Jennifer S. Blumenthal-Barby
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jennifer S. Blumenthal-Barby has a total of 61 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Robert Joseph Volk
Department of Health Services Research, The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, TX, USA
3 shared publications Aanand D. Naik
Department of Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas (JSB-B)
2 shared publicationsAmy L. McGuire
From Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, and Fuqua School of Business and Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina
2 shared publications- Amy L. McGuire
Baylor College of Medicine
2 shared publications - Heather Krieger
University of Houston, Department of Psychology, Houston, Tx, USA
2 shared publications Heidi Voelker Russell
Department of Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas (JSB-B)
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 22 February 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 38-39
Paying the Right Amount to Challenge Trial Participants – We Need to Use Behavioral Science Insights to Sell What’s Right
Sometimes doing what’s right depends on anticipating how people will react when you do the right thing. Consider two aspects of challenge trial payments discussed by Lynch and colleagues (2021). Th...
- 22 February 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 38-39
Paying the Right Amount to Challenge Trial Participants – We Need to Use Behavioral Science Insights to Sell What’s Right
Sometimes doing what’s right depends on anticipating how people will react when you do the right thing. Consider two aspects of challenge trial payments discussed by Lynch and colleagues (2021). Th...
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 38 (11) , 1876-1881
Potential Unintended Consequences Of Recent Shared Decision Making Policy Initiatives
Shared decision making (SDM)—when clinicians and patients make medical decisions together—is moving swiftly from an ethical ideal toward widespread clinical implementation affecting millions of pat...
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 38 (11) , 1876-1881
Potential Unintended Consequences Of Recent Shared Decision Making Policy Initiatives
Shared decision making (SDM)—when clinicians and patients make medical decisions together—is moving swiftly from an ethical ideal toward widespread clinical implementation affecting millions of pat...
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 19 (5) , 66-68
On the Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: The Importance of Conceptual Clarity
(2019). On the Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: The Importance of Conceptual Clarity. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 66-68.
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 19 (5) , 66-68
On the Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: The Importance of Conceptual Clarity
(2019). On the Ethical Criteria for Health-Promoting Nudges: The Importance of Conceptual Clarity. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 66-68.
- 15 January 2019
- Published by American College of Physicians in Annals of Internal Medicine
- Vol. 170 (2) , 133-134
Building on the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual
- 15 January 2019
- Published by American College of Physicians in Annals of Internal Medicine
- Vol. 170 (2) , 133-134
Building on the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual
- 2 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 18 (9) , 4-15
In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad
Bioethicists often draw sharp distinctions between hope and states like denial, self-deception, and unrealistic optimism. But what, exactly, is the difference between hope and its more suspect cousins? One common way of drawing the distinction focuses on accuracy of belief about the desired outcome: Hope, though perhaps sometimes misplaced, does not involve inaccuracy in the way that these other states do. Because inaccurate beliefs are thought to compromise informed decision making, bioethicists have considered these states to be ones where intervention is needed either to correct the person’s mental state or to persuade the person to behave differently, or even to deny the person certain options (e.g., another round of chemotherapy). In this article, we argue that it is difficult to determine whether a patient is really in denial, self-deceived, or unrealistically optimistic. Moreover, even when we are confident that beliefs are unrealistic, they are not always as harmful as critics contend. As a result, we need to be more permissive in our approach to patients who we believe are unrealistically optimistic, in denial, or self-deceived—that is, unless patients significantly misunderstand their situation and thus make decisions that are clearly bad for them (especially in light of their own values and goals), we should not intervene by trying to change their mental states or persuade them to behave differently, or by paternalistically denying them certain options (e.g., a risky procedure).
- 2 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 18 (9) , 4-15
In Defense of “Denial”: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad
Bioethicists often draw sharp distinctions between hope and states like denial, self-deception, and unrealistic optimism. But what, exactly, is the difference between hope and its more suspect cousins? One common way of drawing the distinction focuses on accuracy of belief about the desired outcome: Hope, though perhaps sometimes misplaced, does not involve inaccuracy in the way that these other states do. Because inaccurate beliefs are thought to compromise informed decision making, bioethicists have considered these states to be ones where intervention is needed either to correct the person’s mental state or to persuade the person to behave differently, or even to deny the person certain options (e.g., another round of chemotherapy). In this article, we argue that it is difficult to determine whether a patient is really in denial, self-deceived, or unrealistically optimistic. Moreover, even when we are confident that beliefs are unrealistic, they are not always as harmful as critics contend. As a result, we need to be more permissive in our approach to patients who we believe are unrealistically optimistic, in denial, or self-deceived—that is, unless patients significantly misunderstand their situation and thus make decisions that are clearly bad for them (especially in light of their own values and goals), we should not intervene by trying to change their mental states or persuade them to behave differently, or by paternalistically denying them certain options (e.g., a risky procedure).
- 2 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 18 (9) , W3-W5
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on ‘‘In Defense of ‘Denial’: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad”
(2018). Response to Open Peer Commentaries on ‘‘In Defense of ‘Denial’: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad”. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. W3-W5.
- 2 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 18 (9) , W3-W5
Response to Open Peer Commentaries on ‘‘In Defense of ‘Denial’: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad”
(2018). Response to Open Peer Commentaries on ‘‘In Defense of ‘Denial’: Difficulty Knowing When Beliefs Are Unrealistic and Whether Unrealistic Beliefs Are Bad”. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 18, No. 9, pp. W3-W5.
- 25 April 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 16 (5) , 5-15
Biases and Heuristics in Decision Making and Their Impact on Autonomy
Cognitive scientists have identified a wide range of biases and heuristics in human decision making over the past few decades. Only recently have bioethicists begun to think seriously about the implications of these findings for topics such as agency, autonomy, and consent. This article aims to provide an overview of biases and heuristics that have been identified and a framework in which to think comprehensively about the impact of them on the exercise of autonomous decision making. I analyze the impact that these biases and heuristics have on the following dimensions of autonomy: understanding, intentionality, absence of alienating or controlling influence, and match between formally autonomous preferences or decisions and actual choices or actions.
- 25 April 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 16 (5) , 5-15
Biases and Heuristics in Decision Making and Their Impact on Autonomy
Cognitive scientists have identified a wide range of biases and heuristics in human decision making over the past few decades. Only recently have bioethicists begun to think seriously about the implications of these findings for topics such as agency, autonomy, and consent. This article aims to provide an overview of biases and heuristics that have been identified and a framework in which to think comprehensively about the impact of them on the exercise of autonomous decision making. I analyze the impact that these biases and heuristics have on the following dimensions of autonomy: understanding, intentionality, absence of alienating or controlling influence, and match between formally autonomous preferences or decisions and actual choices or actions.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Perinatal Medicine
- Vol. 44 (6) , 645-653
Communication about maternal-fetal surgery for myelomeningocele and congenital diaphragmatic hernia: preliminary findings with implications for informed consent and shared decision-making
To examine the style and content of consultations for maternal-fetal surgery and draw conclusions about best practices for informed consent and shared decision-making. Qualitative study of 15 h-long consultations with women diagnosed with fetal myelomeningocele (MMC, n=11) or congenital diaphragmatic hernia (CDH, n=4) who were potential candidates for maternal-fetal surgery at a large children's hospital in the Southwestern US. Major findings were that physicians tended to discuss the risks of fetal prognosis qualitatively more often than quantitatively (70% compared to 30%) and when mortality was a risk the "positive" (percentage survival) frame was always given rather than the morality frame. On average, families only talked 15% of the time and 45% of all their questions were about diagnostic or surgical procedure clarification. Efforts should be made to minimize qualitative presentation of risk, which can be vague and confusing to patients. Both survival and mortality frames should be used to avoid biased decision-making. Communication and decision support tools that facilitate more shared decision-making between families and physicians are needed.
- 1 January 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Perinatal Medicine
- Vol. 44 (6) , 645-653
Communication about maternal-fetal surgery for myelomeningocele and congenital diaphragmatic hernia: preliminary findings with implications for informed consent and shared decision-making
To examine the style and content of consultations for maternal-fetal surgery and draw conclusions about best practices for informed consent and shared decision-making. Qualitative study of 15 h-long consultations with women diagnosed with fetal myelomeningocele (MMC, n=11) or congenital diaphragmatic hernia (CDH, n=4) who were potential candidates for maternal-fetal surgery at a large children's hospital in the Southwestern US. Major findings were that physicians tended to discuss the risks of fetal prognosis qualitatively more often than quantitatively (70% compared to 30%) and when mortality was a risk the "positive" (percentage survival) frame was always given rather than the morality frame. On average, families only talked 15% of the time and 45% of all their questions were about diagnostic or surgical procedure clarification. Efforts should be made to minimize qualitative presentation of risk, which can be vague and confusing to patients. Both survival and mortality frames should be used to avoid biased decision-making. Communication and decision support tools that facilitate more shared decision-making between families and physicians are needed.
- 20 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 44 (2) , 395-406
Dilemmas for the Rarity Thesis in Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology
- 20 November 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 44 (2) , 395-406
Dilemmas for the Rarity Thesis in Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology
- 23 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 44 (1) , 87-100
What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How
- 23 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 44 (1) , 87-100
What Sort of Collective Afterlife Matters and How