David Rupprecht
Research Subjects
David Rupprecht has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Katharina Kohls
Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands
3 shared publications - Thijs Heijligenberg
Radboud University, Netherlands
2 shared publications - Adrian Dabrowski
University of Applied Sciences Technikum Wien, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Bedran Karakoc
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication - Christian Böhm
Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication - Christina Pöpper
New York University Abu Dhabi
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 54-64
The attacks aren’t alright: Large-Scale Simulation of Fake Base Station Attacks and Detections
Fake base stations are a well-known threat to pre-5G mobile networks and are one of the most common primitives for mobile attacks that are used in the real world. However, despite years of research we only have limited knowledge about their performance spectrum and how well detection mechanisms work in practice. Consequently, mobile network operators and vendors struggle to identify, implement, and deploy a practical solution in the form of detection mechanisms. For the first time, we systematically study fake base station attacks and their main influencing factors. We use a specification-conform simulation model that lets us analyze fake base station attacks on a large scale, and test detection mechanisms on the generated data. The simulation environment allows us to test diverse scenarios with a large measure of control and insight, while providing realism in the aspects that matter. We study detection mechanisms from academic work and ongoing 3GPP discussions. Our experiments reveal the influencing factors of the success of fake base station attacks and detection, and provides nuances for performance that is missing from existing work.
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 54-64
Open AccessThe attacks aren’t alright: Large-Scale Simulation of Fake Base Station Attacks and Detections
Fake base stations are a well-known threat to pre-5G mobile networks and are one of the most common primitives for mobile attacks that are used in the real world. However, despite years of research we only have limited knowledge about their performance spectrum and how well detection mechanisms work in practice. Consequently, mobile network operators and vendors struggle to identify, implement, and deploy a practical solution in the form of detection mechanisms. For the first time, we systematically study fake base station attacks and their main influencing factors. We use a specification-conform simulation model that lets us analyze fake base station attacks on a large scale, and test detection mechanisms on the generated data. The simulation environment allows us to test diverse scenarios with a large measure of control and insight, while providing realism in the aspects that matter. We study detection mechanisms from academic work and ongoing 3GPP discussions. Our experiments reveal the influencing factors of the success of fake base station attacks and detection, and provides nuances for performance that is missing from existing work.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 145-150
BigMac: Performance Overhead of User Plane Integrity Protection in 5G Networks
5G introduces a series of new security features that overcome known issues of the previous mobile generations. One of these features is integrity protection for user plane data. While this addition protects against manipulations like DNS spoofing, it also introduces extra overhead to user plane traffic. As it is optional to enable, this additional overhead can be the decision point for network operators to avoid the additional security feature. In this work, we investigate the overhead induced by different integrity protection algorithms and test the burden they add to the workload of a device. Our results indicate how visible performance differences would be on the end-devices of users, and how the performance of the algorithms differs in isolation. With these results we aim to initiate a discussion regarding the benefits of enabling user plane integrity protection and to overcome misconceptions regarding the performance impairments for end users.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 145-150
Open AccessBigMac: Performance Overhead of User Plane Integrity Protection in 5G Networks
5G introduces a series of new security features that overcome known issues of the previous mobile generations. One of these features is integrity protection for user plane data. While this addition protects against manipulations like DNS spoofing, it also introduces extra overhead to user plane traffic. As it is optional to enable, this additional overhead can be the decision point for network operators to avoid the additional security feature. In this work, we investigate the overhead induced by different integrity protection algorithms and test the burden they add to the workload of a device. Our results indicate how visible performance differences would be on the end-devices of users, and how the performance of the algorithms differs in isolation. With these results we aim to initiate a discussion regarding the benefits of enabling user plane integrity protection and to overcome misconceptions regarding the performance impairments for end users.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 97-108
Never Let Me Down Again: Bidding-Down Attacks and Mitigations in 5G and 4G
Bidding-down attacks reduce the security of a mobile network connection. Weaker encryption algorithms or even downgrades to prior network generations enable an adversary to exploit numerous attack vectors and harm the users of a network. The problem of bidding-down attacks has been known for generations, and various mitigations are integrated into the latest 4G and 5G specifications. However, current research lacks a systematic identification and analysis of the variety of potential attack vectors. In this work, we classify an extensive set of bidding-down attack vectors and mitigations and analyze their specification and implementation in phones and networks. Our results demonstrate vulnerabilities for all attacks and devices, including the latest mobile generation 5G and recent flagship phones. To further prove how the identified attack vectors can be exploited in sophisticated attacks, we conduct two case studies in which we apply a full downgrade attack from 5G SA to 2G and bid down a 5G NSA connection by enforcing null encryption. Again, we find a majority of systems vulnerable. With this paper, we hope to improve the state of bidding-down mitigations in the specification and implementation.
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 97-108
Open AccessNever Let Me Down Again: Bidding-Down Attacks and Mitigations in 5G and 4G
Bidding-down attacks reduce the security of a mobile network connection. Weaker encryption algorithms or even downgrades to prior network generations enable an adversary to exploit numerous attack vectors and harm the users of a network. The problem of bidding-down attacks has been known for generations, and various mitigations are integrated into the latest 4G and 5G specifications. However, current research lacks a systematic identification and analysis of the variety of potential attack vectors. In this work, we classify an extensive set of bidding-down attack vectors and mitigations and analyze their specification and implementation in phones and networks. Our results demonstrate vulnerabilities for all attacks and devices, including the latest mobile generation 5G and recent flagship phones. To further prove how the identified attack vectors can be exploited in sophisticated attacks, we conduct two case studies in which we apply a full downgrade attack from 5G SA to 2G and bid down a 5G NSA connection by enforcing null encryption. Again, we find a majority of systems vulnerable. With this paper, we hope to improve the state of bidding-down mitigations in the specification and implementation.
- 16 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-183
Cryptanalysis of the GPRS Encryption Algorithms GEA-1 and GEA-2
- 16 June 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 155-183
Cryptanalysis of the GPRS Encryption Algorithms GEA-1 and GEA-2
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Georg Thieme Verlag KG in Radiopraxis
- Vol. 14 (01) , 34-43
Behandlung pädiatrischer Patientinnen und Patienten in der Partikeltherapie
Die Partikeltherapie, vor allem die Protonentherapie, ermöglicht es pädiatrische Patientinnen und Patienten hinsichtlich einer Dosisminimierung des gesunden Gewebes optimal zu behandeln. Das oberste Ziel hierbei ist es, neurokognitive und endokrine Funktionseinschränkungen zu reduzieren und Langzeitfolgen wie Sekundärkarzinome bei gleichzeitiger optimaler Dosisapplikation im zu bestrahlenden Gebiet zu vermeiden.
- 10 March 2021
- Published by Georg Thieme Verlag KG in Radiopraxis
- Vol. 14 (01) , 34-43
Behandlung pädiatrischer Patientinnen und Patienten in der Partikeltherapie
Die Partikeltherapie, vor allem die Protonentherapie, ermöglicht es pädiatrische Patientinnen und Patienten hinsichtlich einer Dosisminimierung des gesunden Gewebes optimal zu behandeln. Das oberste Ziel hierbei ist es, neurokognitive und endokrine Funktionseinschränkungen zu reduzieren und Langzeitfolgen wie Sekundärkarzinome bei gleichzeitiger optimaler Dosisapplikation im zu bestrahlenden Gebiet zu vermeiden.
- 2 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
- Vol. 20 (3) , 2518-2542
On Security Research Towards Future Mobile Network Generations
Over the last decades, numerous security and privacy issues in all three active mobile network generations have been revealed that threaten users as well as network providers. In view of the newest generation (5G) currently under development, we now have the unique opportunity to identify research directions for the next generation based on existing security and privacy issues as well as already proposed defenses. This paper aims to unify security knowledge on mobile phone networks into a comprehensive overview and to derive pressing open research questions. To achieve this systematically, we develop a methodology that categorizes known attacks by their aim, proposed defenses, underlying causes, and root causes. Further, we assess the impact and the efficacy of each attack and defense. We then apply this methodology to existing literature on attacks and defenses in all three network generations. By doing so, we identify ten causes and four root causes for attacks. Mapping the attacks to proposed defenses and suggestions for the 5G specification enables us to uncover open research questions and challenges for the development of next-generation mobile networks. The problems of unsecured pre-authentication traffic and jamming attacks exist across all three mobile generations. They should be addressed in the future, in particular to wipe out the class of downgrade attacks and, thereby, strengthen the users' privacy. Further advances are needed in the areas of inter-operator protocols as well as secure baseband implementations. Additionally, mitigations against denial-of-service attacks by smart protocol design represent an open research question.
- 2 April 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
- Vol. 20 (3) , 2518-2542
On Security Research Towards Future Mobile Network Generations
Over the last decades, numerous security and privacy issues in all three active mobile network generations have been revealed that threaten users as well as network providers. In view of the newest generation (5G) currently under development, we now have the unique opportunity to identify research directions for the next generation based on existing security and privacy issues as well as already proposed defenses. This paper aims to unify security knowledge on mobile phone networks into a comprehensive overview and to derive pressing open research questions. To achieve this systematically, we develop a methodology that categorizes known attacks by their aim, proposed defenses, underlying causes, and root causes. Further, we assess the impact and the efficacy of each attack and defense. We then apply this methodology to existing literature on attacks and defenses in all three network generations. By doing so, we identify ten causes and four root causes for attacks. Mapping the attacks to proposed defenses and suggestions for the 5G specification enables us to uncover open research questions and challenges for the development of next-generation mobile networks. The problems of unsecured pre-authentication traffic and jamming attacks exist across all three mobile generations. They should be addressed in the future, in particular to wipe out the class of downgrade attacks and, thereby, strengthen the users' privacy. Further advances are needed in the areas of inter-operator protocols as well as secure baseband implementations. Additionally, mitigations against denial-of-service attacks by smart protocol design represent an open research question.