Sergio Montero
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Sergio Montero has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Abhijit V. Banerjee
Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( )
1 shared publication- Anderson Frey
University of Rochester
1 shared publication Benjamin J Gillen
Claremont-McKenna College, Robert Day School of Economics and Finance, Claremont, CA 91711
1 shared publicationErik Snowberg
Vancouver School of Economics, University of British Columbia ( )
1 shared publication- Gabriel López‐Moctezuma
California Institute of Technology
1 shared publication Hyungsik Roger Moon
University of Southern California, Dept. of Economics, Los Angeles, CA 90089; Yonsei University, Dept. of Economics, Seoul, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 67 (4) , 915-931
Sleeping with the Enemy: Effective Representation under Dynamic Electoral Competition
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties – among other unconventional electoral strategies – may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short‐term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future. This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections. We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995 and 2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have served as an instrument of democratic consolidation.
- 3 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 67 (4) , 915-931
Sleeping with the Enemy: Effective Representation under Dynamic Electoral Competition
Electoral coalitions between ideologically incompatible parties – among other unconventional electoral strategies – may seem to threaten effective representation, signaling a breakdown of programmatic politics. However, this perspective overlooks parties' and voters' dynamic considerations. We propose and estimate a model of dynamic electoral competition in which a short‐term ideology compromise, via an electoral coalition, offers opposition parties (and voters) the opportunity to remove an entrenched incumbent party from office, thus leveling the playing field in the future. This tradeoff provides a previously unrecognized rationale for coalition formation in elections. We take our model to data from Mexican municipal elections between 1995 and 2016 and show that coalitions between parties on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum have served as an instrument of democratic consolidation.
- 14 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (4) , 1195-1212
Learning about Growth and Democracy
We develop and estimate a model of learning that accounts for the observed correlation between economic development and democracy and for the clustering of democratization events. In our model, countries’ own and neighbors’ past experiences shape elites’ beliefs about the effects of democracy on economic growth and their likelihood of retaining power. These beliefs influence the choice to transition into or out of democracy. We show that learning is crucial to explaining observed transitions since the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, our model predicts reversals to authoritarianism if the world experienced a growth shock the size of the Great Depression.
- 14 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 114 (4) , 1195-1212
Learning about Growth and Democracy
We develop and estimate a model of learning that accounts for the observed correlation between economic development and democracy and for the clustering of democratization events. In our model, countries’ own and neighbors’ past experiences shape elites’ beliefs about the effects of democracy on economic growth and their likelihood of retaining power. These beliefs influence the choice to transition into or out of democracy. We show that learning is crucial to explaining observed transitions since the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, our model predicts reversals to authoritarianism if the world experienced a growth shock the size of the Great Depression.
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 110 (4) , 1206-1230
A Theory of Experimenters: Robustness, Randomization, and Balance
This paper studies the problem of experiment design by an ambiguity-averse decision-maker who trades off subjective expected performance against robust performance guarantees. This framework accounts for real-world experimenters’ preference for randomization. It also clarifies the circumstances in which randomization is optimal: when the available sample size is large and robustness is an important concern. We apply our model to shed light on the practice of rerandomization, used to improve balance across treatment and control groups. We show that rerandomization creates a trade-off between subjective performance and robust performance guarantees. However, robust performance guarantees diminish very slowly with the number of rerandomizations. This suggests that moderate levels of rerandomization usefully expand the set of acceptable compromises between subjective performance and robustness. Targeting a fixed quantile of balance is safer than targeting an absolute balance objective. (JEL C90, D81)
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 110 (4) , 1206-1230
A Theory of Experimenters: Robustness, Randomization, and Balance
This paper studies the problem of experiment design by an ambiguity-averse decision-maker who trades off subjective expected performance against robust performance guarantees. This framework accounts for real-world experimenters’ preference for randomization. It also clarifies the circumstances in which randomization is optimal: when the available sample size is large and robustness is an important concern. We apply our model to shed light on the practice of rerandomization, used to improve balance across treatment and control groups. We show that rerandomization creates a trade-off between subjective performance and robust performance guarantees. However, robust performance guarantees diminish very slowly with the number of rerandomizations. This suggests that moderate levels of rerandomization usefully expand the set of acceptable compromises between subjective performance and robustness. Targeting a fixed quantile of balance is safer than targeting an absolute balance objective. (JEL C90, D81)
- 11 July 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Econometrics Journal
- Vol. 22 (3) , 262-281
BLP-2LASSO for aggregate discrete choice models with rich covariates
Summary: We introduce the BLP-2LASSO model, which augments the classic BLP (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) random-coefficients logit model to allow for data-driven selection among a high-dimensional set of control variables using the 'double-LASSO' procedure proposed by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2013). Economists often study consumers’ aggregate behaviour across markets choosing from a menu of differentiated products. In this analysis, local demographic characteristics can serve as controls for market-specific preference heterogeneity. Given rich demographic data, implementing these models requires specifying which variables to include in the analysis, an ad hoc process typically guided primarily by a researcher’s intuition. We propose a data-driven approach to estimate these models, applying penalized estimation algorithms from the recent literature in high-dimensional econometrics. Our application explores the effect of campaign spending on vote shares in data from Mexican elections.
- 11 July 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Econometrics Journal
- Vol. 22 (3) , 262-281
BLP-2LASSO for aggregate discrete choice models with rich covariates
Summary: We introduce the BLP-2LASSO model, which augments the classic BLP (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995) random-coefficients logit model to allow for data-driven selection among a high-dimensional set of control variables using the 'double-LASSO' procedure proposed by Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2013). Economists often study consumers’ aggregate behaviour across markets choosing from a menu of differentiated products. In this analysis, local demographic characteristics can serve as controls for market-specific preference heterogeneity. Given rich demographic data, implementing these models requires specifying which variables to include in the analysis, an ad hoc process typically guided primarily by a researcher’s intuition. We propose a data-driven approach to estimate these models, applying penalized estimation algorithms from the recent literature in high-dimensional econometrics. Our application explores the effect of campaign spending on vote shares in data from Mexican elections.