Plamen Akaliyski

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to generate cultural insights, yet little is known about their cultural expertise and the extent to which their outputs replicate or correct for cultural stereotypes. This study compares country-level estimates of individualism–collectivism (I-C) derived from five different LLMs with a recently validated I-C index based on nationally representative surveys. The LLM-based estimates correlate highly with the survey-based index (up to r = 0.874) but also exhibit systematic deviation from the benchmark: Western societies are consistently overestimated on individualism, while Confucian East Asian societies are underestimated. Statistically, the type of benchmark-relative deviations suggests group-specific baseline distortions rather than random noise, with smaller and older models showing weaker alignment. Moreover, the deviations are systematically aligned with Hofstede’s original I-C rankings, suggesting that LLM-generated cultural representations may reflect information from legacy cultural frameworks alongside contemporary empirical patterns. These findings demonstrate both the potential and the risks of using LLMs as cultural interpreters. In consequential settings, LLM-generated cultural insights should be used responsibly—with calibration, human oversight, and awareness of potential biases. Used uncritically, they risk reinforcing outdated narratives that misdirect academic research and managerial decisions.

Public evaluation of those in power is fundamental to societal stability. However, how people judge powerholders depends on their positions within the socioeconomic hierarchy. Drawing on two large-scale cross-cultural studies encompassing 160 samples from 80 cultures, we examined whether socioeconomic status (SES) shapes how people appraise the motive of institutional powerholders. Though scepticism toward powerholders was widespread across the socioeconomic spectrum, higher-SES individuals consistently attributed lesser self-orientation and greater other-orientation to powerholders. In less corrupt societies, perceptions of powerholders were more favourable, and SES-based differences were more pronounced, indicating that the quality of national governance matters as well. In contrast, in highly corrupt national contexts, class-based distinctions largely disappeared. These findings suggest that viewing authorities as serving the common good may be both a privilege of one’s socioeconomic position and a privilege of living in a well-governed society. The results carry important implications for institutional legitimacy, social mobility, and the possible psychological foundations of populist movements.

Women's and men's equal participation in work, education, and politics rests upon widespread public support for gender equality. While notable increases in support for gender equality over the past decades have been celebrated, existing evidence is limited by a predominant focus on Western societies. Utilizing data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study covering 78 countries that represent >86% of the global population, we examine how population-level support for gender equality in the public sphere changed between 1995 and 2022, both globally and across different cultural and socioeconomic contexts. Our results indicate that, although public support for gender equality increased in most countries, it stagnated in the global population as a whole. Moreover, there has been a pronounced and increasing divergence across countries, particularly between Western and non-Western societies. We attribute part of the stagnation in global public support for gender equality to demographically induced compositional effects. Namely, we find that (i) changes in the national composition of the global population have constrained increases in global public support for gender equality; (ii) fertility is higher in countries where average support for gender equality is lower; and (iii) fertility is higher and occurs earlier among women with less egalitarian views. Given that parents typically transmit their gender-related views to their children, higher and earlier fertility among persons with less egalitarian views has likely constrained global growth in gender egalitarianism. We call for a closer examination of how demographic processes influence global trends in gender egalitarianism.

Individualism-collectivism (I-C), the most widely researched cultural dimension, is often equated with Hofstede's pioneering nation scores. Concerns are growing about these scores' validity, but subsequent research has not produced a widely accepted alternative. Here, we offer a refined theoretical conceptualization of I-C, we systematically reevaluate the validity of Hofstede's I-C scores, and we report the development and validation of a new I-C index, covering 102 countries/territories inhabited by an estimated 88% of the world's population. In Study 1, we document the inferior convergent and nomological validity of Hofstede's I-C index, compared to subsequent measures. Hofstede's scores substantially overestimate individualism in English-speaking countries and collectivism in East Asian societies, which we demonstrate can considerably bias research findings. In Study 2, we develop an authoritative, theory-driven I-C index, using nationally representative data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study, which shows excellent internal coherence, temporal stability, and strong evidence of convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity. Theorized facets of individualism-freedom (vs. conformity), tolerance of differences (vs. exclusion), and equality (vs. discrimination)-form a coherent and stable dimension at the cultural level of analysis. Individualism is higher in societies with better existential security (e.g., socioeconomic development, stable institutions) and is not associated with greater selfishness, anomie, or competitive beliefs and values. Relying on outdated indices may perpetuate cultural stereotypes and underpin flawed theorizing. Scholars should use theoretically appropriate and up-to-date measures of societal culture when seeking to understand global variation in human psychological functioning. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Prior research on the relationship between Information and Communication Technology (ICT) use and job satisfaction has shown inconsistencies. This warrants retesting the relationship with larger, more representative multinational samples, and considering potential moderating factors, such as national culture. Using data from two multinational surveys (28 countries/regions and 32 countries/regions, respectively), we examine the relationship between ICT use and job satisfaction in a cross-cultural context, focusing on the role of cultural egalitarianism in this relationship. Results from multilevel analyses show a positive association between ICT use and job satisfaction. This association was moderated by the level of cultural egalitarianism: in more egalitarian cultures, the link between ICT use and job satisfaction is weaker. We conjecture that this pattern is due to the inherent satisfaction provided by the egalitarian culture itself, thereby reducing the perceived contribution of ICT use to job satisfaction. These findings hold significant implications for organizations and policymakers, particularly in an increasingly globalized and digitized work environment. This study emphasizes the importance of considering local cultural contexts in ICT strategy implementation and of cultivating an egalitarian culture to enhance job satisfaction.

Individualism-Collectivism (I-C), a key concept in cross-cultural research and one of the most studied context variables in personality, social, and developmental psychology, is often treated as synonymous with Hofstede’s pioneering nation scores. Concerns are growing about these scores’ validity, but subsequent research has not produced a widely accepted alternative. In Study 1, we systematically evaluated Hofstede’s I-C index, revealing inferior convergent and nomological validity compared to subsequent measures. Specific biases in Hofstede’s scores overestimate the individualism of English-speaking countries and collectivism of East Asian societies, which may perpetuate cultural stereotypes and underpin flawed theorizing. We illustrate how applying Hofstede’s scores can bias research findings. In Study 2, we aimed to develop an authoritative, theory-driven I-C index, using nationally representative data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study, covering 102 countries/territories inhabited by an estimated 88% of the world’s population. Our index shows excellent internal coherence and temporal stability and outperforms Hofstede’s I-C in associations with a nomological network of 28 societal indicators theoretically linked to I-C. We argue for an overdue paradigm shift in cross-cultural research: scholars should rely on theoretically appropriate and up-to-date measures of societal culture when seeking to understand global variation in human psychological functioning.

We revisit a critical problem of cross-cultural research: the non-independence of nations arising from shared ancestry and joint cultural diffusion. Recent review highlighted that few published cross-cultural studies attempt to control for such non-independence, often doing so inefficiently. This may compromise causal claims derived from such analyses. We reassess the problem and caution against using a one-size-fits-all “remedy” for non-independence. Non-independence can involve three distinct issues—(1) confounding by (un)observable variables, (2) Galton’s problem (joint diffusion and shared ancestry) as a special case of confounding, and (3) non-independence as a nuisance—each requiring a careful assessment of the causal model and a specific treatment. Controlling for non-independence by default may result in one of five outcomes, including successful elimination of the bias, improving precision, doing nothing, harming precision, or introducing bias, which we demonstrate with simulations. Instead of rolling a five-sided dice, we encourage cross-cultural scholars to begin with a careful evaluation of their underlying theoretical assumptions and causal models. In essence, we contribute to the refinement of cross-cultural research methodology by advocating for a tailored approach to addressing non-independence that models the real-world processes under examination.

Post–Cold War Europe has become a scene of a grueling contestation over questions of morality, with key players being the EU and Russia. The legacy of the Cold War on the moral beliefs of European nations and their transformation over the last three decades requires an examination. We advance theory toward the potential role of development, institutions , and identity , associated with the Cold War division and continued differentiation at present. We use the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale fielded in the World Value Survey and the European Values Study (1981–2021) to analyze the variation in the long-term dynamics of two moral dimensions: (a) dishonest-illegal issues (DII) and (b) personal-sexual issues (PSI). An age-period-cohort analysis reveals that old EU-members, post-communist EU-members, and post-communist non-EU countries have experienced distinct evolutions in both moral domains. The identity approach was supported: old EU members have increased their leniency on PSI and decreased it on DII; new EU members followed the same trends but slower on PSI and faster on DII; non-EU nations experienced no change on either issue. These trends are only partly attributable to the changes in the quality of institutions. Economic development has the expected positive effect only in old EU members, while its impact on PSI dwindles and even reverses as one moves away from Brussels’ sphere of influence. Furthermore, contrary to previous evidence, we find that economic development predicts changes in DII, potentially due to the expansion of moral concern to unknown others.