Kaixun Sha
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kaixun Sha has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dongdong Hua
School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, 47 Heping Road, Jinan 250014, People's Republic of China
1 shared publicationJie Yang
Shandong Jianzhu University
1 shared publication- Ruiqian Song
Shandong Construction Industry Administration
1 shared publication Shaoyan Wu
Management School, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300384, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Construction Management and Economics
- Vol. 37 (8) , 461-471
Incentive strategies for construction project manager: a common agency perspective
According to the principal-agent theory, the agent should be motivated to behave in a manner consistent with the principal’s requirements. By expanding the focus from the bilateral principal-agent relationship within the firm to the triangular relationship between the client, the construction company and its project manager, this study seeks to explore a new way in which construction firms determining incentive strategies for their construction project managers (CPMs). A common agency model of ‘one servant of two masters’ is established while some negative/positive factors are identified, including rent-seeking effect, collusion effect and check-and-balance effect between the three parties. An autonomy-incentive grid is developed in which one can distinguish four alternative strategies. Implementation costs of each strategy in different scenarios are qualitatively assessed and a set of incentive strategies suitable for different scenarios are determined according to the complicatedness of the project and the type of the client. The model of ‘one servant of two masters’ may provide conceptual insights into incentive strategies for CPMs, and provide practical guidelines for construction firms, but at the same time, it needs testing, verifying and improving in the future practice.
- 6 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Construction Management and Economics
- Vol. 37 (8) , 461-471
Incentive strategies for construction project manager: a common agency perspective
According to the principal-agent theory, the agent should be motivated to behave in a manner consistent with the principal’s requirements. By expanding the focus from the bilateral principal-agent relationship within the firm to the triangular relationship between the client, the construction company and its project manager, this study seeks to explore a new way in which construction firms determining incentive strategies for their construction project managers (CPMs). A common agency model of ‘one servant of two masters’ is established while some negative/positive factors are identified, including rent-seeking effect, collusion effect and check-and-balance effect between the three parties. An autonomy-incentive grid is developed in which one can distinguish four alternative strategies. Implementation costs of each strategy in different scenarios are qualitatively assessed and a set of incentive strategies suitable for different scenarios are determined according to the complicatedness of the project and the type of the client. The model of ‘one servant of two masters’ may provide conceptual insights into incentive strategies for CPMs, and provide practical guidelines for construction firms, but at the same time, it needs testing, verifying and improving in the future practice.
- 9 March 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 619-629
Multilevel governance for building energy conservation in rural China
Under the city–countryside dual structure, the existing building governance system in China differentiates between urban and rural areas. When updating building regulations and related policies to meet challenges in the built environment, it is essential to develop different strategies for different locations according to local circumstances, requirements and capabilities. Based on two research projects, this article examines the mechanisms and strategies for promoting building energy conservation in rural China from the perspective of economic governance. The challenges and potentials of building energy conservation in rural China are analyzed. The essence of the governance paradigm is briefly reviewed. A three-level analysis framework is developed in which markets, governments and the third party (professionals and others) play complementary roles in regulating stakeholders’ behaviour. A key question addressed is how to create a favourable institutional environment in which people are willing to do the right things. Different strategy portfolios are proposed for different levels, including technology strategy, financing strategy, as well as regulations and incentive policies. In conclusion, there is no ‘best’ but rather the ‘most suitable’ approach to building governance. In this light, the principle of discriminating alignment and the multilevel analysis approach provides conceptual insights.
- 9 March 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 619-629
Multilevel governance for building energy conservation in rural China
Under the city–countryside dual structure, the existing building governance system in China differentiates between urban and rural areas. When updating building regulations and related policies to meet challenges in the built environment, it is essential to develop different strategies for different locations according to local circumstances, requirements and capabilities. Based on two research projects, this article examines the mechanisms and strategies for promoting building energy conservation in rural China from the perspective of economic governance. The challenges and potentials of building energy conservation in rural China are analyzed. The essence of the governance paradigm is briefly reviewed. A three-level analysis framework is developed in which markets, governments and the third party (professionals and others) play complementary roles in regulating stakeholders’ behaviour. A key question addressed is how to create a favourable institutional environment in which people are willing to do the right things. Different strategy portfolios are proposed for different levels, including technology strategy, financing strategy, as well as regulations and incentive policies. In conclusion, there is no ‘best’ but rather the ‘most suitable’ approach to building governance. In this light, the principle of discriminating alignment and the multilevel analysis approach provides conceptual insights.
- 30 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 42 (3) , 391-392
Destructive construction and constructive conflicts
(2014). Destructive construction and constructive conflicts. Building Research & Information: Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 391-392.
- 30 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 42 (3) , 391-392
Destructive construction and constructive conflicts
(2014). Destructive construction and constructive conflicts. Building Research & Information: Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 391-392.
- Open Access
- 2 October 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 41 (6) , 742-751
Professionalism in China's building sector: an economic governance perspective
As the third force beside markets and governments, professionalism emerged to protect the interests of civil society, and it has played a unique role in the building sector. By conceptualizing professionalism as a community-based governance structure, an economic governance perspective is adopted to examine professionalism in China's building sector. The development of professionalism in China's building sector is reviewed, and both its achievements and its weaknesses are assessed. Root-cause analysis reveals that the primary impediment to building professionalism is the imbalanced relationship between markets, governments and professionals. It is argued that the success of professionalism in China's building sector is dependent ultimately on whether the government can change its overly dominant role in the economy. To address the concern of creating an independent, vibrant professional culture that contributes to the long-term public interest, the following are recommended: separating professional associations and relevant bodies from government agencies completely; improving the administrative system for both practice qualification and market access; and increasing the proportion of non-government investments to change the imbalanced relationship between professionals and public clients.
- 2 October 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 41 (6) , 742-751
Open AccessProfessionalism in China's building sector: an economic governance perspective
As the third force beside markets and governments, professionalism emerged to protect the interests of civil society, and it has played a unique role in the building sector. By conceptualizing professionalism as a community-based governance structure, an economic governance perspective is adopted to examine professionalism in China's building sector. The development of professionalism in China's building sector is reviewed, and both its achievements and its weaknesses are assessed. Root-cause analysis reveals that the primary impediment to building professionalism is the imbalanced relationship between markets, governments and professionals. It is argued that the success of professionalism in China's building sector is dependent ultimately on whether the government can change its overly dominant role in the economy. To address the concern of creating an independent, vibrant professional culture that contributes to the long-term public interest, the following are recommended: separating professional associations and relevant bodies from government agencies completely; improving the administrative system for both practice qualification and market access; and increasing the proportion of non-government investments to change the imbalanced relationship between professionals and public clients.
- 2 August 2013
- Published by Engineering Project Organization Society in Engineering Project Organization Journal
- Vol. 3 (4) , 227-239
Historical dynamics of construction business systems: an institutional evolution perspective
As a kind of basic institutional environment, the construction business system provides an underlying platform of the interactions for stakeholders of construction projects and hence exerts a great influence on the building sector. Taking the view of ‘the construction business system as a complex adaptive system’, a research framework is developed with the aim of understanding how and why construction business systems emerge and evolve over time. The principles of evolutionarily stable strategy and replicator dynamic are briefly introduced. A three-strategy evolutionary game model is developed on the basis of a set of assumptions, with the distinctiveness of the construction industry fully taken into consideration. The model illustrates some characteristic outcomes: multiple equilibria, path dependence, original-state-sensitiveness, the long-term persistence of Pareto-inferior outcomes as well as proneness to the stable equilibrium characterized by more efficient negotiation and higher average payoff. It is expected that introducing ‘revolutionary’ events that are not explicitly modelled, such as non-best responses and exogenous changes, could break the existing equilibrium and bring about new equilibrium outcomes.
- 2 August 2013
- Published by Engineering Project Organization Society in Engineering Project Organization Journal
- Vol. 3 (4) , 227-239
Historical dynamics of construction business systems: an institutional evolution perspective
As a kind of basic institutional environment, the construction business system provides an underlying platform of the interactions for stakeholders of construction projects and hence exerts a great influence on the building sector. Taking the view of ‘the construction business system as a complex adaptive system’, a research framework is developed with the aim of understanding how and why construction business systems emerge and evolve over time. The principles of evolutionarily stable strategy and replicator dynamic are briefly introduced. A three-strategy evolutionary game model is developed on the basis of a set of assumptions, with the distinctiveness of the construction industry fully taken into consideration. The model illustrates some characteristic outcomes: multiple equilibria, path dependence, original-state-sensitiveness, the long-term persistence of Pareto-inferior outcomes as well as proneness to the stable equilibrium characterized by more efficient negotiation and higher average payoff. It is expected that introducing ‘revolutionary’ events that are not explicitly modelled, such as non-best responses and exogenous changes, could break the existing equilibrium and bring about new equilibrium outcomes.
- 1 November 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Construction Management and Economics
- Vol. 29 (11) , 1137-1147
Vertical governance of construction projects: an information cost perspective
A research framework is developed to analyse the vertical governance, or transaction relationships between the client and its first-tier suppliers of construction projects in terms of project procurement route and payment terms. Starting from the particularity of the construction industry, reduced treatments that Williamson used in governance structure analysis are revised, and an assumption of ‘second-order transformation’ is proposed: as the information gap reaches a given level, and the proportion of specialized knowledge to deal with uncertainty exceeds a certain degree, the approach of selecting the governance structure of construction projects might deviate from the path anticipated by canonical theories. Both uncertainty and information cost are included in the analysis framework, and a principal–agent model is developed to analyse the procurement route and payment terms of construction projects. It is concluded that the information gap and the relative cost coefficient of information are decisive factors that determine the vertical governance structure of construction projects. They determine not only the time when ‘second-order transformation’ occurs, but also the distribution of ‘weak incentive regions’.
- 1 November 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Construction Management and Economics
- Vol. 29 (11) , 1137-1147
Vertical governance of construction projects: an information cost perspective
A research framework is developed to analyse the vertical governance, or transaction relationships between the client and its first-tier suppliers of construction projects in terms of project procurement route and payment terms. Starting from the particularity of the construction industry, reduced treatments that Williamson used in governance structure analysis are revised, and an assumption of ‘second-order transformation’ is proposed: as the information gap reaches a given level, and the proportion of specialized knowledge to deal with uncertainty exceeds a certain degree, the approach of selecting the governance structure of construction projects might deviate from the path anticipated by canonical theories. Both uncertainty and information cost are included in the analysis framework, and a principal–agent model is developed to analyse the procurement route and payment terms of construction projects. It is concluded that the information gap and the relative cost coefficient of information are decisive factors that determine the vertical governance structure of construction projects. They determine not only the time when ‘second-order transformation’ occurs, but also the distribution of ‘weak incentive regions’.
- 10 December 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 36 (1) , 97-109
Competitiveness assessment system for China's construction industry
How can competitiveness be defined and measured within China's construction industry to evaluate the overall performance and also allow enterprises to assess and improve their competence? The Competitiveness Index for the Construction Industry (CICI) is a new single index that can measure relative competitiveness of the construction industry at China's provincial level. The principles and process of the system development are elaborated. Using the CICI, the competitiveness of the construction industry in ten target provinces and/or municipalities is evaluated, the competitiveness of Shandong Province's building sector is further analysed, and the system's limitations and further research work are identified. It is concluded that currently there is no so-called ‘powerful province/municipality’ in the construction industry, that according to the status quo and the tendency of development, it is most probable for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shandong provinces may be the first to achieve this goal, and that the indicators of Relevant industries and Structure are the bottleneck that hampers enhancing the competitiveness of Shandong's building sector. Comment la compétitivité peut-elle être définie et mesurée dans le secteur de la construction en Chine pour évaluer les performances globales et pour permettre également aux entreprises d'évaluer et d'améliorer leurs compétences? L'indice de compétitivité de l'industrie de la construction (CICI) est un nouvel indice simple qui peut mesurer la compétitivité relative de ce secteur au niveau provincial chinois. Les principes et processus de développement du système sont élaborés. Au moyen du CICI, on évalue la compétitivité de l'industrie de la construction dans dix provinces et (ou) municipalités; la compétitivité du secteur du bâtiment de la province de Shandong fait l'objet d'une autre analyse tandis que sont identifiées les limitations du système et que sont décidés des travaux complémentaires de recherche. L'article conclut en disant qu'actuellement il n'existe pas ce qu'on pourrait appeler des provinces/municipalités puissantes dans l'industrie de la construction et que, conformément au statu quo et à la tendance de développement, il est vraisemblable que les provinces de Jiangsu, Zhejiang, et Shandong soient les premières à atteindre cet objectif et que les indicateurs du Relevant industries and Structure constituent le goulot d'étranglement qui empêche d'améliorer la compétitivité dans le secteur du bâtiment de Shandong. Mots clés: système d'évaluation, compétitivité, industrie de la construction, marchés de la construction, performances de la construction, indicateurs, productivité, police publique, entreprises nationalisées, Chine
- 10 December 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Building Research & Information
- Vol. 36 (1) , 97-109
Competitiveness assessment system for China's construction industry
How can competitiveness be defined and measured within China's construction industry to evaluate the overall performance and also allow enterprises to assess and improve their competence? The Competitiveness Index for the Construction Industry (CICI) is a new single index that can measure relative competitiveness of the construction industry at China's provincial level. The principles and process of the system development are elaborated. Using the CICI, the competitiveness of the construction industry in ten target provinces and/or municipalities is evaluated, the competitiveness of Shandong Province's building sector is further analysed, and the system's limitations and further research work are identified. It is concluded that currently there is no so-called ‘powerful province/municipality’ in the construction industry, that according to the status quo and the tendency of development, it is most probable for Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Shandong provinces may be the first to achieve this goal, and that the indicators of Relevant industries and Structure are the bottleneck that hampers enhancing the competitiveness of Shandong's building sector. Comment la compétitivité peut-elle être définie et mesurée dans le secteur de la construction en Chine pour évaluer les performances globales et pour permettre également aux entreprises d'évaluer et d'améliorer leurs compétences? L'indice de compétitivité de l'industrie de la construction (CICI) est un nouvel indice simple qui peut mesurer la compétitivité relative de ce secteur au niveau provincial chinois. Les principes et processus de développement du système sont élaborés. Au moyen du CICI, on évalue la compétitivité de l'industrie de la construction dans dix provinces et (ou) municipalités; la compétitivité du secteur du bâtiment de la province de Shandong fait l'objet d'une autre analyse tandis que sont identifiées les limitations du système et que sont décidés des travaux complémentaires de recherche. L'article conclut en disant qu'actuellement il n'existe pas ce qu'on pourrait appeler des provinces/municipalités puissantes dans l'industrie de la construction et que, conformément au statu quo et à la tendance de développement, il est vraisemblable que les provinces de Jiangsu, Zhejiang, et Shandong soient les premières à atteindre cet objectif et que les indicateurs du Relevant industries and Structure constituent le goulot d'étranglement qui empêche d'améliorer la compétitivité dans le secteur du bâtiment de Shandong. Mots clés: système d'évaluation, compétitivité, industrie de la construction, marchés de la construction, performances de la construction, indicateurs, productivité, police publique, entreprises nationalisées, Chine