David Basin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
David Basin has a total of 167 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ralf Sasse
ETH Zurich
26 shared publications - Adrian Perrig
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
22 shared publications - Cas Cremers
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany
20 shared publications - Jannik Dreier
Université de Lorraine CNRS Inria LORIA
20 shared publications - Srđan Krstić
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
19 shared publications - David Hausheer
Otto-von-Guericke Universität Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
18 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7043-7057
Models Trump Code: An Empirical Analysis of GDPR Compliance
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7043-7057
Open AccessModels Trump Code: An Empirical Analysis of GDPR Compliance
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7013-7027
eBind: Privacy-Enhanced and eIDAS 2.0-Compliant Binding of Anonymous Credentials to Humans
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7013-7027
Open AccesseBind: Privacy-Enhanced and eIDAS 2.0-Compliant Binding of Anonymous Credentials to Humans
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3205-3219
Lex: Turning Laws into Enforceable Security Policies
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3205-3219
Open AccessLex: Turning Laws into Enforceable Security Policies
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 10 (OOPSLA2) , 260-287
A Type System for Optimizing Dynamic IFC
Dynamic information-flow control (IFC) enforces confidentiality policies at runtime by tagging values with security labels and blocking policy-violating outputs by terminating the running system. Pervasive label tracking and enforcement checks incur high runtime costs, which limits practical IFC deployment to performance-insensitive workloads. We present a novel alternative called MinIF, a type-directed program transformation that statically eliminates the overhead of dynamic IFC for existing systems. The central contribution of MinIF is a flow-sensitive type system that tracks which sensitive inputs influence a value and whether the enforcement mechanism would accept operations on it, even though the enforced policy is unknown to the type system. Using the type system, MinIF statically predicts enforcement outcomes and removes redundant checks along with the label-tracking code that served them, and we prove that the optimized program preserves both the behavior and the enforcement decisions of the original. For IFC systems with introspection, the optimization is fully automatic, as the introspection queries already present in the program supply all the permission information MinIF needs, with no programmer annotations. Unresolved checks surface as warnings, and the absence of warnings gives developers a static guarantee against enforcement-induced system termination. We evaluate MinIF on Python programs running on the WebTTC dynamic IFC platform. On benchmarks, MinIF eliminates between 13% and 99% of the enforcement overhead, and compute-intensive workloads that time out under enforcement now complete in milliseconds.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
- Vol. 10 (OOPSLA2) , 260-287
Open AccessA Type System for Optimizing Dynamic IFC
Dynamic information-flow control (IFC) enforces confidentiality policies at runtime by tagging values with security labels and blocking policy-violating outputs by terminating the running system. Pervasive label tracking and enforcement checks incur high runtime costs, which limits practical IFC deployment to performance-insensitive workloads. We present a novel alternative called MinIF, a type-directed program transformation that statically eliminates the overhead of dynamic IFC for existing systems. The central contribution of MinIF is a flow-sensitive type system that tracks which sensitive inputs influence a value and whether the enforcement mechanism would accept operations on it, even though the enforced policy is unknown to the type system. Using the type system, MinIF statically predicts enforcement outcomes and removes redundant checks along with the label-tracking code that served them, and we prove that the optimized program preserves both the behavior and the enforcement decisions of the original. For IFC systems with introspection, the optimization is fully automatic, as the introspection queries already present in the program supply all the permission information MinIF needs, with no programmer annotations. Unresolved checks surface as warnings, and the absence of warnings gives developers a static guarantee against enforcement-induced system termination. We evaluate MinIF on Python programs running on the WebTTC dynamic IFC platform. On benchmarks, MinIF eliminates between 13% and 99% of the enforcement overhead, and compute-intensive workloads that time out under enforcement now complete in milliseconds.
- Open Access
Beyond the Finite Variant Property: Extending Symbolic Diffie-Hellman Group Models (Extended Version)
Diffie-Hellman groups are commonly used in cryptographic protocols. While most state-of-the-art, symbolic protocol verifiers support them to some degree, they do not support all mathematical operations possible in these groups. In particular, they lack support for exponent addition, as these tools reason about terms using unification, which is undecidable in the theory describing all Diffie-Hellman operators. In this paper we approximate such a theory and propose a semi-decision procedure to determine whether a protocol, which may use all operations in such groups, satisfies user-defined properties. We implement this approach by extending the Tamarin prover to support the full Diffie-Hellman theory, including group element multiplication and hence addition of exponents. This is the first time a state-of-the-art tool can model and reason about such protocols. We illustrate our approach's effectiveness with different case studies: ElGamal encryption and MQV. Using Tamarin, we prove security properties of ElGamal, and we rediscover known attacks on MQV.
Open AccessBeyond the Finite Variant Property: Extending Symbolic Diffie-Hellman Group Models (Extended Version)
Diffie-Hellman groups are commonly used in cryptographic protocols. While most state-of-the-art, symbolic protocol verifiers support them to some degree, they do not support all mathematical operations possible in these groups. In particular, they lack support for exponent addition, as these tools reason about terms using unification, which is undecidable in the theory describing all Diffie-Hellman operators. In this paper we approximate such a theory and propose a semi-decision procedure to determine whether a protocol, which may use all operations in such groups, satisfies user-defined properties. We implement this approach by extending the Tamarin prover to support the full Diffie-Hellman theory, including group element multiplication and hence addition of exponents. This is the first time a state-of-the-art tool can model and reason about such protocols. We illustrate our approach's effectiveness with different case studies: ElGamal encryption and MQV. Using Tamarin, we prove security properties of ElGamal, and we rediscover known attacks on MQV.
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2759-2773
Looping for Good: Cyclic Proofs for Security Protocols
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2759-2773
Open AccessLooping for Good: Cyclic Proofs for Security Protocols
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1469-1483
Protocols to Code: Formal Verification of a Secure Next-Generation Internet Router
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1469-1483
Open AccessProtocols to Code: Formal Verification of a Secure Next-Generation Internet Router
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2-5
Mechanizing Privacy by Design
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2-5
Open AccessMechanizing Privacy by Design
- Open Access
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
- Vol. 3 (4) , 1-26
Testing Graph Databases with Synthesized Queries
Graph databases (GDBs) are increasingly used in many applications. However, their advanced features make them prone to logic bugs. Despite advances in GDB testing, a common limitation of current approaches is the lack of ground truth for their test oracles. This results in both incorrectly identified bugs and overlooked bugs. We introduce GQS (Graph Query Synthesis), the first automated testing approach for detecting logic bugs in graph databases (GDBs) based on an established ground truth. GQS starts by randomly generating a graph and selecting a set of properties associated with its elements, whose key-value pairs form the expected result set serving as the ground truth. It then synthesizes a query that should retrieve these values from the graph. When the query is executed on the graph by the GDB under test, any discrepancy between the actual result set and the ground truth indicates a logic bug. To extensively test a GDB, we develop novel techniques that synthesize both syntactically and semantically complex queries. We implement GQS in a tool that incorporates the first Cypher query synthesizer specifically designed for testing GDBs. Our tool finds 36 previously unknown bugs across four production GDBs, of which 26 are logic bugs, with some remaining undetected for up to five years. Additionally, our tool demonstrates superior effectiveness in bug detection compared to the state-of-the-art testers.
- 22 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Management of Data
- Vol. 3 (4) , 1-26
Open AccessTesting Graph Databases with Synthesized Queries
Graph databases (GDBs) are increasingly used in many applications. However, their advanced features make them prone to logic bugs. Despite advances in GDB testing, a common limitation of current approaches is the lack of ground truth for their test oracles. This results in both incorrectly identified bugs and overlooked bugs. We introduce GQS (Graph Query Synthesis), the first automated testing approach for detecting logic bugs in graph databases (GDBs) based on an established ground truth. GQS starts by randomly generating a graph and selecting a set of properties associated with its elements, whose key-value pairs form the expected result set serving as the ground truth. It then synthesizes a query that should retrieve these values from the graph. When the query is executed on the graph by the GDB under test, any discrepancy between the actual result set and the ground truth indicates a logic bug. To extensively test a GDB, we develop novel techniques that synthesize both syntactically and semantically complex queries. We implement GQS in a tool that incorporates the first Cypher query synthesizer specifically designed for testing GDBs. Our tool finds 36 previously unknown bugs across four production GDBs, of which 26 are logic bugs, with some remaining undetected for up to five years. Additionally, our tool demonstrates superior effectiveness in bug detection compared to the state-of-the-art testers.