Raunak M. Pillai
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Raunak M. Pillai has a total of 364 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Department of Psychology, New York University
7 shared publications Lisa Fazio
6 shared publications- Lisa K. Fazio
Vanderbilt University
6 shared publications - Steve Rathje
New York University, New York, NY, USA
6 shared publications - Laura K. Globig
Department of Psychology and Neural Science, New York University, New York, NY, USA
3 shared publications Lisa K. Fazio
Department of Psychology and Human Development, Vanderbilt University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Repetition increases belief more for trivia statements than news headlines
Repetition increases belief in true and false statements. This “illusory truth effect,” has been documented across dozens of experiments using materials ranging from trivia statements to claims about consumer products to political news. Further, current theories of the effect focus on low-level psychological cues like processing fluency that arise spontaneously and that should affect judgements of truth uniformly for all such types of statements. In contrast to this picture, we find that the size of the illusory truth effect varies for different types of statements, with larger effects occurring when people see banal trivia statements as opposed to political or viral, health-related news headlines. We report six studies (total N = 1,749 US MTurkers) demonstrating this effect or testing potential explanations. We find that these differences appear to be driven by the overall context of the type of statements participants encounter rather than features of each individual statement. These findings speak to the malleable nature of the link between repetition and belief, with repetition being more a more impactful contributor to beliefs in contexts where people are saying some kinds of statements (e.g., trivia statements) than others (e.g., political or health-related news).
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessRepetition increases belief more for trivia statements than news headlines
Repetition increases belief in true and false statements. This “illusory truth effect,” has been documented across dozens of experiments using materials ranging from trivia statements to claims about consumer products to political news. Further, current theories of the effect focus on low-level psychological cues like processing fluency that arise spontaneously and that should affect judgements of truth uniformly for all such types of statements. In contrast to this picture, we find that the size of the illusory truth effect varies for different types of statements, with larger effects occurring when people see banal trivia statements as opposed to political or viral, health-related news headlines. We report six studies (total N = 1,749 US MTurkers) demonstrating this effect or testing potential explanations. We find that these differences appear to be driven by the overall context of the type of statements participants encounter rather than features of each individual statement. These findings speak to the malleable nature of the link between repetition and belief, with repetition being more a more impactful contributor to beliefs in contexts where people are saying some kinds of statements (e.g., trivia statements) than others (e.g., political or health-related news).
- Open Access
- 20 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Bringing our tribes together: The promise and peril of interdisciplinary research on epistemically suspect beliefs
Epistemically suspect beliefs are studied across multiple disciplines, yet these literatures have developed largely in parallel. We argue that integrating research from clinical, social, cognitive, and political psychology offers an important opportunity to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the origins and consequences of these beliefs. In particular, research on social identity can help explain how people select information and social environments, evaluate evidence, and process information in ways that affirm their identities. Extending these insights to clinical contexts raises new questions about how social and personal identities shape susceptibility to certain beliefs, including in emerging information environments shaped by artificial intelligence. However, interdisciplinary research faces substantial institutional and psychological barriers. Academic incentives often reward disciplinary competition, simple theories, and surprising findings over integration, encouraging researchers to defend disciplinary identities and caricature competing perspectives. Building a robust science of beliefs therefore requires a culture of cooperation that prioritizes explanatory utility and theoretical synthesis over disciplinary dominance, and needs to be supported by interdisciplinary funding, hiring, training, conferences, and journals.
- 20 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessBringing our tribes together: The promise and peril of interdisciplinary research on epistemically suspect beliefs
Epistemically suspect beliefs are studied across multiple disciplines, yet these literatures have developed largely in parallel. We argue that integrating research from clinical, social, cognitive, and political psychology offers an important opportunity to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the origins and consequences of these beliefs. In particular, research on social identity can help explain how people select information and social environments, evaluate evidence, and process information in ways that affirm their identities. Extending these insights to clinical contexts raises new questions about how social and personal identities shape susceptibility to certain beliefs, including in emerging information environments shaped by artificial intelligence. However, interdisciplinary research faces substantial institutional and psychological barriers. Academic incentives often reward disciplinary competition, simple theories, and surprising findings over integration, encouraging researchers to defend disciplinary identities and caricature competing perspectives. Building a robust science of beliefs therefore requires a culture of cooperation that prioritizes explanatory utility and theoretical synthesis over disciplinary dominance, and needs to be supported by interdisciplinary funding, hiring, training, conferences, and journals.
- Open Access
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Impact of Sycophantic AI on Attitudes and Decisions
There is widespread concern that AI chatbots are “sycophantic,” or overly agreeable and validating. However, less is known about the causal impact of interacting with sycophantic AI on beliefs and behaviors. Across seven studies (total n = 7,227), we found that people enjoyed interacting with sycophantic AI chatbots more than interacting with neutral chatbots or “disagreeable” chatbots that challenged them. Brief conversations with sycophantic chatbots about political or personal topics increased the strength of people’s attitudes. However, popular AI models not prompted to be sycophantic did not consistently change attitudes. Sycophantic chatbots also inflated people’s perceptions that they were better than the average person on desirable traits (e.g., intelligence, empathy), and also led people to bet more money that they scored better than average on tasks purporting to measure desirable traits. Participants consistently rated sycophantic chatbots as more “unbiased” than disagreeable chatbots, even though third-party raters viewed these chatbots as equally biased, suggesting that people may be blind to biases in AI output that aligns with their views. Altogether, these results suggest that sycophantic model behavior can entrench attitudes and lead to overconfident beliefs and decisions. Despite this, people enjoy sycophantic models and often fail to recognize their biases.
- 6 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Impact of Sycophantic AI on Attitudes and Decisions
There is widespread concern that AI chatbots are “sycophantic,” or overly agreeable and validating. However, less is known about the causal impact of interacting with sycophantic AI on beliefs and behaviors. Across seven studies (total n = 7,227), we found that people enjoyed interacting with sycophantic AI chatbots more than interacting with neutral chatbots or “disagreeable” chatbots that challenged them. Brief conversations with sycophantic chatbots about political or personal topics increased the strength of people’s attitudes. However, popular AI models not prompted to be sycophantic did not consistently change attitudes. Sycophantic chatbots also inflated people’s perceptions that they were better than the average person on desirable traits (e.g., intelligence, empathy), and also led people to bet more money that they scored better than average on tasks purporting to measure desirable traits. Participants consistently rated sycophantic chatbots as more “unbiased” than disagreeable chatbots, even though third-party raters viewed these chatbots as equally biased, suggesting that people may be blind to biases in AI output that aligns with their views. Altogether, these results suggest that sycophantic model behavior can entrench attitudes and lead to overconfident beliefs and decisions. Despite this, people enjoy sycophantic models and often fail to recognize their biases.
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Tyranny of the minority: How social media influencers, algorithms, and crowds shape public opinion
A small fraction of online actors now exerts outsized influence over what the public sees, believes, and argues about. We trace how social media influencers can turn fringe claims into viral narratives—often by exploiting a feedback loop between influencers, algorithms, and crowds. As such, the modern information environment enables a tyranny of the minority: extreme and coordinated voices dominate attention, distort perceived social norms, and create a “funhouse mirror” version of public opinion that makes fringe positions look common and conflict look inevitable. We synthesize emerging evidence that a tiny number of highly active users drives a disproportionate share of misinformation and toxicity, and explain how platform incentives reward moralized, identity-salient, and emotionally charged content. We conclude by outlining pragmatic responses—individual, institutional, and policy-level—and by highlighting how generative AI could either accelerate bespoke realities or help rebuild shared understanding, depending on how these systems are designed and governed.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTyranny of the minority: How social media influencers, algorithms, and crowds shape public opinion
A small fraction of online actors now exerts outsized influence over what the public sees, believes, and argues about. We trace how social media influencers can turn fringe claims into viral narratives—often by exploiting a feedback loop between influencers, algorithms, and crowds. As such, the modern information environment enables a tyranny of the minority: extreme and coordinated voices dominate attention, distort perceived social norms, and create a “funhouse mirror” version of public opinion that makes fringe positions look common and conflict look inevitable. We synthesize emerging evidence that a tiny number of highly active users drives a disproportionate share of misinformation and toxicity, and explain how platform incentives reward moralized, identity-salient, and emotionally charged content. We conclude by outlining pragmatic responses—individual, institutional, and policy-level—and by highlighting how generative AI could either accelerate bespoke realities or help rebuild shared understanding, depending on how these systems are designed and governed.
- 1 March 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
- Vol. 32 (1) , 80-98
Is that true? Examining the effects of question wording on the effectiveness of political fact checks.
Sentences can be worded to place key information in focus, marking this information as a newer, more prominent contribution to the ongoing discourse. In turn, readers often devote more attention to, and hence better remember, such focused information. Here, we examine whether sentence-level changes that place key information in focus can improve the efficacy of short-form fact checks, brief (140-character) social media posts that verify the truth of publicly circulating claims. Across three experiments (N = 539 U.S.-based Amazon Mechanical Turk/Connect workers), participants read short fact checks on American politics that used open-ended questions to place the focus on the key details under contention (e.g., "What did person A do? Y, not X.") or yes-no questions that did not (e.g., "Did person A do X? No, they did Y."). Exposure to fact checks increased the accuracy of peoples' beliefs, both immediately and after a 1-week delay. Contrary to our hypotheses, both formats resulted in comparable beliefs and memory for key details. We conclude that exposure to short-form fact checks can increase belief accuracy, regardless of their precise phrasing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 March 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied
- Vol. 32 (1) , 80-98
Is that true? Examining the effects of question wording on the effectiveness of political fact checks.
Sentences can be worded to place key information in focus, marking this information as a newer, more prominent contribution to the ongoing discourse. In turn, readers often devote more attention to, and hence better remember, such focused information. Here, we examine whether sentence-level changes that place key information in focus can improve the efficacy of short-form fact checks, brief (140-character) social media posts that verify the truth of publicly circulating claims. Across three experiments (N = 539 U.S.-based Amazon Mechanical Turk/Connect workers), participants read short fact checks on American politics that used open-ended questions to place the focus on the key details under contention (e.g., "What did person A do? Y, not X.") or yes-no questions that did not (e.g., "Did person A do X? No, they did Y."). Exposure to fact checks increased the accuracy of peoples' beliefs, both immediately and after a 1-week delay. Contrary to our hypotheses, both formats resulted in comparable beliefs and memory for key details. We conclude that exposure to short-form fact checks can increase belief accuracy, regardless of their precise phrasing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Novel Social Identities Shape Belief in True and False Information
Classic social psychological accounts of belief formation propose that beliefs can be influenced by directional motives to reach specific conclusions. Such theories have been particularly influential in recent accounts of the spread of political misinformation. However, the assumption of directionally-motivated belief formation has been challenged by theories reexplaining motivational effects in terms of purely cognitive factors like prior beliefs or information exposure. The goal of the present manuscript is to provide a direct test of the assumption that social-identity-based motives can shape what people believe. We report three experiments (N = 1,459) causally isolating the effects of identity-based directional motives on belief formation using minimal groups. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to trust, and thus believe statements endorsed by, arbitrarily assigned in-group versus out-group members. Experiment 2 replicates these findings and experimentally demonstrates that this in- group bias in belief can be affected by social motivations to affiliate with groups: exposing participants to social exclusion selectively reduced belief in statements endorsed by out-group members. Experiment 3 suggests that these effects arise because social motivations moderate people's relative trust in novel in-group over out-group members. Together, these results address longstanding debates about the possible role of social motivations in epistemic processes by demonstrating that social identities, unconfounded from other explanatory factors, can shape who people trust and what they believe.
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessNovel Social Identities Shape Belief in True and False Information
Classic social psychological accounts of belief formation propose that beliefs can be influenced by directional motives to reach specific conclusions. Such theories have been particularly influential in recent accounts of the spread of political misinformation. However, the assumption of directionally-motivated belief formation has been challenged by theories reexplaining motivational effects in terms of purely cognitive factors like prior beliefs or information exposure. The goal of the present manuscript is to provide a direct test of the assumption that social-identity-based motives can shape what people believe. We report three experiments (N = 1,459) causally isolating the effects of identity-based directional motives on belief formation using minimal groups. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to trust, and thus believe statements endorsed by, arbitrarily assigned in-group versus out-group members. Experiment 2 replicates these findings and experimentally demonstrates that this in- group bias in belief can be affected by social motivations to affiliate with groups: exposing participants to social exclusion selectively reduced belief in statements endorsed by out-group members. Experiment 3 suggests that these effects arise because social motivations moderate people's relative trust in novel in-group over out-group members. Together, these results address longstanding debates about the possible role of social motivations in epistemic processes by demonstrating that social identities, unconfounded from other explanatory factors, can shape who people trust and what they believe.
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social and Personality Psychology Compass
- Vol. 20 (2)
An Identity‐Based Approach to Polarization and Public Health
A growing literature identifies political polarization as a risk factor adversely shaping public health outcomes. We propose that this relationship can be understood through theories of group processes and behavioral decision‐making. To explain the effects of polarization on public health, we review and integrate classic models from these traditions. Guided by this framework, we review evidence suggesting that identity‐based motives can shape people's attitudes toward health behaviors, social norms about the behavior, and the perceived ability to control the behavior. This integrative review helps explain divergent patterns of health behaviors across political groups but can also generalize to explain group influences on health behaviors more broadly. We argue that to fully understand the role of social contexts in shaping human health, it is critical to investigate how group identification shapes people's actions.
- 29 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in Social and Personality Psychology Compass
- Vol. 20 (2)
An Identity‐Based Approach to Polarization and Public Health
A growing literature identifies political polarization as a risk factor adversely shaping public health outcomes. We propose that this relationship can be understood through theories of group processes and behavioral decision‐making. To explain the effects of polarization on public health, we review and integrate classic models from these traditions. Guided by this framework, we review evidence suggesting that identity‐based motives can shape people's attitudes toward health behaviors, social norms about the behavior, and the perceived ability to control the behavior. This integrative review helps explain divergent patterns of health behaviors across political groups but can also generalize to explain group influences on health behaviors more broadly. We argue that to fully understand the role of social contexts in shaping human health, it is critical to investigate how group identification shapes people's actions.
- Open Access
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Memory
- Vol. 34 (1) , 96-112
How prior knowledge and statement truth affect retrieval experiences over time
When retrieving information, people often shift over time from "Remembering" high levels of detail about a study episode to simply "Knowing" the information absent such detail. This "Remember-Know" shift is well-documented for true information, and recent work suggests that this effect exists, but is attenuated, for false information. One explanation for this difference is that true information is better represented in people's prior knowledge, supporting retention of this content as "Known" over time. In this registered report we tested this hypothesis by measuring people's reported retrieval experiences (e.g., "Remembering" or "Knowing") for true and false information at two levels of anticipated prior knowledge. While we replicate the "Remember-Know" shift, we do not find that it differs by anticipated prior knowledge. We also examine the relation between retrieval experiences and the production of encountered information, as well as the impact of repeated testing on retrieval experiences.
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Memory
- Vol. 34 (1) , 96-112
Open AccessHow prior knowledge and statement truth affect retrieval experiences over time
When retrieving information, people often shift over time from "Remembering" high levels of detail about a study episode to simply "Knowing" the information absent such detail. This "Remember-Know" shift is well-documented for true information, and recent work suggests that this effect exists, but is attenuated, for false information. One explanation for this difference is that true information is better represented in people's prior knowledge, supporting retention of this content as "Known" over time. In this registered report we tested this hypothesis by measuring people's reported retrieval experiences (e.g., "Remembering" or "Knowing") for true and false information at two levels of anticipated prior knowledge. While we replicate the "Remember-Know" shift, we do not find that it differs by anticipated prior knowledge. We also examine the relation between retrieval experiences and the production of encountered information, as well as the impact of repeated testing on retrieval experiences.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
An Identity-based Approach to Polarization and Public Health
A growing literature identifies political polarization as a risk factor adversely shaping public health outcomes. We propose that this relationship can be understood through theories of group processes and behavioral decision-making. To explain the effects of polarization on public health, we review and integrate classic models from these traditions. Guided by this framework, we review evidence suggesting that identity-based motives can shape people’s attitudes towards health behaviors, social norms about the behavior, and the perceived ability to control the behavior. This integrative review helps explain divergent patterns of health behaviors across political groups but can also generalize to explain group influences on health behaviors more broadly. We argue that to fully understand the role of social contexts in shaping human health, it is critical to investigate how group identification shapes people's actions.
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAn Identity-based Approach to Polarization and Public Health
A growing literature identifies political polarization as a risk factor adversely shaping public health outcomes. We propose that this relationship can be understood through theories of group processes and behavioral decision-making. To explain the effects of polarization on public health, we review and integrate classic models from these traditions. Guided by this framework, we review evidence suggesting that identity-based motives can shape people’s attitudes towards health behaviors, social norms about the behavior, and the perceived ability to control the behavior. This integrative review helps explain divergent patterns of health behaviors across political groups but can also generalize to explain group influences on health behaviors more broadly. We argue that to fully understand the role of social contexts in shaping human health, it is critical to investigate how group identification shapes people's actions.