Olivier Blanchard

Macroeconomics has been under scrutiny as a field since the financial crisis, which brought an abrupt end to the optimism of the Great Moderation. There is widespread acknowledgement that the prevailing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models performed poorly, but little agreement on what alternative future paradigm should be pursued. This article is the elaboration of four blog posts that together present a clear message: current DSGE models are flawed, but they contain the right foundations and must be improved rather than discarded. Further, we need different types of macroeconomic models for different purposes. Specifically, there should be five kinds of general equilibrium models: a common core, plus foundational theory, policy, toy, and forecasting models. The different classes of models have a lot to learn from each other, but the goal of full integration has proven counterproductive. No model can be all things to all people.

Los modelos dsge actuales tienen graves defectos, pero son sumamente mejorables y centrales para el futuro de la macroeconomía. Para mejorarlos debe volverse menos insulares, utilizado un conjunto mucho más amplio de investigaciones económicas. También deben volverse menos imperialistas y compartir el escenario con otros enfoques de la modelación.

For a long while after the explosion of macroeconomics in the 1970s, the field looked like a battlefield. Over time, however, mainly because facts do not go away, a largely shared vision both of fluctuations and of methodology has emerged. Not everything is fine. Like all revolutions, this one has come with the destruction of some knowledge, and it suffers from extremism and herding. None of this is deadly, however. The state of macro is good.

Most central banks perceive a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade‐off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of nontrivial real imperfections. We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare‐relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation–unemployment relation found in the data.

The present paper is an attempt to define the contours of the right macroeconomic strategy for China. In a nutshell, we believe that the package includes a decrease in saving, with a focus on private saving, an increase in the supply of services, in particular health services, and an appreciation of the RMB. This is why we refer to this strategy as a “three‐handed approach”: action on the fiscal and budgetary front, accompanied by currency revaluation. We start by asking how the Chinese economy got to where it is, what the strategy has been since the beginning of the reforms, and what the main characteristics of the economy are today. We then ask what is the desirable path for the future, and which are the main policy trade‐offs implied by such a path. Finally, we put the various pieces together to describe what we believe is a consistent policy package.(Edited by Xiaoming Feng)

In a dynamically efficient economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.

Most of us are armchair economists. Whether our opinions are right or wrong, we can proffer them at little personal cost—the most we can lose is our reputation. Not so for János Kornai. For much of his life, speaking freely would have led him to land in jail, or worse. He faced a difficult choice. He could publish illegally, take the samizdat route, but reach a very small number of readers. He could instead respect a number of official taboos, publish legally, and reach a much wider readership. These difficulties have not prevented him from giving us the most informed and deepest critique of the socialist system to date. This interview is, I hope, successful in showing the degree to which Kornai's life and work have been intertwined, and how he came to believe what he believes today. Kornai is sharing his time between Harvard and Collegium Budapest. The interview took place in my office when I was visiting Harvard University in June 1998.

We have two goals in this paper. The first is to draw lessons from the privatization experiences in Eastern Europe so far, in particular with respect to the relation between alternative privatization methods, the evolution of ownership after privatization and restructuring. The second is to draw from these lessons to suggest ways in which remaining privatization programmes might be designed or improved, when political constraints and economic realities are taken into account.