Tal Pavel

This research examines the role of major technology corporations in shaping cyber resilience during significant cyber incidents in the Balkans in 2022. This study conducts a comparative analysis of eight Balkan nations (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia), focusing on the forms and drivers of Big Tech engagement. The findings identify three patterns: comprehensive operational involvement; limited and delayed engagement; and minimal or no involvement. Interacting factors, including geopolitical alignment, attribution clarity, incident visibility, and institutional preparedness, shape these differences. The research develops a multi-level explanatory framework and conceptualises Big Tech as quasi-sovereign actors whose engagement is selective and context-dependent, with implications for cyber resilience and digital sovereignty in smaller states.

This article examines cybersecurity risks to the Slovenian electrical grid, a critical infrastructure asset, amid escalating global threats from state-sponsored actors, geopolitical tensions, and technological vulnerabilities, including ICT interdependencies, legacy systems, IoT devices, and supply chain weaknesses. Adopting an interdisciplinary lens from law, public policy, and cybersecurity, it addresses three research questions: identifying cyber threats, evaluating Slovenia's policy framework and legal regime, and proposing enhancements to resilience. Through normative-dogmatic, dialectical methods and a Xanthakian qualitative assessment of legislative quality, focusing on effectiveness, clarity, precision, and unambiguity, it uncovers gaps such as inconsistent strategic prioritisation, scattered provisions, and reactive approaches. Recommendations include formalising stakeholder cooperation, developing grid-specific strategies, mandating annual cyber stress tests, integrating AI-driven modelling, and refining drafting to ensure unified terminology. The study highlights Slovenia's need for proactive, EU-harmonised measures to bolster energy security amid an evolving cyber landscape.

This study examines Russian cyber activities targeting European political elections, focusing on how Russia uses hacking, disinformation, and influence operations to undermine democratic institutions and sway public opinion. It highlights geographic hotspots in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans within the broader EU context. The research addresses key questions about the specific cyber tactics Russia employs and the legal and policy measures Europe has adopted to protect electoral integrity. The study maps Russian cyber threat actors and their strategies, assessing their operational objectives. It also evaluates existing national and EU-level legal frameworks and response mechanisms against foreign electoral interference. Methodologically, the study draws from a diverse range of reliable sources, including academic research, cybersecurity reports, journalism, and official publications, to provide a balanced and comprehensive analysis. Findings reveal that Russian cyber operations continuously and systematically target European elections using sophisticated methods. Current EU responses are fragmented, lack unified standards and enforcement, and create gaps in electoral security. The study argues for a holistic, multi-level European approach, emphasising the need for unified frameworks, permanent coordination, revised sanctions, and proportionate security measures. Ultimately, the research calls for an integrated European defence grounded in the rule of law, highlighting legally binding solidarity and institutional coherence among member states to strengthen democratic resilience.

Objective – To examine Serbia's deployment of Chinese-supplied surveillance technologies and assess the implications for democracy, privacy, and civil liberties in the context of Serbia's deteriorating freedom indices and EU accession aspirations. Goal – To analyse the technological cooperation between China and Serbia in surveillance infrastructure, evaluate the transparency and accountability of Serbian institutions in implementing these systems, review the legal framework governing digital surveillance, and assess local and international responses to this deployment. Methodology – This study employs a qualitative research approach based on document analysis from diverse, highly reliable sources. The methodology prioritises relevance, reliability, and diversity, integrating academic publications, reports from established human rights organisations, investigative journalism, and official government documents. The 41 sources were selected to ensure comprehensive coverage of technological, legal, political, and social dimensions of surveillance deployment in Serbia. Findings – The research reveals that Serbia has significantly expanded its state surveillance capabilities through a strategic partnership with China, particularly with Huawei, deploying thousands of cameras equipped with facial and license plate recognition across major cities. The findings demonstrate a troubling lack of transparency and accountability, with agreements classified as confidential and explicit references to Chinese involvement deliberately obscured. Serbia's legal framework for digital surveillance remains underdeveloped, lacking adequate oversight mechanisms and privacy protections. Locally, concerns persist about the political misuse of surveillance for control rather than public safety. Internationally, the EU has expressed alarm over Chinese technological penetration and its implications for Serbia's EU accession goals.

Scholarly book by Dr Tal Pavel comprehensively explores the Internet’s multifaceted role in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, situating technological developments within the broader historical, political, and cultural context. It demonstrates how the rapid diffusion of digital technologies at the turn of the 21ˢᵗ century introduced new opportunities for education, commerce, and civic participation, while simultaneously posing significant challenges to traditional governance structures.The Internet in MENA was initially perceived as a symbol of openness and progress, offering unprecedented access to information, global connectivity, and platforms for dialogue that transcended borders. Civil society, human rights advocates, and activists quickly adopted digital tools to amplify marginalised voices, challenge entrenched power relations, and mobilise for social change. In doing so, the Internet emerged as a technological innovation and a transformative medium, reshaping public discourse across the region.Structural inequalities, including uneven infrastructure development and limited digital literacy, created significant disparities in access. The scarcity of Arabic-language content further constrained the Internet’s inclusive potential. Most critically, state authorities, initially cautious observers, came to view the internet as both a vehicle for modernisation and a threat to political stability. Governments responded by implementing censorship, surveillance, and restrictive measures designed to curtail dissent, regulate information flows, and safeguard regime authority.This persistent tension between openness and control defines the digital experience in MENA. On the one hand, the Internet empowered individuals and civil society to engage in new forms of participation; on the other hand, it became subject to sophisticated mechanisms of restriction and regulation. International and local countermeasures, ranging from technological solutions to advocacy for digital rights, sought to resist these pressures and preserve the internet as a space for freedom of expression and civic engagement.The book argues that the internet in MENA should not be understood solely in terms of infrastructure or technology but as a profoundly political and social process. Tracing the historical trajectory of digitalisation in the region highlights how technological adoption is inseparable from governance, cultural identity, and social transformation issues. Ultimately, the study underscores that the future of the Internet in MENA will continue to be shaped by the unresolved balance between state control and societal aspirations for openness, innovation, and freedom.

Objective – The paper analyses the Iranian cyber-attacks in Albania, a small but strategically important nation in the Balkans. It examines the cyber incidents attributed to Iranian actors, highlighting the tactics employed, targeted sectors, and the objectives behind these operations. As geopolitical tensions between Iran and Albania have escalated in recent years, mainly due to Albania's support for an Iranian dissident group, Tehran has increasingly resorted to cyber warfare as a tool of influence and retaliation. By assessing the effectiveness of these cyber campaigns and their implications for Albania's national security, this study contributes to the broader understanding of how state-sponsored cyber activities are being used as foreign policy instruments. Goal – Through this analysis, the study aims to shed light on the complex dynamics of state-sponsored cyber aggression and its impact on national and regional security. It also examines cyber-attacks as a tool by foreign states, Iran in this case, to achieve political goals. In addition, the study emphasises the possibility of future Iranian cyber-attacks in other Balkan states to promote its strategy and that of its allies. Methodology – This study prioritised selecting diverse and reliable sources to ensure a comprehensive analysis. Sources were chosen based on their relevance to the research topic, reliability, and diversity, incorporating academic articles, analyses from cyber research companies, journalistic reports, and official publications. This approach ensured a balanced and trustworthy foundation for the research.

Povzetek: Palestinska militantna skupina Hamas je 7. oktobra 2023 začela obsežno skupno ofenzivo proti Izraelu. Hkrati s kinetičnimi napadi so različni povzročitelji kibernetskih groženj, ki jih pripisujejo Hamasu, Hezbolahu, Iranu in Rusiji, sprožili kibernetske napade na izraelske informacijske sisteme v komercialnem, industrijskem in vladnem sektorju. Ta prispevek analizira te kibernetske napade in izraelske protiukrepe na področju kibernetske varnosti. Čeprav je Izrael sicer vzdržal napad kibernetskega napadalca »digitalni 7. oktober«, ključne ugotovitve kažejo na to, da lahko tovrstni napadi znatno vplivajo na različne institucije in jim povzročijo škodo ter da je treba tako v Izraelu kot po svetu temeljito spremeniti opredelitev kibernetske obrambe in odpornosti, zlasti kar zadeva civilno družbo in infrastrukturo.

This study examines the cybersecurity insurance market in the United States (U.S.) in order to reveal if an “invisible hole” of services and information exists in this market. This is performed by mapping the cybersecurity insurance services, offered by insurance companies, to cope with cybersecurity risks, and finding in which way these services are exposed, visible and comprehensive, in the insurance companies' websites. The research questions examined the extent cybersecurity insurance services offered by the main U.S. insurance companies; the visibility of such services on their websites; and the types of services offered. The sample included 44 insurance companies based upon nine lists of the top U.S. insurance companies. The findings present that most companies (68%) offer cybersecurity insurance services, while only a few (26.92%) expose such information in a visible way. Moreover, on the one hand, the insurance companies use general terms for services, which may be blur and ambiguous, while on the other hand, there is a widespread of specific services, most of them (81%) provided only by few companies. These findings may derive due to insufficient understanding of cybersecurity insurance clients' needs and may reflect the lack of maturity of the cybersecurity insurance market, as matured marketplaces are mostly more standardized. This study demonstrates that there is a long way to advance until the insurance market for cybersecurity risks will be mature, customers (businesses and organizations) will understand the needs for such insurance, and insurance companies will develop and offer relevant insurance services.

Small and Medium Businesses (SMB) use Internet and computer-based tools in their daily processes, sometimes without being aware to the cyber threats, or without knowing how to be prepared in case of a cyber-attack, although they are a major target for cyber-attacks. Specific information about cybersecurity needed by SMBs, in order to cope with cyber threats, is not always available or easily accessible. In this study, a vast search of different types of information about SMBs’ cybersecurity was performed, in order to find whether a hole of accessible information exists in this area. This exploratory research covered general mass communication media channels, technological and professional cybersecurity websites, and academic journals, and found that indeed very few studies, articles and news items were published in this matter. Leveraging knowledge and awareness, diminishing the shame for reporting cyber-attacks, and increasing mass communication media interest and public attention, may be activities to cover this “invisible hole”.