Tiago Ventura
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Tiago Ventura has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ernesto Calvo
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, College Park, USA
8 shared publications - Natalia Aruguete
CONICET; Universidad Nacional de Quilmes
5 shared publications - Carlos Scartascini
Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, USA
4 shared publications Jonathan Nagler
New York University
3 shared publications- Joshua A. Tucker
New York University
3 shared publications - Bernhard Clemm von Hohenberg
University of the Bundeswehr Munich
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 58 (12) , 1-28
Comparing the Humanness of Machine-Generated and Human-Authored Text
As chatbots have become more commonplace writing tools, a need exists to understand the breadth of research about the humanness of machine-generated text via techniques that extend beyond the traditional Turing Test, in both dialogue (e.g., conversing with a chatbot) and non-dialogue (e.g., reading a news article) scenarios. To fill this gap and support future work, we survey current literature that examines and identifies humanness features of written communication generated with the state-of-the-art generative pre-trained transformer language models, provide a working definition of humanness, propose a text-based humanness taxonomy based on linguistic properties, and identify current research gaps.
- 18 May 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Computing Surveys
- Vol. 58 (12) , 1-28
Open AccessComparing the Humanness of Machine-Generated and Human-Authored Text
As chatbots have become more commonplace writing tools, a need exists to understand the breadth of research about the humanness of machine-generated text via techniques that extend beyond the traditional Turing Test, in both dialogue (e.g., conversing with a chatbot) and non-dialogue (e.g., reading a news article) scenarios. To fill this gap and support future work, we survey current literature that examines and identifies humanness features of written communication generated with the state-of-the-art generative pre-trained transformer language models, provide a working definition of humanness, propose a text-based humanness taxonomy based on linguistic properties, and identify current research gaps.
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Reducing Social Media Usage During Elections: Evidence from a Multi-Country WhatsApp Experiment
Social media messaging platforms are central to worldwide communication, but are also major hubs of misinformation and toxic content. On these platforms, informationspreads through interpersonal and group-based chats rather than feed-based recommendations. We argue that introducing barriers to usage can increase the costs ofconsuming low-quality content and promote more deliberate engagement, shaping information consumption and downstream attitudes. We evaluate our argument throughthree coordinated online field experiments in Brazil, India, and South Africa. We incentivize participants to either avoid multimedia content on WhatsApp or to limit theirusage to 10 minutes per day for four weeks ahead of each country’s elections. Our interventions significantly reduced participants’ exposure to uncivil political discussionsand misinformation—but at the expense of keeping up with political news. However, political attitudes did not shift, although treated participants did report improved wellbeing, particularly when they substituted WhatsApp usage with more offline activities.
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessReducing Social Media Usage During Elections: Evidence from a Multi-Country WhatsApp Experiment
Social media messaging platforms are central to worldwide communication, but are also major hubs of misinformation and toxic content. On these platforms, informationspreads through interpersonal and group-based chats rather than feed-based recommendations. We argue that introducing barriers to usage can increase the costs ofconsuming low-quality content and promote more deliberate engagement, shaping information consumption and downstream attitudes. We evaluate our argument throughthree coordinated online field experiments in Brazil, India, and South Africa. We incentivize participants to either avoid multimedia content on WhatsApp or to limit theirusage to 10 minutes per day for four weeks ahead of each country’s elections. Our interventions significantly reduced participants’ exposure to uncivil political discussionsand misinformation—but at the expense of keeping up with political news. However, political attitudes did not shift, although treated participants did report improved wellbeing, particularly when they substituted WhatsApp usage with more offline activities.
- Open Access
- 21 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Partisan Effects of Social Media Bans
What happens to information environments when democracies ban social media platforms? While a large literature examines information control under authoritarianism, democratic governments have increasingly intervened in major online platforms. We study a prominent case: Brazil's 2024 national ban on the social media platform X. Using an event-study design, we estimate the causal effects of the ban and examine how partisan identity shaped responses. Drawing on a large sample of politically engaged users and ideal-point estimates of ideology, we find strong partisan asymmetries. Conservative users not aligned with the government were more likely to circumvent the ban, and right-leaning news domains became markedly more prevalent on the platform. We describe this dynamic as a ``sorting ratchet": the ban segmented the digital public sphere along partisan lines, with effects that persisted even after restrictions were lifted. Platform bans in democratic settings may therefore deepen polarization and durably reshape information environments.
- 21 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Partisan Effects of Social Media Bans
What happens to information environments when democracies ban social media platforms? While a large literature examines information control under authoritarianism, democratic governments have increasingly intervened in major online platforms. We study a prominent case: Brazil's 2024 national ban on the social media platform X. Using an event-study design, we estimate the causal effects of the ban and examine how partisan identity shaped responses. Drawing on a large sample of politically engaged users and ideal-point estimates of ideology, we find strong partisan asymmetries. Conservative users not aligned with the government were more likely to circumvent the ban, and right-leaning news domains became markedly more prevalent on the platform. We describe this dynamic as a ``sorting ratchet": the ban segmented the digital public sphere along partisan lines, with effects that persisted even after restrictions were lifted. Platform bans in democratic settings may therefore deepen polarization and durably reshape information environments.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Stage 1 Registered Report: Testing the Causal Impact of Social Media Reduction Around the Globe
More than half of the world’s population uses social media. There is widespread debate among the public, politicians, and academics about social media’s impact on important outcomes, such as intergroup conflict and well-being. However, most prior research on the impact of social media relies on samples from the United States and Western Europe, despite emerging evidence suggesting that the impact of social media is likely to differ across the globe. Building on the results of pilot experiments from three countries (n = 894), we plan to conduct a global field experiment to measure the causal impact of reducing social media usage for two weeks across 23 countries (projected n > 8,000). We will then test how social media reduction influences four main outcomes: news knowledge, exposure to online hostility, intergroup attitudes, and well-being. We will also explore how the effects of social media reduction vary across world regions, focusing on three theoretically-informed country-level moderators: income level, inequality, and democratic strength. This large-scale, high-powered field experiment, and the global dataset resulting from it, will offer rare causal evidence to inform ongoing debates about the impact of social media and how it varies around the world.
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessStage 1 Registered Report: Testing the Causal Impact of Social Media Reduction Around the Globe
More than half of the world’s population uses social media. There is widespread debate among the public, politicians, and academics about social media’s impact on important outcomes, such as intergroup conflict and well-being. However, most prior research on the impact of social media relies on samples from the United States and Western Europe, despite emerging evidence suggesting that the impact of social media is likely to differ across the globe. Building on the results of pilot experiments from three countries (n = 894), we plan to conduct a global field experiment to measure the causal impact of reducing social media usage for two weeks across 23 countries (projected n > 8,000). We will then test how social media reduction influences four main outcomes: news knowledge, exposure to online hostility, intergroup attitudes, and well-being. We will also explore how the effects of social media reduction vary across world regions, focusing on three theoretically-informed country-level moderators: income level, inequality, and democratic strength. This large-scale, high-powered field experiment, and the global dataset resulting from it, will offer rare causal evidence to inform ongoing debates about the impact of social media and how it varies around the world.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 489
Survey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data – ERRATUM
- 4 December 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 489
Open AccessSurvey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data – ERRATUM
- Open Access
- 6 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 432-450
Survey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data
Online panels have become an important resource for research in political science, but the compensation offered to panelists incentivizes them to become “survey professionals,” raising concerns about data quality. We provide evidence on survey professionalism exploring three US samples of subjects who donated their browsing data, recruited via Lucid, YouGov, and Facebook (total n equals 3 comma 886 $n = 3,886$ ). Survey professionalism is common, but varies across samples: by our most conservative estimate, we find 1.7% of respondents on Facebook, 7. backslash color b l a c k Baseline 6 $\color {black}6$ % on YouGov, and 34 backslash color b l a c k period 7 $\color {black}.7$ % on Lucid to be professionals (under the assumption that professionals are as likely as non-professionals to donate data after conditioning on observable demographics available from all online survey takers). However, evidence that professionals lower data quality is limited: they do not systematically differ demographically or politically from non-professionals and do not exhibit more response instability. They are, however, somewhat more likely to speed, straightline, and attempt to take questionnaires repeatedly. To address potential selection issues in donating of browsing data, we present sensitivity analyses with lower bounds for survey professionalism. While concerns about professionalism are warranted, we conclude that survey professionals do not, by and large, distort inferences of research based on online panels.- 6 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 34 (3) , 432-450
Open AccessSurvey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data
Online panels have become an important resource for research in political science, but the compensation offered to panelists incentivizes them to become “survey professionals,” raising concerns about data quality. We provide evidence on survey professionalism exploring three US samples of subjects who donated their browsing data, recruited via Lucid, YouGov, and Facebook (total n equals 3 comma 886 $n = 3,886$ ). Survey professionalism is common, but varies across samples: by our most conservative estimate, we find 1.7% of respondents on Facebook, 7. backslash color b l a c k Baseline 6 $\color {black}6$ % on YouGov, and 34 backslash color b l a c k period 7 $\color {black}.7$ % on Lucid to be professionals (under the assumption that professionals are as likely as non-professionals to donate data after conditioning on observable demographics available from all online survey takers). However, evidence that professionals lower data quality is limited: they do not systematically differ demographically or politically from non-professionals and do not exhibit more response instability. They are, however, somewhat more likely to speed, straightline, and attempt to take questionnaires repeatedly. To address potential selection issues in donating of browsing data, we present sensitivity analyses with lower bounds for survey professionalism. While concerns about professionalism are warranted, we conclude that survey professionals do not, by and large, distort inferences of research based on online panels. - Open Access
- 2 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Survey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data
Online panels have become an important resource for research in political science, but the financial compensation involved incentivizes respondents to become “survey professionals”, which raises concerns about data quality. We provide evidence on survey professionalism using behavioral web browsing data from three U.S. samples, recruited via Lucid, YouGov, and Facebook (total n = 3,886). Survey professionalism is common but varies across samples: By our most conservative measure, we identify 1.7% of respondents on Facebook, 7.9% of respondents on YouGov, and 34.3% of respondents on Lucid as survey professionals. However, evidence that professionals lower data quality is limited: they do not systematically differ demographically or politically from non-professionals and do not respond more randomly—although they are somewhat more likely to speed, to straightline, and to take questionnaires repeatedly. While concerns are warranted, we conclude that survey professionals do not, by and large, distort inferences of research based on online panels.
- 2 September 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessSurvey Professionalism: New Evidence from Web Browsing Data
Online panels have become an important resource for research in political science, but the financial compensation involved incentivizes respondents to become “survey professionals”, which raises concerns about data quality. We provide evidence on survey professionalism using behavioral web browsing data from three U.S. samples, recruited via Lucid, YouGov, and Facebook (total n = 3,886). Survey professionalism is common but varies across samples: By our most conservative measure, we identify 1.7% of respondents on Facebook, 7.9% of respondents on YouGov, and 34.3% of respondents on Lucid as survey professionals. However, evidence that professionals lower data quality is limited: they do not systematically differ demographically or politically from non-professionals and do not respond more randomly—although they are somewhat more likely to speed, to straightline, and to take questionnaires repeatedly. While concerns are warranted, we conclude that survey professionals do not, by and large, distort inferences of research based on online panels.
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Felipe Herrera Library (Inter-American Development Bank)
Research Insights: How Do Confirmation Frames Reduce Misinformation in Fact-Checking?
Confirmation frames lead to higher engagement rates than refutation frames across four countries. Confirmation frames are also associated with reduced negative emotions and affective polarization, which is vital for policy interventions targeting health misinformation and harmful speech. By reducing negative emotions and fostering positive ones, confirmation frames could contribute to a more constructive and less polarized online environment.
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Felipe Herrera Library (Inter-American Development Bank)
Research Insights: How Do Confirmation Frames Reduce Misinformation in Fact-Checking?
Confirmation frames lead to higher engagement rates than refutation frames across four countries. Confirmation frames are also associated with reduced negative emotions and affective polarization, which is vital for policy interventions targeting health misinformation and harmful speech. By reducing negative emotions and fostering positive ones, confirmation frames could contribute to a more constructive and less polarized online environment.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 101-106
Training Computational Social Science PhD Students for Academic and Non-Academic Careers
Social scientists with data science skills increasingly are assuming positions as computational social scientists in academic and non-academic organizations. However, because computational social science (CSS) is still relatively new to the social sciences, it can feel like a hidden curriculum for many PhD students. To support social science PhD students, this article is an accessible guide to CSS training based on previous literature and our collective working experiences in academic, public-, and private-sector organizations. We contend that students should supplement their traditional social science training in research design and domain expertise with CSS training by focusing on three core areas: (1) learning data science skills, (2) building a portfolio that uses data science to answer social science questions, and (3) connecting with computational social scientists. We conclude with practical recommendations for departments and professional associations to better support PhD students.
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (1) , 101-106
Open AccessTraining Computational Social Science PhD Students for Academic and Non-Academic Careers
Social scientists with data science skills increasingly are assuming positions as computational social scientists in academic and non-academic organizations. However, because computational social science (CSS) is still relatively new to the social sciences, it can feel like a hidden curriculum for many PhD students. To support social science PhD students, this article is an accessible guide to CSS training based on previous literature and our collective working experiences in academic, public-, and private-sector organizations. We contend that students should supplement their traditional social science training in research design and domain expertise with CSS training by focusing on three core areas: (1) learning data science skills, (2) building a portfolio that uses data science to answer social science questions, and (3) connecting with computational social scientists. We conclude with practical recommendations for departments and professional associations to better support PhD students.
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Felipe Herrera Library (Inter-American Development Bank)
Reducing Misinformation: The Role of Confirmation Frames in Fact-Checking Interventions
Previous research has extensively investigated why users spread misinformation online, while less attention has been given to the motivations behind sharing fact-checks. This paper reports a four-country survey experiment assessing the influence of confirmation and refutation frames on engagement with online fact-checks. Respondents randomly received semantically identical content, either affirming accurate information (“It is TRUE that p”) or refuting misinformation (“It is FALSE that not p”). Despite semantic equivalence, confirmation frames elicit higher engagement rates than refutation frames. Additionally, confirmation frames reduce self-reported negative emotions related to polarization. These findings are crucial for designing policy interventions aiming to amplify fact-check exposure and reduce affective polarization, particularly in critical areas such as health-related misinformation and harmful speech.
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Felipe Herrera Library (Inter-American Development Bank)
Reducing Misinformation: The Role of Confirmation Frames in Fact-Checking Interventions
Previous research has extensively investigated why users spread misinformation online, while less attention has been given to the motivations behind sharing fact-checks. This paper reports a four-country survey experiment assessing the influence of confirmation and refutation frames on engagement with online fact-checks. Respondents randomly received semantically identical content, either affirming accurate information (“It is TRUE that p”) or refuting misinformation (“It is FALSE that not p”). Despite semantic equivalence, confirmation frames elicit higher engagement rates than refutation frames. Additionally, confirmation frames reduce self-reported negative emotions related to polarization. These findings are crucial for designing policy interventions aiming to amplify fact-check exposure and reduce affective polarization, particularly in critical areas such as health-related misinformation and harmful speech.