosure policy changes depending on whether the manager has a duty to update past disclosures. Among our results, we show that if a manager is prohibited from issuing half-truths, the manager discloses a wider array of information than if the manager is allowed to issue half-truths, and investors view the absence of disclosure more skeptically; we also show that imposing a duty to update on the manager does not affect the manager’s initial disclosures, but it results in the manager disclosing uniformly more information over time. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 72 (1)
Learning about risk-factor exposures from earnings: Implications for asset pricing and manipulation
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 72 (1)
Learning about risk-factor exposures from earnings: Implications for asset pricing and manipulation
- 7 August 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (4) , 111-130
Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span “all equity” contracts, “all debt” contracts, and “all enterprise value” contracts. We show: (1) under both “all equity” and “all debt” contracts, increased debt always leads to reduced voluntary disclosure; (2) under “all enterprise value” contracts, increased debt has no effect on voluntary disclosure; (3) for all contracts that place positive weight on both equity and enterprise values, more debt leads to less (respectively, more) disclosure if the initial debt level is low (respectively, high); (4) increasing the weight on equity prices always induces less disclosure, so: (5) “all equity” contracts minimize disclosures, and “all debt” contracts maximize disclosures.
- 7 August 2020
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 96 (4) , 111-130
Debt and Voluntary Disclosure
This paper studies equilibrium voluntary disclosures for a company financed with both debt and equity, where the firm's manager is compensated based on a linear combination of the market prices of the firm's equity and enterprise values (i.e., the sum of its values of equity and debt). Such compensation policies span “all equity” contracts, “all debt” contracts, and “all enterprise value” contracts. We show: (1) under both “all equity” and “all debt” contracts, increased debt always leads to reduced voluntary disclosure; (2) under “all enterprise value” contracts, increased debt has no effect on voluntary disclosure; (3) for all contracts that place positive weight on both equity and enterprise values, more debt leads to less (respectively, more) disclosure if the initial debt level is low (respectively, high); (4) increasing the weight on equity prices always induces less disclosure, so: (5) “all equity” contracts minimize disclosures, and “all debt” contracts maximize disclosures.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (4) , 77-101
Earnings Management and Earnings Quality: Theory and Evidence
We study a model of earnings management and provide predictions about the time-series properties of earnings quality and reporting bias. We estimate the model to empirically separate two components of investor uncertainty: fundamental economic uncertainty, and information asymmetry between the manager and investors due to reporting noise. We find that (1) the null hypothesis of zero reporting bias is rejected; (2) the ratio of the variance of the noise introduced by the reporting process to the variance of earnings shocks is, on average, 45 percent; (3) the reporting noise plays a significantly less prominent role in valuation, due to the persistence of shocks to economic earnings; (4) the magnitude of investors' uncertainty created by reporting noise about firms' assets in place and about future earnings is similar; and (5) ignoring the possibility of reporting distortions would bias the estimates of variance and persistence of economic earnings.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 94 (4) , 77-101
Earnings Management and Earnings Quality: Theory and Evidence
We study a model of earnings management and provide predictions about the time-series properties of earnings quality and reporting bias. We estimate the model to empirically separate two components of investor uncertainty: fundamental economic uncertainty, and information asymmetry between the manager and investors due to reporting noise. We find that (1) the null hypothesis of zero reporting bias is rejected; (2) the ratio of the variance of the noise introduced by the reporting process to the variance of earnings shocks is, on average, 45 percent; (3) the reporting noise plays a significantly less prominent role in valuation, due to the persistence of shocks to economic earnings; (4) the magnitude of investors' uncertainty created by reporting noise about firms' assets in place and about future earnings is similar; and (5) ignoring the possibility of reporting distortions would bias the estimates of variance and persistence of economic earnings.
- 17 August 2016
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foundations and Trends® in Accounting
- Vol. 10 (2-4) , 262-313
From Casual to Causal Inference in Accounting Research: The Need for Theoretical Foundations
On December 5th and 6th 2014, the Stanford Graduate School of Business hosted the Causality in the Social Sciences Conference. The conference brought together several distinguished speakers from philosophy, economics, finance, accounting and marketing with the bold mission of debating scientific methods that support causal inferences. We highlight key themes from the conference as relevant for accounting researchers. First, we emphasize the role of formal economic theory in informing empirical research that seeks to draw causal inferences, and offer a skeptical perspective on attempts to draw causal inferences in the absence of welldefined constructs and assumptions. Next, we highlight some of the conceptual limitations of quasi-natural experimental methods that were discussed at the conference, and discuss the role of structural estimation. Finally, we illustrate many of the points from the conference by estimating a novel, theoretically grounded measure of disclosure costs.
- 17 August 2016
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Foundations and Trends® in Accounting
- Vol. 10 (2-4) , 262-313
From Casual to Causal Inference in Accounting Research: The Need for Theoretical Foundations
On December 5th and 6th 2014, the Stanford Graduate School of Business hosted the Causality in the Social Sciences Conference. The conference brought together several distinguished speakers from philosophy, economics, finance, accounting and marketing with the bold mission of debating scientific methods that support causal inferences. We highlight key themes from the conference as relevant for accounting researchers. First, we emphasize the role of formal economic theory in informing empirical research that seeks to draw causal inferences, and offer a skeptical perspective on attempts to draw causal inferences in the absence of welldefined constructs and assumptions. Next, we highlight some of the conceptual limitations of quasi-natural experimental methods that were discussed at the conference, and discuss the role of structural estimation. Finally, we illustrate many of the points from the conference by estimating a novel, theoretically grounded measure of disclosure costs.
- 22 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 17 (4) , 877-912
Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts
- 22 January 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 17 (4) , 877-912
Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts