KIKonstantinos Ioannidis

Konstantinos Ioannidis

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Konstantinos Ioannidis has a total of 210 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Sound of Silence: Does Competition Decrease Whistleblowing? Evidence From a Preregistered Experiment

    by Konstantinos Ioannidis

    We investigate whether market competition suppresses whistleblowing, using a highpowered, preregistered experiment (N = 240). In a setting where firms either operate independently or compete in a tournament for market revenue, managers choose between a productive task and breaking the law to double firm surplus at the expense of the public, while employees decide whether to report misconduct at a personal cost. Aggregate results indicate that competition has a statistically null effect on whistleblowing. While we observe a directional increase in manager lawbreaking under competition, this does not translate into a significant erosion of the propensity to report misconduct. Exploratory analysis reveals heterogeneous treatment effects by population: whistleblowing decreased significantly in our Birmingham pool, but remained unaffected in Cambridge.

  • Open Access

    Correction: The Open Anchoring Quest Dataset: Anchored Estimates from 96 Studies on Anchoring Effects

    by Lukas Röseler, Lucia Weber, Katharina Helgerth, Elena Stich, Miriam Günther, Paulina Tegethoff, Felix Stefan Wagner, Elitza Ambrus, Martina Antunovic, F. Barrera-Lemarchand, et al.

    This article details a correction to: Röseler, L., Weber, L., Helgerth, K., Stich, E., Günther, M., Tegethoff, P., … Schütz, A. (2022). The Open Anchoring Quest Dataset: Anchored Estimates from 96 Studies on Anchoring Effects. Journal of Open Psychology Data, 10(1), 16. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/jopd.67


  • Open Access

    Competition and moral behavior: A meta-analysis of forty-five crowd-sourced experimental designs

    by Christoph Huber, Anna Dreber, Jürgen Huber, Magnus Johannesson, Michael Kirchler, Utz Weitzel, Miguel Abellán, Xeniya Adayeva, Fehime Ceren Ay, Kai Barron, et al.

    Does competition affect moral behavior? This fundamental question has been debated among leading scholars for centuries, and more recently, it has been tested in experimental studies yielding a body of rather inconclusive empirical evidence. A potential source of ambivalent empirical results on the same hypothesis is design heterogeneity—variation in true effect sizes across various reasonable experimental research protocols. To provide further evidence on whether competition affects moral behavior and to examine whether the generalizability of a single experimental study is jeopardized by design heterogeneity, we invited independent research teams to contribute experimental designs to a crowd-sourced project. In a large-scale online data collection, 18,123 experimental participants were randomly allocated to 45 randomly selected experimental designs out of 95 submitted designs. We find a small adverse effect of competition on moral behavior in a meta-analysis of the pooled data. The crowd-sourced design of our study allows for a clean identification and estimation of the variation in effect sizes above and beyond what could be expected due to sampling variance. We find substantial design heterogeneity—estimated to be about 1.6 times as large as the average standard error of effect size estimates of the 45 research designs—indicating that the informativeness and generalizability of results based on a single experimental design are limited. Drawing strong conclusions about the underlying hypotheses in the presence of substantive design heterogeneity requires moving toward much larger data collections on various experimental designs testing the same hypothesis.


  • Open Access

    Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach

    by Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof

    The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a game-theoretic foundation for the strategic effect that underlies this approach. We consider a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional penalty is imposed. Constructing precise but false statements is assumed to be cognitively costly. We derive all equilibria and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer valuable information from the speaker’s statement at face value. If cognitive costs are not prohibitively high, these require that liars are deterred from making false precise statements if always verified. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem in a partially pooling equilibrium. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable information via the statements per se, whereas larger lying costs or a harsher penalty do not once the deterrence condition for the existence of this equilibrium is met.


  • Open Access

    Habitual Communication

    by Konstantinos Ioannidis

    Many everyday activities are habitual. Among the most common human activities is communication. If people primarily communicate in a common-interests environment, they may form habits of truth-telling and believing messages. If they primarily communicate in a conflicting-interests environment, they may form habits of lying and mistrusting mes- sages. We provide experimental evidence that habits affect strategic communication in an unfamiliar environment. Additionally, we contrast two mechanisms through which habits operate, preference formation and inattention. By varying the frequency of communicating in the unfamiliar environment, we find an effect only when the unfamiliar environment oc- curs rarely. Our results favor inattention as preference formation would predict an effect irrespective of the frequency of the new environment. Analysis of individual decisions sheds further light on the mechanisms. Our findings highlight the importance of accounting for habits, especially when studying human behavior in infrequent situations.

  • Open Access

    The Open Anchoring Quest Dataset: Anchored Estimates from 96 Studies on Anchoring Effects

    by Lukas Röseler, Lucia Weber, Katharina Helgerth, Elena Stich, Miriam Günther, Paulina Tegethoff, Felix Wagner, M. Antunovic, F. Barrera-Lemarchand, E. Halali, et al.


  • Open Access

    On the effect of anchoring on valuations when the anchor is transparently uninformative

    by Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof

    We test whether anchoring affects people’s elicited valuations for a bottle of wine in individual decision-making and in markets. We anchor subjects by asking them if they are willing to sell a bottle of wine for a transparently uninformative random price. We elicit subjects’ Willingness-To-Accept for the bottle before and after the market. Subjects participate in a double auction market either in a small or a large trading group. The variance in subjects’ Willingness-To-Accept shrinks within trading groups. Our evidence supports the idea that markets have the potential to diminish anchoring effects. However, the market is not needed: our anchoring manipulation failed in a large sample. In a concise meta-analysis, we identify the circumstances under which anchoring effects of preferences can be expected.


  • Open Access

    Lie Detection: A Strategic Analysis of the Verifiability Approach

    by Konstantinos Ioannidis, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof

    The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a-game-theoretic analysis of a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional obstruction penalty is imposed. We derive all the equilibria of the game and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer additional information from the speaker's statement at face value. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable (strategic) information transmission, whereas a harsher obstruction penalty does not as soon as a lower limit is met.