Runjie Fan

Currently, many online platforms participate in the recycling of waste products, and the online recycling of used mobile phones is especially popular. We explore the service strategy for and the factors influencing customers’ willingness of online recycling (CWOR) of used mobile phones. We develop a game model of a reverse supply chain comprising a mobile phone manufacturer (MPM) and an online recycling platform (ORP) to analytically examine the influencing factors of CWOR. We show that the MPM’s profit is mainly affected by CWOR and the ORP’s offered recycling service. The impacts of customers’ preferences of the recycling price and recycling service on the MPM’s profit depend on the service cost coefficient. The ORP’s profit is independent of its service cost and customers’ preference of the recycling service. However, the impact of the recycling commission is restricted by customers’ preference of the recycling price. We also use structural equation modelling to empirically show that recycling service and environmental consciousness positively affect CWOR, and environmental protection publicity enhances environmental consciousness. In addition, customers’ age and income moderate the recycling service–CWOR link. Our findings reveal that improving the recycling service can directly and indirectly promote the recycling of used mobile phones. These findings provide guidance to the government and businesses related to used mobile phone recycling.

Considering the peculiarities of logistics in the electronic commerce (e-commerce) supply chain (ESC) and e-commerce platform’s altruistic preferences, a model including an e-commerce platform, third-party logistics service provider, and manufacturer is constructed. Based on this, three decision models are proposed and equilibrium solutions are obtained by the Stackelberg game. Then, an “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract is proposed to maximize system efficiency. Finally, numerical analysis is used to validate the findings of the paper. The article not only analyzes and compares the optimal decisions under different ESC models, but also explores the intrinsic factors affecting the decisions. This paper finds that the conclusions of dual-channel supply chains or traditional supply chains do not necessarily apply to ESC, and that the effect of altruistic behavior under ESC is influenced by consumer preferences. Moreover, there is a multiparty win–win state for ESC, and this state can be achieved through the “altruistic preference joint fixed-cost” contract. Therefore, the findings of this paper contribute to the development of an e-commerce market and the cooperation of ESC members.

Since environmental problems are becoming increasingly prominent, macro policies and social development have placed higher requirements on manufacturing enterprises to promote green transformation and upgrading (GTU) in China. Considering that different manufacturing enterprises choose different green technology innovation levels for GTU under environmental regulation, a game model between manufacturing enterprises and the government is constructed. The relationship between the green technology innovation level (GTIL) and the environmental regulation intensity is analyzed. Through numerical examples, the influences of environmental regulation and consumer preference on system decisions are further examined. Moreover, an econometric model is constructed to explore the influence that the environmental regulation exerts on the GTIL using panel data from the Chinese manufacturing industry. Our results show that the increase in environmental regulation intensity contributes to improving GTIL and promoting the GTU of manufacturing enterprises. Furthermore, as the environmental regulation is enhanced, the sales price decreases, benefiting consumers. Consumers’ preference for high-GTIL products is conducive to GTU under environmental regulation. Empirical analysis shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between environmental regulation and the GTIL. Only when the intensity reaches a threshold can the environmental regulation be beneficial to improve the GTIL and promote the GTU of Chinese manufacturing enterprises.