Alan I. Abramowitz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alan I. Abramowitz has a total of 56 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alfred G. Cuzán
University of West Florida
1 shared publication - Andreas Graefe
Macromedia University of Applied Sciences
1 shared publication B Cox
Community Colleges
1 shared publication- Bartholomew H. Sparrow
Department of Government, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
1 shared publication - Ben Ansell
University of Oxford
1 shared publication - Brad Lockerbie
East Carolina University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Polity
- Vol. 55 (3) , 633-637
The Generic Ballot Model and the 2022 Midterm Election
- 1 July 2023
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Polity
- Vol. 55 (3) , 633-637
The Generic Ballot Model and the 2022 Midterm Election
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 19 (3) , 349-364
It’s Only You and Me and We Just Disagree: The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization
Using the extensive battery of issue questions included in the 2020 ANES survey, I find that a single underlying liberal-conservative dimension largely explains the policy preferences of ordinary Americans across a wide range of issues including the size and scope of the welfare state, abortion, gay and transgender rights, race relations, immigration, gun control and climate change. I find that the distribution of preferences on this liberal-conservative issue scale is highly polarized with Democratic identifiers and leaners located overwhelmingly on the left, Republican identifiers and leaners located overwhelmingly on the right and little overlap between the two distributions. Finally, I show that ideological preferences strongly predict feelings toward the parties and presidential candidates. These findings indicate that polarization in the American public has a rational foundation. Hostility toward the opposing party reflects strong disagreement with the policies of the opposing party. As long as the parties remain on the opposite sides of almost all major issues, feelings of mistrust and animosity are unlikely to diminish regardless of Donald Trump’s future role in the Republican Party.
- 29 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 19 (3) , 349-364
It’s Only You and Me and We Just Disagree: The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization
Using the extensive battery of issue questions included in the 2020 ANES survey, I find that a single underlying liberal-conservative dimension largely explains the policy preferences of ordinary Americans across a wide range of issues including the size and scope of the welfare state, abortion, gay and transgender rights, race relations, immigration, gun control and climate change. I find that the distribution of preferences on this liberal-conservative issue scale is highly polarized with Democratic identifiers and leaners located overwhelmingly on the left, Republican identifiers and leaners located overwhelmingly on the right and little overlap between the two distributions. Finally, I show that ideological preferences strongly predict feelings toward the parties and presidential candidates. These findings indicate that polarization in the American public has a rational foundation. Hostility toward the opposing party reflects strong disagreement with the policies of the opposing party. As long as the parties remain on the opposite sides of almost all major issues, feelings of mistrust and animosity are unlikely to diminish regardless of Donald Trump’s future role in the Republican Party.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 83-106
Ideological Realignment and the Nationalization of Southern Politics: Party Activists and Candidates in Virginia
The possibility of a party realignment in the American South has fascinated students of electoral behavior and southern politics for the past quarter century. 1 Almost all of the research on this topic, however, has been concerned with voting behavior. The central argument of this study is that a party realignment also involves a change in the nature of the choices that are offered the electorate by party elites. In the United States, since the New Deal, the national Democratic and Republican parties have generally presented the electorate with a choice between liberal and conservative political philosophies. This study examines the clarity of choices presented to voters by party elites—activists and candidates—in Virginia, a southern state that has recently witnessed the rapid development of two-party competition.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 83-106
Ideological Realignment and the Nationalization of Southern Politics: Party Activists and Candidates in Virginia
The possibility of a party realignment in the American South has fascinated students of electoral behavior and southern politics for the past quarter century. 1 Almost all of the research on this topic, however, has been concerned with voting behavior. The central argument of this study is that a party realignment also involves a change in the nature of the choices that are offered the electorate by party elites. In the United States, since the New Deal, the national Democratic and Republican parties have generally presented the electorate with a choice between liberal and conservative political philosophies. This study examines the clarity of choices presented to voters by party elites—activists and candidates—in Virginia, a southern state that has recently witnessed the rapid development of two-party competition.
- 15 October 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 54 (1) , 52-54
It’s the Pandemic, Stupid! A Simplified Model for Forecasting the 2020 Presidential Election
- 15 October 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 54 (1) , 52-54
It’s the Pandemic, Stupid! A Simplified Model for Forecasting the 2020 Presidential Election
- Top Cited Papers
- 20 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
- Vol. 681 (1) , 137-156
United States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America
Growing racial, ideological, and cultural polarization within the American electorate contributed to the shocking victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Using data from American National Election Studies surveys, we show that Trump’s unusually explicit appeals to racial and ethnic resentment attracted strong support from white working-class voters while repelling many college-educated whites along with the overwhelming majority of nonwhite voters. However, Trump’s campaign exploited divisions that have been growing within the electorate for decades because of demographic and cultural changes in American society. The 2016 presidential campaign also reinforced another longstanding trend in American electoral politics: the rise of negative partisanship, that is voting based on hostility toward the opposing party and its leaders. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of deepening partisan and affective polarization for American democracy and the perceptions by both experts and the public of an erosion in its quality.
- 20 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
- Vol. 681 (1) , 137-156
Top Cited PapersUnited States: Racial Resentment, Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America
Growing racial, ideological, and cultural polarization within the American electorate contributed to the shocking victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election. Using data from American National Election Studies surveys, we show that Trump’s unusually explicit appeals to racial and ethnic resentment attracted strong support from white working-class voters while repelling many college-educated whites along with the overwhelming majority of nonwhite voters. However, Trump’s campaign exploited divisions that have been growing within the electorate for decades because of demographic and cultural changes in American society. The 2016 presidential campaign also reinforced another longstanding trend in American electoral politics: the rise of negative partisanship, that is voting based on hostility toward the opposing party and its leaders. We conclude with a discussion of the consequences of deepening partisan and affective polarization for American democracy and the perceptions by both experts and the public of an erosion in its quality.
- Top Cited Papers
- 13 February 2018
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 39 (S1) , 119-135
Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans
One of the most important developments in American politics over the last 40 years has been the rise of negative partisanship—the phenomenon whereby Americans largely align against one party instead of affiliating with the other. Though it has the power to reshape patterns of political behavior, little is known about the microfoundations driving negative partisanship. In this article, we show how the growing racial divide between the two major parties, as well as the presence of partisan‐friendly media outlets, have led to the rise of negative partisanship. We also utilize the growing literature on personality and politics to show how the Big Five personality traits are predictive of negative partisanship. The results suggest that the psychological roots of negative partisanship are both widespread and, absent drastic individual and structural‐level changes, likely to persist.
- 13 February 2018
- Published by Wiley in Political Psychology
- Vol. 39 (S1) , 119-135
Top Cited PapersNegative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans
One of the most important developments in American politics over the last 40 years has been the rise of negative partisanship—the phenomenon whereby Americans largely align against one party instead of affiliating with the other. Though it has the power to reshape patterns of political behavior, little is known about the microfoundations driving negative partisanship. In this article, we show how the growing racial divide between the two major parties, as well as the presence of partisan‐friendly media outlets, have led to the rise of negative partisanship. We also utilize the growing literature on personality and politics to show how the Big Five personality traits are predictive of negative partisanship. The results suggest that the psychological roots of negative partisanship are both widespread and, absent drastic individual and structural‐level changes, likely to persist.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 50 (2) , f1-f8
PSC volume 50 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- 31 March 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 50 (2) , f1-f8
Open AccessPSC volume 50 issue 2 Cover and Front matter
- 14 July 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 39 (03) , 473-475
Just Weight! The Case for Dynamic Party Identification Weighting
- 14 July 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 39 (03) , 473-475
Just Weight! The Case for Dynamic Party Identification Weighting
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 35 (4) , 701-703
Gubernatorial Influence in Presidential Elections: Fact or Myth
“It is no accident that the president's travels this year have followed the map of states that top the Bush target list for winning in 2004, particularly Florida and Pennsylvania. That also helps explain why his advisers sometimes seem more focused on electing Republican governors rather than members of Congress in states like Florida, Illinois, and Michigan: they could help him immensely in 2004.”Richard L. Berke, “Is What's Good for Bush Also Good for the G.O.P.?” New York Times, February 10, 2002, section 4, p. 5.
- 1 March 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 35 (4) , 701-703
Gubernatorial Influence in Presidential Elections: Fact or Myth
“It is no accident that the president's travels this year have followed the map of states that top the Bush target list for winning in 2004, particularly Florida and Pennsylvania. That also helps explain why his advisers sometimes seem more focused on electing Republican governors rather than members of Congress in states like Florida, Illinois, and Michigan: they could help him immensely in 2004.”Richard L. Berke, “Is What's Good for Bush Also Good for the G.O.P.?” New York Times, February 10, 2002, section 4, p. 5.