Kazuyuki Shudo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kazuyuki Shudo has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Akira Sakurai
Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
4 shared publications - Kazuki Nakajima
Graduate School of Systems Design, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hino-shi, Japan
4 shared publications - Naoki Masuda
University of Michigan
3 shared publications - Ryohei Banno
Kogakuin University
3 shared publications - Shiori Hironaka
Kyoto University Kyoto Japan
2 shared publications - Takeshi Kaneko
Tokyo Institute of Technology,Tokyo,Japan
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 14, 90762-90769
A Fully Local Last-Generated Rule in a Blockchain
An effective method for suppressing intentional forks in a blockchain is the last-generated rule, which selects the most recent chain as the main chain in the event of a chain tie. This rule helps invalidate blocks that are withheld by adversaries for a certain period. However, existing last-generated rules face an issue in that their application to the system is not fully localized. In conservative cryptocurrency systems such as Bitcoin, it is desirable for methods to be applied in a fully local manner. In this paper, we propose a locally applicable last-generated rule. Our method is straightforward and is based on a relative time reference. By conservatively setting the upper bound on the clock skew ΔOi to 54 s, we show through simulation experiments that our proposed method reduces the proportion γ of honest miners following the adversary during chain ties by more than 76% in Bitcoin compared to the existing local method, i.e., the random rule.
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 14, 90762-90769
Open AccessA Fully Local Last-Generated Rule in a Blockchain
An effective method for suppressing intentional forks in a blockchain is the last-generated rule, which selects the most recent chain as the main chain in the event of a chain tie. This rule helps invalidate blocks that are withheld by adversaries for a certain period. However, existing last-generated rules face an issue in that their application to the system is not fully localized. In conservative cryptocurrency systems such as Bitcoin, it is desirable for methods to be applied in a fully local manner. In this paper, we propose a locally applicable last-generated rule. Our method is straightforward and is based on a relative time reference. By conservatively setting the upper bound on the clock skew ΔOi to 54 s, we show through simulation experiments that our proposed method reduces the proportion γ of honest miners following the adversary during chain ties by more than 76% in Bitcoin compared to the existing local method, i.e., the random rule.
- Open Access
- 17 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society
- Vol. 7, 129-141
Model-Based Calculation Method of Mining Fairness in Blockchain
Mining fairness in blockchain refers to equality between the computational resources invested in mining and the block rewards received. There exists a dilemma wherein increasing the transaction processing capacity of a blockchain compromises mining fairness, thereby undermining its decentralization. This dilemma remains unresolved despite methods such as the greedy heaviest observed subtree (GHOST) protocol, indicating that mining fairness is an inherent bottleneck in the transaction processing capacity of the blockchain system. However, despite its significance, existing analyses neglect the impact of blockchain forks, resulting in imprecise evaluations and limited insights. To address this issue, we propose a method for calculating mining fairness that explicitly captures the influence of forks. First, we approximate a complex blockchain network using a simple mathematical model, assuming that no more than two blocks are generated per round. Within this model, we quantitatively determine local mining fairness and derive several measures of global mining fairness based on local mining fairness. Subsequently, we validated by blockchain network simulations that our calculation method computes mining fairness in networks much more accurately than existing methods. The proposed method facilitates a rigorous evaluation of trade-offs between scalability and decentralization by offering a clear, quantitative framework for measuring and comparing reward distribution among miners. Consequently, it is expected to provide valuable insights for future mining fairness research and the design of next-generation blockchain systems.
- 17 December 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Open Journal of the Computer Society
- Vol. 7, 129-141
Open AccessModel-Based Calculation Method of Mining Fairness in Blockchain
Mining fairness in blockchain refers to equality between the computational resources invested in mining and the block rewards received. There exists a dilemma wherein increasing the transaction processing capacity of a blockchain compromises mining fairness, thereby undermining its decentralization. This dilemma remains unresolved despite methods such as the greedy heaviest observed subtree (GHOST) protocol, indicating that mining fairness is an inherent bottleneck in the transaction processing capacity of the blockchain system. However, despite its significance, existing analyses neglect the impact of blockchain forks, resulting in imprecise evaluations and limited insights. To address this issue, we propose a method for calculating mining fairness that explicitly captures the influence of forks. First, we approximate a complex blockchain network using a simple mathematical model, assuming that no more than two blocks are generated per round. Within this model, we quantitatively determine local mining fairness and derive several measures of global mining fairness based on local mining fairness. Subsequently, we validated by blockchain network simulations that our calculation method computes mining fairness in networks much more accurately than existing methods. The proposed method facilitates a rigorous evaluation of trade-offs between scalability and decentralization by offering a clear, quantitative framework for measuring and comparing reward distribution among miners. Consequently, it is expected to provide valuable insights for future mining fairness research and the design of next-generation blockchain systems.
- Open Access
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 114-124
Bringing Together Cross-ISA Checkpoint/Restoration and AOT Compilation of WebAssembly Programs
- 9 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 114-124
Open AccessBringing Together Cross-ISA Checkpoint/Restoration and AOT Compilation of WebAssembly Programs
- Open Access
- 23 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 197999-198014
Tie-Breaking Rule Based on Partial Proof of Work in a Blockchain
In the area of blockchain, numerous methods have been proposed for suppressing intentional forks by attackers more effectively than the random rule. However, all of them, except for the random rule, require major updates such as hard forks or soft forks, rely on a trusted third party, or assume strong synchrony. Hence, it is challenging to apply these methods to existing systems such as Bitcoin. To address these issues, we propose another countermeasure that can be easily applied to existing proof of work blockchain systems. Our method is a tie-breaking rule that uses partial proof ofwork, which does not function as a block, as a time standard with finer granularity. By using the characteristic of partial proof of work, the proposed method enables miners to choose the last-generated block in a chain tie, which suppresses intentional forks by attackers. Only weak synchrony, which is already met by existing systems such as Bitcoin, is required for effective functioning. We evaluated the proposed method through detailed analyses that are lacking in existing works. In networks that adopt our method, the proportion of the attacker hashrate necessary for selfish mining was approximately 0.31479 or higher, which is remarkably close to the optimal value of 1/3, regardless of the block propagation capability of the attacker. Furthermore, we demonstrated through extended selfish mining that the impact of Match against pre-generated block, which is a concern in all last-generated rules, can be mitigated with appropriate parameter settings.
- 23 December 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 197999-198014
Open AccessTie-Breaking Rule Based on Partial Proof of Work in a Blockchain
In the area of blockchain, numerous methods have been proposed for suppressing intentional forks by attackers more effectively than the random rule. However, all of them, except for the random rule, require major updates such as hard forks or soft forks, rely on a trusted third party, or assume strong synchrony. Hence, it is challenging to apply these methods to existing systems such as Bitcoin. To address these issues, we propose another countermeasure that can be easily applied to existing proof of work blockchain systems. Our method is a tie-breaking rule that uses partial proof ofwork, which does not function as a block, as a time standard with finer granularity. By using the characteristic of partial proof of work, the proposed method enables miners to choose the last-generated block in a chain tie, which suppresses intentional forks by attackers. Only weak synchrony, which is already met by existing systems such as Bitcoin, is required for effective functioning. We evaluated the proposed method through detailed analyses that are lacking in existing works. In networks that adopt our method, the proportion of the attacker hashrate necessary for selfish mining was approximately 0.31479 or higher, which is remarkably close to the optimal value of 1/3, regardless of the block propagation capability of the attacker. Furthermore, we demonstrated through extended selfish mining that the impact of Match against pre-generated block, which is a concern in all last-generated rules, can be mitigated with appropriate parameter settings.
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 456-466
Estimation of Graph Features Based on Random Walks Using Neighbors’ Properties
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 456-466
Estimation of Graph Features Based on Random Walks Using Neighbors’ Properties
- 19 August 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 470-476
Correlation Analysis of Reward Rate in a DPoS Blockchain
In the blockchain architecture, there are various consensus methods, such as Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS) and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) for validator selection. A DPoS protocol works similarly to an election, where token holders vote for validator candidates. Elected validators generate blocks and receive block generation rewards. BNB Chain adopting DPoS has implemented a leveling mechanism to prevent the concentration of votes on a small number of validators. However, voting token holders do not always act in economically rational ways. This causes disparity in rewards to votes by token holders. We investigated the BNB Chain and factors related to the reward rates. We calculated Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between reward rates and several factors: the number of delegate-related transactions, the amount of delegated tokens, the rate of change in the amount of delegated tokens, and the average number of voting validators. As a result, we found that the number of delegate-related transactions has the strongest correlation with reward rates, and that there is a non-linear correlation between the reward rate and the average number of voting validators.
- 19 August 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 470-476
Correlation Analysis of Reward Rate in a DPoS Blockchain
In the blockchain architecture, there are various consensus methods, such as Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS) and Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) for validator selection. A DPoS protocol works similarly to an election, where token holders vote for validator candidates. Elected validators generate blocks and receive block generation rewards. BNB Chain adopting DPoS has implemented a leveling mechanism to prevent the concentration of votes on a small number of validators. However, voting token holders do not always act in economically rational ways. This causes disparity in rewards to votes by token holders. We investigated the BNB Chain and factors related to the reward rates. We calculated Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between reward rates and several factors: the number of delegate-related transactions, the amount of delegated tokens, the rate of change in the amount of delegated tokens, and the average number of voting validators. As a result, we found that the number of delegate-related transactions has the strongest correlation with reward rates, and that there is a non-linear correlation between the reward rate and the average number of voting validators.
- Open Access
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 80559-80578
A Formulation of the Trilemma in Proof of Work Blockchain
The blockchain trilemma, introduced in 2017 on a blog post authored by Vitalik Buterin, one of Ethereum’s co-founders, asserts that achieving decentralization, scalability, and security simultaneously within a blockchain is unattainable. While this concept has garnered empirical support through extensive analyses of blockchain performance, it remains unproven theoretically. In this study, we establish a formula representing the trilemma within a Proof of Work blockchain and validate it through theoretical and experimental analyses. Additionally, we explore the correlation between a formula term denoting decentralization and established decentralization indices, finding a strong correlation with the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Moreover, our analysis reveals that strategies to enhance trilemma properties within the trilemma’s constraints can be classified into two distinct categories. The first strategy is to reduce the block header or transaction size. The second strategy is to optimize the propagation time per byte between nodes.
- 5 June 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 12, 80559-80578
Open AccessA Formulation of the Trilemma in Proof of Work Blockchain
The blockchain trilemma, introduced in 2017 on a blog post authored by Vitalik Buterin, one of Ethereum’s co-founders, asserts that achieving decentralization, scalability, and security simultaneously within a blockchain is unattainable. While this concept has garnered empirical support through extensive analyses of blockchain performance, it remains unproven theoretically. In this study, we establish a formula representing the trilemma within a Proof of Work blockchain and validate it through theoretical and experimental analyses. Additionally, we explore the correlation between a formula term denoting decentralization and established decentralization indices, finding a strong correlation with the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. Moreover, our analysis reveals that strategies to enhance trilemma properties within the trilemma’s constraints can be classified into two distinct categories. The first strategy is to reduce the block header or transaction size. The second strategy is to optimize the propagation time per byte between nodes.
- Open Access
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Informetrics
- Vol. 17 (4)
Quantifying gender imbalance in East Asian academia: Research career and citation practice
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Informetrics
- Vol. 17 (4)
Open AccessQuantifying gender imbalance in East Asian academia: Research career and citation practice
- Open Access
Higher-order rich-club phenomenon in collaborative research grants
Modern scientific work, including writing papers and submitting research grant proposals, increasingly involves researchers from different institutions. In grant collaborations, it is known that institutions involved in many collaborations tend to densely collaborate with each other, forming rich clubs. Here we investigate higher-order rich-club phenomena in collaborative research grants among institutions and their associations with research productivity. Using publicly available data from the National Science Foundation in the US, we construct a bipartite network of institutions and collaborative grants, which distinguishes among the collaboration with different numbers of institutions. By extending the concept and algorithms of the rich club for dyadic networks to the case of bipartite networks, we find rich clubs both in the entire bipartite network and the bipartite subnetwork induced by the collaborative grants involving a given number of institutions up to five. We also find that the collaborative grants within rich clubs tend to be more productive in a per-dollar sense than the control. Our results highlight advantages of collaborative grants among the institutions in the rich clubs.
Open AccessHigher-order rich-club phenomenon in collaborative research grants
Modern scientific work, including writing papers and submitting research grant proposals, increasingly involves researchers from different institutions. In grant collaborations, it is known that institutions involved in many collaborations tend to densely collaborate with each other, forming rich clubs. Here we investigate higher-order rich-club phenomena in collaborative research grants among institutions and their associations with research productivity. Using publicly available data from the National Science Foundation in the US, we construct a bipartite network of institutions and collaborative grants, which distinguishes among the collaboration with different numbers of institutions. By extending the concept and algorithms of the rich club for dyadic networks to the case of bipartite networks, we find rich clubs both in the entire bipartite network and the bipartite subnetwork induced by the collaborative grants involving a given number of institutions up to five. We also find that the collaborative grants within rich clubs tend to be more productive in a per-dollar sense than the control. Our results highlight advantages of collaborative grants among the institutions in the rich clubs.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery From Data
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1-28
Random Walk Sampling in Social Networks Involving Private Nodes
Analysis of social networks with limited data access is challenging for third parties. To address this challenge, a number of studies have developed algorithms that estimate properties of social networks via a simple random walk. However, most existing algorithms do not assume private nodes that do not publish their neighbors’ data when they are queried in empirical social networks. Here we propose a practical framework for estimating properties via random walk-based sampling in social networks involving private nodes. First, we develop a sampling algorithm by extending a simple random walk to the case of social networks involving private nodes. Then, we propose estimators with reduced biases induced by private nodes for the network size, average degree, and density of the node label. Our results show that the proposed estimators reduce biases induced by private nodes in the existing estimators by up to 92.6% on social network datasets involving private nodes.
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Knowledge Discovery From Data
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1-28
Open AccessRandom Walk Sampling in Social Networks Involving Private Nodes
Analysis of social networks with limited data access is challenging for third parties. To address this challenge, a number of studies have developed algorithms that estimate properties of social networks via a simple random walk. However, most existing algorithms do not assume private nodes that do not publish their neighbors’ data when they are queried in empirical social networks. Here we propose a practical framework for estimating properties via random walk-based sampling in social networks involving private nodes. First, we develop a sampling algorithm by extending a simple random walk to the case of social networks involving private nodes. Then, we propose estimators with reduced biases induced by private nodes for the network size, average degree, and density of the node label. Our results show that the proposed estimators reduce biases induced by private nodes in the existing estimators by up to 92.6% on social network datasets involving private nodes.