RBRobert M. Bowen

Robert M. Bowen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Robert M. Bowen has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • CEO–CFO Compatibility and Audit Risk

    by Robert M. Bowen, S. Jane Jollineau, Sarah C. Lyon, Shavin Malhotra, Pengcheng Zhu

    This study examines the influence of CEO–CFO compatibility (proxied by the similarity of their personalities) on audit risk (proxied by audit fees). Relying on similarity‐attraction theory, we posit that alignment between the CEO's and CFO's personalities − specifically their ‘Big Five’ traits − enhances internal communication, information sharing and decision‐making processes within the organization. This alignment, in turn, reduces audit risk associated with the firm's financial reporting. We test our theory using firm fixed effects and find that greater CEO–CFO personality similarity is associated with reduced audit fees. Further, we find that the tenure of the CEO–CFO relationship partially explains the relation between their personality similarity and audit fees. Finally, we find that the effect of CEO–CFO personality similarity on audit fees is stronger when corporate governance allows greater managerial autonomy, that is, CEO–CFO compatibility is more important for reducing audit risk when corporate governance is weak. Our results are robust after controlling for many other characteristics of the CEO and CFO and potential endogeneity related to CEO turnover.


  • Alaska Gold Company: Using Financial Analysis to Uncover a Firm’s Underlying Economics

    by Robert M. Bowen, S. Jane Jollineau, Glenn Pfeiffer

    Students reasonably assume that financial reporting provides useful insights into financial performance. Alaska Gold is an instructional case that is based on a disguised real-world company, where reported GAAP-based financial statements obfuscate the firm’s underlying economics. The Company mined gold for its first two years of operations but reported zero gold revenue for each of these years because it did not sell any. In the third year, the Company sold all of the gold mined to date—and reported gold revenue and related cost of gold sold. Students use publicly available data to prepare an alternative analysis that unveils the economics of what really happened to Alaska Gold in each of the three years 2017–2019. The situation helps students appreciate that accounting rules, business models, managerial discretion, and economic context are important to understanding and evaluating financial performance.

  • Open Access

    CEO extraversion and the cost of equity capital

    by Biljana Adebambo, Robert M. Bowen, Shavin Malhotra, Pengcheng Zhu

    We examine whether CEO extraversion, an important personality trait associated with leadership, is associated with firms' expected cost of equity capital. We measure CEO extraversion using CEOs' speech patterns during the unscripted portion of conference calls. After controlling for multiple CEO and firm‐specific variables, we find a strong positive incremental association between CEO extraversion and firms' expected cost of capital. Moreover, cost of equity increases when a more extraverted CEO replaces a less extraverted CEO. In addition, we find that firms with relatively extraverted CEOs take more risk and exhibit lower credit ratings, which is associated with higher cost of equity capital. These results are statistically and economically meaningful and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality, endogenous matching, look‐ahead bias, or bias in analysts' earnings forecast.


  • Does Corporate Governance Quality Influence Insider Trading around Private Meetings between Managers and Investors?

    by Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang, Pengcheng Zhu

    SYNOPSIS: We examine the effectiveness of corporate governance in influencing insider trading around private in-house meetings (hereafter “private meetings”) between management and investors in China. Consistent with better corporate governance curbing (1) disclosure of nonpublic price-sensitive information and (2) insider trading, we find that better governance quality is associated with reduced insider trading frequency, value, and profitability around private meetings. Firms with better corporate governance appear to exchange less price-sensitive information with outsider investors around private meetings, which limits the opportunity to make profitable insider trades. Our results are economically significant and robust using instrumental variable and propensity score matching approaches to address endogeneity. We argue that improving corporate governance quality may be a partial substitute for costly government regulation designed to curb insider trading around private meetings. JEL Classifications: G34; G14; G18.


  • Open Access

    Blockholder mutual fund participation in private in‐house meetings

    by Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang, Pengcheng Zhu

    The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China is unique worldwide in requiring disclosure of the timing, participants, and selected content of private in‐house meetings between firm managers and outsider investors. We investigate whether these private meetings benefit hosting firms and their major outside institutional investors—blockholder mutual funds (i.e., funds with ownership ≥5%). Using a large data set of SZSE firms, we find that blockholder mutual funds have more access to private in‐house meetings, and top management is more likely to be present, especially when a meeting is associated with negative news. Furthermore, when blockholder mutual funds attend negative‐news meetings with top management, they are less likely to sell shares, their investment relationship with the hosting firm lasts longer, and hosting firms experience lower postmeeting stock return volatility. These findings suggest that private in‐house meetings are an informative disclosure channel that improves social bonding between top management and blockholder mutual funds in ways that benefit hosting firms.


  • A Practical Guide to Using Path Analysis: Mediation and Moderation in Accounting Research

    by S. Jane Jollineau, Robert M. Bowen

    We use plain English, figures, and simple math to explain how to use path analysis to test for mediation and moderation. Many theories in accounting research can be conceptualized as mediated, moderated, or moderated mediation models to investigate both simple and complex hypothesized relationships. Analyses using these models capture the dependent nature of an entire set of relationships rather than attempting to make piecemeal inferences from a series of individual regressions that may not be as revealing and may even yield misleading inferences. We introduce tools that help build theory, reduce the number of inferential tests that are relied on, and use bootstrapping for inferential tests of moderated mediation that do not rely on distributional assumptions. We provide two examples from published research to illustrate and apply these concepts. Tools for analysis include PROCESS (Hayes 2020) and structural equation modeling (SEM). JEL Classifications: C12; C18; C87; C90; M41; M42; M49.


  • Open Access

    Does Stricter Disclosure Regulation of Private Meetings Improve the Information Environment?

    by Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang, Pengcheng Zhu

    The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China is unique worldwide in requiring disclosure of the existence and content of private meetings between firm managers and outside investors. We investigate whether the SZSE’s increased disclosure requirements in July 2012 led to tangible benefits for market participants. We use a difference-in-differences design (where possible) and a dataset that includes Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) firms as a control group. Despite allegedly ‘improved’ disclosures, we find the SZSE’s information environment experienced increased stock price volatility and reduced information efficiency relative to pre-July 2012 and relative to SHSE firms. After July 2012, private meetings became quasi-public and disclosures became more positive and less informative. Mutual fund participation in private meetings increased – especially for funds with little or no ownership in the host firm. Increased participation by these less informed institutional investors is one explanation for observed higher stock volatility and lower information efficiency around these meetings.


  • The Information Game

    by Robert M. Bowen, S. Jane Jollineau, Glenn M. Pfeiffer

    Students want to know why accounting and auditing are important. The Information Game is a classroom resource that introduces the role of accounting, the value of information, the value of auditing, and the importance of auditor independence in an easy-to-use, fun exercise for the first day of class. Students experience the value of (accounting) information and auditing during the game. The Teaching Notes that accompany this case provide (1) additional commentary on the game, (2) post-game questions, (3) a suggested script, and (4) a summary of concepts, analogies, and takeaways that help students appreciate the importance of accounting and auditing in the global market economy. An anonymous survey of those who have used the Information Game suggests that instructors find the game highly effective and generally easy to use. Instructors tend to occasionally refer back to the game's concepts and takeaways during the remainder of their course.


  • Open Access

    Mutual Fund Participation in Private In-house Meetings: Evidence from Firms Listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange

    by Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Songlian Tang, PengCheng Zhu

    The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China is unique worldwide in requiring disclosure of the timing, participants and selected content of private in-house meetings between firm managers and outside investors. We investigate whether these private meetings benefit hosting-firms and their major outside institutional investors, mutual funds. Using a large hand-collected dataset of SZSE firms, we find that mutual funds with relatively large ownership in the hosting firm (i) have more access to private in-house meetings, particularly those meetings that reveal negative information, (ii) interact more often with top management, (iii) attend more exclusive meetings, and (iv) have longer meetings with hosting firms. When mutual funds with relatively large ownership attend negative news meetings, firms tend to experience lower post-meeting stock return volatility. This finding suggests that allowing managers and select institutional investors to discuss negative developments in a private setting – possibly to provide elaboration and manage the news – helps minimize stock sell-offs and mitigate stock return volatility.


  • Open Access

    Are Financially Constrained Firms More Prone to Financial Restatements?

    by Robert M. Bowen, Shantanu Dutta, Pengcheng Zhu

    We examine the association between firms’ financial constraints and potentially value- destroying financial restatements. How financial constraints affect managerial behavior has been labeled as a core issue in accounting and finance. Ex-ante, the nature of the relation between financial constraints and financial restatements is unclear and remains unexplored in the literature. We find that financially constrained firms are more prone to restate their financial statements. We examine two explanations for this relation. First, consistent with managerial opportunism, we find that among financially constrained firms, weaker firm performance, greater financial leverage, and greater informational complexity are associated with higher discretionary accruals and more restatements. Second, consistent with managerial signalling, we find that although firms with greater investment opportunities and financing needs have higher discretionary accruals, they are not associated with more restatements. These firms signal positive prospects through earnings management while avoiding GAAP violations that could trigger restatements. Finally, we find that a financial constraint measure based on textual analysis outperforms traditional metrics used in most prior research.