Yixin Tao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yixin Tao has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Richard Cole
Courant Institute, New York University, NY, USA
4 shared publications - Laszlo A. Vegh
Hertz Chair for Algorithms and Optimization, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
3 shared publications - Yun Kuen Cheung
University of London
3 shared publications - Christoph Hertrich
University of Technology Nuremberg, Nuremberg, Germany
2 shared publications - Dagui Chen
Alibaba Group, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Fan Wu
Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5754-5765
Two-Stage Auctions with Bid Refinement for Online Advertising
- 8 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5754-5765
Open AccessTwo-Stage Auctions with Bid Refinement for Online Advertising
- Open Access
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 286-297
Fisher Meets Lindahl: A Unified Duality Framework for Market Equilibrium
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 286-297
Open AccessFisher Meets Lindahl: A Unified Duality Framework for Market Equilibrium
- Open Access
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 249-260
Pay for The Second-Best Service: A Game-Theoretic Approach against Dishonest LLM Providers
- 12 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 249-260
Open AccessPay for The Second-Best Service: A Game-Theoretic Approach against Dishonest LLM Providers
- Open Access
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 142-166
Approximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 142-166
Open AccessApproximating competitive equilibrium by Nash welfare
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 456-475
Mode Connectivity in Auction Design
Optimal auction design is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory. This problem is notoriously difficult already in very simple settings. Recent work in differentiable economics showed that neural networks can efficiently learn known optimal auction mechanisms and discover interesting new ones. In an attempt to theoretically justify their empirical success, we focus on one of the first such networks, RochetNet, and a generalized version for affine maximizer auctions. We prove that they satisfy mode connectivity; that is, locally optimal solutions are connected by a simple, piecewise linear path such that every solution on the path is almost as good as one of the two local optima. Mode connectivity has been recently investigated as an intriguing empirical and theoretically justifiable property of neural networks used for prediction problems. Our results give the first such analysis in the context of differentiable economics, where neural networks are used directly for solving nonconvex optimization problems. Funding: All three authors gratefully acknowledge support by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant ScaleOpt–757481 (all three authors); Grant ForEFront–615640 (C. Hertrich)]. Y. Tao is partially supported by the National Key R&D Program of China [Grant 2023YFA1009500].
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 51 (1) , 456-475
Mode Connectivity in Auction Design
Optimal auction design is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory. This problem is notoriously difficult already in very simple settings. Recent work in differentiable economics showed that neural networks can efficiently learn known optimal auction mechanisms and discover interesting new ones. In an attempt to theoretically justify their empirical success, we focus on one of the first such networks, RochetNet, and a generalized version for affine maximizer auctions. We prove that they satisfy mode connectivity; that is, locally optimal solutions are connected by a simple, piecewise linear path such that every solution on the path is almost as good as one of the two local optima. Mode connectivity has been recently investigated as an intriguing empirical and theoretically justifiable property of neural networks used for prediction problems. Our results give the first such analysis in the context of differentiable economics, where neural networks are used directly for solving nonconvex optimization problems. Funding: All three authors gratefully acknowledge support by the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant ScaleOpt–757481 (all three authors); Grant ForEFront–615640 (C. Hertrich)]. Y. Tao is partially supported by the National Key R&D Program of China [Grant 2023YFA1009500].
- Open Access
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 389
Proportional Response Dynamics in Gross Substitutes Markets
- 2 July 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 389
Open AccessProportional Response Dynamics in Gross Substitutes Markets
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 57-70
A First Order Method for Linear Programming Parameterized by Circuit Imbalance
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 57-70
A First Order Method for Linear Programming Parameterized by Circuit Imbalance
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Optimization
- Vol. 31 (1) , 448-460
Parallel Stochastic Asynchronous Coordinate Descent: Tight Bounds on the Possible Parallelism
Several works have shown linear speedup is achieved by an asynchronous parallel implementation of stochastic coordinate descent so long as there is not too much parallelism. More specifically, it i...
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM) in SIAM Journal on Optimization
- Vol. 31 (1) , 448-460
Parallel Stochastic Asynchronous Coordinate Descent: Tight Bounds on the Possible Parallelism
Several works have shown linear speedup is achieved by an asynchronous parallel implementation of stochastic coordinate descent so long as there is not too much parallelism. More specifically, it i...
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 190 (1-2) , 615-677
Fully asynchronous stochastic coordinate descent: a tight lower bound on the parallelism achieving linear speedup
- 7 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 190 (1-2) , 615-677
Fully asynchronous stochastic coordinate descent: a tight lower bound on the parallelism achieving linear speedup