MCMartine Cools

Martine Cools

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Martine Cools has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Enabling Employee Adaptability to Change: The Joint Effect of Compensation Contract and Process Accountability

    by Marte Abts, Martine Cools, Sabra Khajehnejad, Alexandra Van Den Abbeele

    Organizations increasingly operate in uncertain environments, requiring employees to revise task strategies to remain effective. We examine how pay for performance (PFP) influences adaptive performance following unanticipated change and argue that process accountability moderates this effect. Although PFP increases effort, it hinders adaptation by reinforcing persistence with an existing task strategy. Process accountability channels PFP-induced motivation into deeper strategic deliberation, enabling adaptation. We test our predictions in an experiment manipulating compensation (PFP versus flat wage) and process accountability (absent, reflection-only, and present), with participants in the reflection-only condition privately reflecting on their decision-making to isolate the social-evaluative component. Results show that PFP, relative to a flat wage, decreases adaptive performance when process accountability is absent, has no significant effect under reflection-only, and increases it when process accountability is present. Additional analyses suggest that strategic deliberation partially explains this effect. The findings underscore pairing PFP with process accountability to foster adaptation. Data Availability: Data are available upon request. JEL Classifications: D91; M21; M41; M52.

  • Open Access

    Asking How Versus Asking for: How Subjectivity in Performance Evaluation Motivates Advice Seeking

    by Elien Voermans, Martine Cools, Alexandra G. H. L. Van Den Abbeele

    This paper investigates how the design of the performance evaluation system (objective versus subjective) influences employees’ tendency to seek advice from their supervisor. Prior research indicates that impression management motives induced by subjectivity in performance evaluation can detain employees from seeking advice. We challenge this finding by recognizing the existence of autonomous and dependent types of advice seeking. In contrast to the literature, the results of our computer-based experiment show that subjectivity in performance evaluation does not discourage advice seeking. Further, we identify conditions under which subjective rather than objective performance evaluation fosters employees’ willingness to seek advice. Finally, our results show an equal tendency of employees to engage in autonomous and dependent types of advice seeking under both designs of the performance evaluation system.


  • Open Access

    The role of information accuracy and justification in bonus allocations

    by Tim Hermans, Martine Cools, Alexandra Van Den Abbeele


  • International Transfer Pricing: MNE Dependency on Knowledge of External Tax Consultants

    by Martine Cools, Jacob Christian Plesner Rossing

    This paper explores the dependency of multinational enterprises (MNEs) on the international transfer pricing (ITP) knowledge offered by external tax consultants. Based on interviews with 13 ITP/tax executives working for large MNEs in the U.K., we find that the dependency on consultants varies significantly across specific ITP tasks. This dependency is not rooted in a lack of in-house technical ITP knowledge. Rather, consultants offer important industry and process knowledge, often at the individual tax inspector level, that MNEs need to successfully implement their ITP policy and to handle negotiations with tax authorities. The recent OECD project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is found to have a limited effect on MNE dependency on consultants, except for the documentation task. We conclude that the profile of consultants as knowledge experts depends on the specific ITP task they undertake.


  • Characterizing supply chain visibility – a literature review

    by Sirirat Somapa, Martine Cools, Wout Dullaert

    Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to present a literature review that aims to provide insight into the characteristics and effectiveness of supply chain visibility (SCV), as well as to identify metrics that capture these aspects in business processes.Design/methodology/approach: A systematic review of the supply chain literature is conducted to identify the characteristics and the effectiveness of SCV. The synthesis of SCV effectiveness and its metrics are based on the process-oriented approach which relates the effectiveness of SCV to improved business performance.Findings: This study reveals that the characteristics of SCV can be captured in terms of the accessibility, quality, and usefulness of information. The benefits of SCV are found to extend beyond improvements to operational efficiency of business processes or to the strategic competencies of an organization.Practical implications: This study underlines that clear agreements between all players involved in the SC can help to solve problems caused by information completeness (type and amount of information), and unlock the full potential of SCV projects.Originality/value: By using a process-oriented approach, this review provides a comprehensive explanation of the functions of SCV, as well as its first-order effects, in terms of automational, informational, and transformational characteristics.


  • International transfer pricing in multinational enterprises

    by Christian Plesner Rossing, Martine Cools, Carsten Rohde


  • Management Control for Stimulating Different Types of Creativity: The Role of Budgets

    by Martine Cools, Kristof Stouthuysen, Alexandra Van Den Abbeele

    In this paper, we examine the role of budgets as a central instrument within the management control system (MCS) in a creative context. In particular we investigate whether creative firms characterized by different kinds of creativity use their budgets in a similar way. We hereby distinguish between expected creativity (for open, self-discovered problems) and responsive creativity (for closed, presented problems) (Unsworth 2001) and investigate the interactive versus diagnostic use of budgets (Simons 1990, 1991, 1995). Based on a comparative study involving four creative firms, we find that creative firms, being mainly characterized by expected creativity, use their budgets in a more interactive way. In creative firms in which responsive creativity is most important, the budgets are used in a rather diagnostic way. This study contributes to the management control literature by acknowledging that a diagnostic use of budgets does not per se stifle creativity. Instead, it is important to understand that the specific creative context might have implications for the way in which MCS instruments are used to sustain the creative process.


  • Status Differences and Knowledge Transfer: The Effect of Incentives

    by Katlijn Haesebrouck, Martine Cools, Alexandra Van Den Abbeele

    We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between group members with equal or different status who solve an interdependent task. In our experiment, group members receive group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job titles with corresponding role descriptions. Although all conditions require knowledge sharing to maximize payoffs, our results suggest that significantly more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across these incentive manipulations for equal-status groups. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that individual incentives can motivate knowledge sharing among equal-status groups, but cannot overcome the negative interactions that arise under status differences. Instead, group incentives are required to induce cooperative behavior that mitigates the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. We contribute to the literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the social context and that job titles can have unintended consequences.


  • To Shift or Not To Shift? Intertemporal Income Shifting as a Response to the Risk Capital Allowance Introduction in Belgium

    by Kathleen Andries, Martine Cools, Steve Van Uytbergen

    This study examines how firms shift profits from one period to another in response to the introduction of an allowance for corporate equity. We focus on the introduction of the risk capital allowance in Belgium by the law of 22 June 2005. We predict and find that firms with relatively low (but positive) earnings in 2006 have incentives to defer profits in 2005 and that this effect is stronger for firms with higher equity ratios. Conversely, we predict that firms that are highly profitable in 2006 and have large net operating loss carryforwards in 2005 have incentives to accelerate profits. We find that only subsets of firms react to the latter incentive, in particular firms with higher equity ratios. Our findings show that tax-related benefits motivate firms to engage in conforming tax avoidance and provide evidence of cross-sectional variations in their reaction to these incentives. These insights contribute to the literature outlining the costs and benefits of changes in tax regimes and documenting earnings management in response to tax incentives in a high book-tax-conform environment.


  • Open Access

    Status Differences and Knowledge Transfer: The Effect of Incentives

    by Katlijn Haesebrouck, Martine Cools, Alexandra G. H. L. Van Den Abbeele

    We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between group members with equal or different status who solve an interdependent task. In our experiment, group members receive group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job titles with corresponding role descriptions. Although all conditions require knowledge sharing to maximize payoffs, our results suggest that significantly more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across these incentive manipulations for equal-status groups. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that individual incentives can motivate knowledge sharing among equal-status groups, but cannot overcome the negative interactions that arise under status differences. Instead, group incentives are required to induce cooperative behavior that mitigates the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. We contribute to the literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the social context and that job titles can have unintended consequences.