Pranav Dandekar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Pranav Dandekar has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ashish Goel
Stanford University
2 shared publications Ashish Goel
Management Science and Engineering and (by courtesy) Computer Science, and
1 shared publication- David Lee
Stanford University
1 shared publication David T. Lee
Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305
1 shared publicationIan Post
Computer Science Department Stanford University
1 shared publication- Nadia Fawaz
Palo Alto CA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 27 March 2013
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 110 (15) , 5791-5796
Biased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization
We study the issue of polarization in society through a model of opinion formation. We say an opinion formation process is polarizing if it results in increased divergence of opinions. Empirical studies have shown that homophily, i.e., greater interaction between like-minded individuals, results in polarization. However, we show that DeGroot’s well-known model of opinion formation based on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. We generalize DeGroot’s model to account for a phenomenon well known in social psychology as biased assimilation: When presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue, individuals draw undue support for their initial position, thereby arriving at a more extreme opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation process results in polarization if individuals are sufficiently biased. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides a framework to analyze the polarizing effect of Internet-based recommender systems that show us personalized content.
- 27 March 2013
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 110 (15) , 5791-5796
Top Cited PapersBiased assimilation, homophily, and the dynamics of polarization
We study the issue of polarization in society through a model of opinion formation. We say an opinion formation process is polarizing if it results in increased divergence of opinions. Empirical studies have shown that homophily, i.e., greater interaction between like-minded individuals, results in polarization. However, we show that DeGroot’s well-known model of opinion formation based on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. We generalize DeGroot’s model to account for a phenomenon well known in social psychology as biased assimilation: When presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue, individuals draw undue support for their initial position, thereby arriving at a more extreme opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation process results in polarization if individuals are sufficiently biased. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides a framework to analyze the polarizing effect of Internet-based recommender systems that show us personalized content.
- Open Access
Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy guarantee given by the analyst at the time of the release. The analyst incentivizes individuals by compensating them, giving rise to a \emph{privacy auction}. Motivated by recommender systems, the statistic we consider is a linear predictor function with publicly known weights. The statistic can be viewed as a prediction of the unknown data of a new individual, based on the data of individuals in the database. We formalize the trade-off between privacy and accuracy in this setting, and show that a simple class of estimates achieves an order-optimal trade-off. It thus suffices to focus on auction mechanisms that output such estimates. We use this observation to design a truthful, individually rational, proportional-purchase mechanism under a fixed budget constraint. We show that our mechanism is 5-approximate in terms of accuracy compared to the optimal mechanism, and that no truthful mechanism can achieve a $2-\varepsilon$ approximation, for any $\varepsilon > 0$.Open AccessPrivacy Auctions for Recommender Systems
We study a market for private data in which a data analyst publicly releases a statistic over a database of private information. Individuals that own the data incur a cost for their loss of privacy proportional to the differential privacy guarantee given by the analyst at the time of the release. The analyst incentivizes individuals by compensating them, giving rise to a \emph{privacy auction}. Motivated by recommender systems, the statistic we consider is a linear predictor function with publicly known weights. The statistic can be viewed as a prediction of the unknown data of a new individual, based on the data of individuals in the database. We formalize the trade-off between privacy and accuracy in this setting, and show that a simple class of estimates achieves an order-optimal trade-off. It thus suffices to focus on auction mechanisms that output such estimates. We use this observation to design a truthful, individually rational, proportional-purchase mechanism under a fixed budget constraint. We show that our mechanism is 5-approximate in terms of accuracy compared to the optimal mechanism, and that no truthful mechanism can achieve a $2-\varepsilon$ approximation, for any $\varepsilon > 0$. - Open Access
Biased Assimilation, Homophily and the Dynamics of Polarization
Are we as a society getting more polarized, and if so, why? We try to answer this question through a model of opinion formation. Empirical studies have shown that homophily results in polarization. However, we show that DeGroot's well-known model of opinion formation based on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. We generalize DeGroot's model to account for a phenomenon well-known in social psychology as biased assimilation: when presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue, individuals draw undue support for their initial position thereby arriving at a more extreme opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation process results in either polarization, persistent disagreement or consensus depending on how biased individuals are. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides insight into the following related question: do internet based recommender algorithms that show us personalized content contribute to polarization? We make a connection between biased assimilation and the polarizing effects of some random-walk based recommender algorithms that are similar in spirit to some commonly used recommender algorithms.
Open AccessBiased Assimilation, Homophily and the Dynamics of Polarization
Are we as a society getting more polarized, and if so, why? We try to answer this question through a model of opinion formation. Empirical studies have shown that homophily results in polarization. However, we show that DeGroot's well-known model of opinion formation based on repeated averaging can never be polarizing, even if individuals are arbitrarily homophilous. We generalize DeGroot's model to account for a phenomenon well-known in social psychology as biased assimilation: when presented with mixed or inconclusive evidence on a complex issue, individuals draw undue support for their initial position thereby arriving at a more extreme opinion. We show that in a simple model of homophilous networks, our biased opinion formation process results in either polarization, persistent disagreement or consensus depending on how biased individuals are. In other words, homophily alone, without biased assimilation, is not sufficient to polarize society. Quite interestingly, biased assimilation also provides insight into the following related question: do internet based recommender algorithms that show us personalized content contribute to polarization? We make a connection between biased assimilation and the polarizing effects of some random-walk based recommender algorithms that are similar in spirit to some commonly used recommender algorithms.
- Open Access
Liquidity in Credit Networks: A Little Trust Goes a Long Way
Credit networks represent a way of modeling trust between entities in a network. Nodes in the network print their own currency and trust each other for a certain amount of each other's currency. This allows the network to serve as a decentralized payment infrastructure---arbitrary payments can be routed through the network by passing IOUs between trusting nodes in their respective currencies---and obviates the need for a common currency. Nodes can repeatedly transact with each other and pay for the transaction using trusted currency. A natural question to ask in this setting is: how long can the network sustain liquidity, i.e., how long can the network support the routing of payments before credit dries up? We answer this question in terms of the long term failure probability of transactions for various network topologies and credit values. We prove that the transaction failure probability is independent of the path along which transactions are routed. We show that under symmetric transaction rates, the transaction failure probability in a number of well-known graph families goes to zero as the size, density or credit capacity of the network increases. We also show via simulations that even networks of small size and credit capacity can route transactions with high probability if they are well-connected. Further, we characterize a centralized currency system as a special type of a star network (one where edges to the root have infinite credit capacity, and transactions occur only between leaf nodes) and compute the steady-state transaction failure probability in a centralized system. We show that liquidity in star networks, complete graphs and Erd\"{o}s-R\'{e}nyi networks is comparable to that in equivalent centralized currency systems; thus we do not lose much liquidity in return for their robustness and decentralized properties.
Open AccessLiquidity in Credit Networks: A Little Trust Goes a Long Way
Credit networks represent a way of modeling trust between entities in a network. Nodes in the network print their own currency and trust each other for a certain amount of each other's currency. This allows the network to serve as a decentralized payment infrastructure---arbitrary payments can be routed through the network by passing IOUs between trusting nodes in their respective currencies---and obviates the need for a common currency. Nodes can repeatedly transact with each other and pay for the transaction using trusted currency. A natural question to ask in this setting is: how long can the network sustain liquidity, i.e., how long can the network support the routing of payments before credit dries up? We answer this question in terms of the long term failure probability of transactions for various network topologies and credit values. We prove that the transaction failure probability is independent of the path along which transactions are routed. We show that under symmetric transaction rates, the transaction failure probability in a number of well-known graph families goes to zero as the size, density or credit capacity of the network increases. We also show via simulations that even networks of small size and credit capacity can route transactions with high probability if they are well-connected. Further, we characterize a centralized currency system as a special type of a star network (one where edges to the root have infinite credit capacity, and transactions occur only between leaf nodes) and compute the steady-state transaction failure probability in a centralized system. We show that liquidity in star networks, complete graphs and Erd\"{o}s-R\'{e}nyi networks is comparable to that in equivalent centralized currency systems; thus we do not lose much liquidity in return for their robustness and decentralized properties.