Guowei Liu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Guowei Liu has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guowei Zhu
Business School, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan, China
1 shared publication - Hui Cao
School of Economics and Management Hebei University of Technology Tianjin 300401 China
1 shared publication - Jianxiong Zhang
Tianjin University
1 shared publication - Rui Dai
Glorious Sun School of Business and Management, Donghua University, Shanghai 200051, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 28 (2) , 839-871
Competitive pricing and innovation investment strategies of green products considering firms' farsightedness and myopia
With the deterioration of ecological environment and the improvement of consumer environmental awareness, a number of firms are actively engaging in product innovation to enhance product greenness. In this paper, we develop a differential game involving two competing firms, each of which produces and sells one green product to end consumers. The two firms carry out innovation investments to improve customers' perceived product greenness and also determine their own retail prices. Each firm's demand is linearly dependent on its own retail price and innovation investment, the rival's retail price and innovation investment, and the customer perceived product greenness. The objective of our study is to examine the impacts of the competing firms' farsighted and myopic behaviors regarding the consumer perceived product greenness on their pricing and innovation investment strategies and profits. We find the following interesting results. First, when one firm is farsighted and the other is myopic, the latter obtains more profits than the former if one firm's innovation investment has a relatively small direct effect on the other's demand, that is, there is a free‐riding for the myopic firm. Second, when the intensity of competition regarding the two firms' innovation investments is not strong, competing with a farsighted rival can make a firm better off. Third, the scenario that the two firms adopt farsighted strategies can achieve an equilibrium, whereas acting myopic strategies can bring more profits for both of them under some conditions, which leads to a prisoner's dilemma. These results still hold under separable multiplicative demand between retail prices and innovation investments.
- 21 August 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Transactions in Operational Research
- Vol. 28 (2) , 839-871
Competitive pricing and innovation investment strategies of green products considering firms' farsightedness and myopia
With the deterioration of ecological environment and the improvement of consumer environmental awareness, a number of firms are actively engaging in product innovation to enhance product greenness. In this paper, we develop a differential game involving two competing firms, each of which produces and sells one green product to end consumers. The two firms carry out innovation investments to improve customers' perceived product greenness and also determine their own retail prices. Each firm's demand is linearly dependent on its own retail price and innovation investment, the rival's retail price and innovation investment, and the customer perceived product greenness. The objective of our study is to examine the impacts of the competing firms' farsighted and myopic behaviors regarding the consumer perceived product greenness on their pricing and innovation investment strategies and profits. We find the following interesting results. First, when one firm is farsighted and the other is myopic, the latter obtains more profits than the former if one firm's innovation investment has a relatively small direct effect on the other's demand, that is, there is a free‐riding for the myopic firm. Second, when the intensity of competition regarding the two firms' innovation investments is not strong, competing with a farsighted rival can make a firm better off. Third, the scenario that the two firms adopt farsighted strategies can achieve an equilibrium, whereas acting myopic strategies can bring more profits for both of them under some conditions, which leads to a prisoner's dilemma. These results still hold under separable multiplicative demand between retail prices and innovation investments.
- Open Access
- 15 February 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (4) , 1443
Carbon Tariff vs. Emission Cap of North–South Countries in Response to Manufacturer’s Production
Economy prosperity has concurrently caused severe emission damages worldwide, which calls for strong abatement efforts from both nations and manufacturers. In this paper, we establish a two-stage game to investigate the policy selections of a foreign developed country (North) and a domestic developing country (South), and the response of a Southern manufacturer. The welfare-maximizing governments in the two countries participate in an announcement game of environmental policies where the South decides on whether or not to enforce an emission cap and the North chooses either a carbon tariff or no policy, after which the profit-seeking manufacturer reacts to make production strategies and distribute differentiated products to the two countries. Our analysis shows that under an emission cap, the manufacturer shrinks product quantities in both markets, cuts emissions, and suffers profit losses. A carbon tariff has similar impacts on the manufacturer except for unaffected domestic sales. In addition, equilibrium policy selections for the two governments depend on the degree of emission damage in the South: A moderate level of damage generates an equilibrium in the scenario of the unilateral tariff policy where the Northern welfare peaks and the Southern well-being is not the worst; a severe damage leads to a prisoner’s dilemma, since the two governments would arrive at an equilibrium in the bilateral-policy scenario, but it is dominated by a no-policy scheme. What is more, we find that a negotiation between the two governments is able to help them out of the dilemma and achieve a Pareto-improving outcome.
- 15 February 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (4) , 1443
Open AccessCarbon Tariff vs. Emission Cap of North–South Countries in Response to Manufacturer’s Production
Economy prosperity has concurrently caused severe emission damages worldwide, which calls for strong abatement efforts from both nations and manufacturers. In this paper, we establish a two-stage game to investigate the policy selections of a foreign developed country (North) and a domestic developing country (South), and the response of a Southern manufacturer. The welfare-maximizing governments in the two countries participate in an announcement game of environmental policies where the South decides on whether or not to enforce an emission cap and the North chooses either a carbon tariff or no policy, after which the profit-seeking manufacturer reacts to make production strategies and distribute differentiated products to the two countries. Our analysis shows that under an emission cap, the manufacturer shrinks product quantities in both markets, cuts emissions, and suffers profit losses. A carbon tariff has similar impacts on the manufacturer except for unaffected domestic sales. In addition, equilibrium policy selections for the two governments depend on the degree of emission damage in the South: A moderate level of damage generates an equilibrium in the scenario of the unilateral tariff policy where the Northern welfare peaks and the Southern well-being is not the worst; a severe damage leads to a prisoner’s dilemma, since the two governments would arrive at an equilibrium in the bilateral-policy scenario, but it is dominated by a no-policy scheme. What is more, we find that a negotiation between the two governments is able to help them out of the dilemma and achieve a Pareto-improving outcome.