DSDuo Shi

Duo Shi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Duo Shi has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Ad Blockers and Ad Quality

    by Jingyan Li, Quan Zheng, Shichang Li, Jie Wu, Duo Shi

    Problem definition: There has been a fierce debate among practitioners regarding ad blockers. On one hand, ad blockers are considered a serious threat to content platforms because advertising is a key revenue driver. On the other hand, people argue that ad blockers improve the advertising industry by pushing the creation of more attractive ads. This paper investigates the impact of ad blockers on a content platform when the advertiser’s ad quality decision is taken into account. Methodology/results: We develop an analytical model with an advertiser, a content platform, and a mass of consumers. Consumer valuations of advertising involve three aspects: information value—the knowledge about product attributes, entertainment value—the engaging text/image/video included, and nuisance disvalue—the interruption caused during content consumption. The advertiser can invest in ad quality to enhance its ad’s entertainment value. Consumers are classified into effective and ineffective types based on whether they derive information value and potentially purchase the advertised product. We identify two effects of ad blockers: the consumer screening effect filters out ineffective consumers who cannot generate revenue for the advertiser; the quality adjustment effect may induce the advertiser to improve ad quality to better serve effective consumers. As a result of these two effects, the presence of ad blockers can lead to a win-win-win outcome for all parties. This occurs if nuisance disvalue is high with intermediate information value or if nuisance disvalue is low and effective consumers are few. We further examine six extensions that reflect various industry structures and market microdynamics to demonstrate generalizability of the all-win outcome. Managerial implications: Advertisers and content platforms should manage ad blockers strategically, which possibly makes the system more efficient and benefits every stakeholder. Always opposing ad blockers is not the best solution, and permission should be given, particularly when the ad features a highly interruptive format (e.g., embedded videos) but provides consumers with some useful product knowledge, or when the audience contains few potential buyers and the ad format is mildly interruptive (e.g., texts only). Grant: The work of J. Li was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72501063] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities in UIBE [Grant 24QD13], the work of Q. Zheng was supported by the Major Program of NSFC [Grants 72091210/72091215], the work of J. Wu was supported by the National Natural Science Funds of China [Grants 72371232, 71971203, 72188101], and the work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0377 .

  • Quick Response Under Strategic Manufacturer

    by Jiguang Chen, Qiying Hu, Duo Shi, Fuqiang Zhang

    Problem definition: Quick response is a classic operations strategy that allows a retailer to place a rapid replenishment order during the selling season using information learned from early sales. The benefits of quick response are widely studied in the literature under the condition that the manufacturer’s wholesale prices are exogenously given. Motivated by the practice of emerging small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) fashion brands, this paper revisits the value of quick response for a retailer when a manufacturer can strategically set its wholesale prices. Methodology/results: We develop a game-theoretic model consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. In contrast to the traditional quick response setting, the manufacturer can dynamically adjust wholesale prices for both regular and replenishment orders. First, we investigate whether and when quick response still benefits the retailer. We find that, under low or significantly high demand uncertainties, the firms share a common preferred ordering strategy, and quick response benefits the retailer as well as the supply chain. But, under moderately high demand uncertainty, the retailer’s favored ordering strategy conflicts with the manufacturer’s interest; as a result, the manufacturer would set wholesale prices to counter the retailer’s ordering strategy, which makes quick response detrimental to the retailer. Second, we search for mechanisms that can resolve this conflict and restore the beneficial effect of quick response. We show that letting the manufacturer commit to wholesale prices up front is ineffective in fixing the problem. However, if the retailer can propose a take-it-or-leave-it wholesale price for the replenishment order (possibly with the replenishment quantity) once the regular wholesale price is set, then quick response leads to a win–win outcome for both firms. Managerial implications: The findings caution retailers with weak power (e.g., SMEs) when adopting quick response, especially when facing moderately high demand uncertainties. The retailer, although weak, should be aware of the retailer’s natural ability to propose replenishment terms because, otherwise, the retailer can always forgo quick response; this opens up an opportunity to design more favorable arrangements. Funding: The work of J. Chen was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72171202, 72232007]; the work of Q. Hu was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72271057, 72091211]; the work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205] and Shenzhen Stable Support Program for Higher Education Institutions; the work of F. Zhang was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 71929201, 72131004]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0561 .


  • Food Safety Audits in Developing Economies: Decentralization vs. Centralization

    by Lingxiu Dong, Iva Rashkova, Duo Shi

    Problem definition: This paper investigates and compares two types of food safety auditing structures: decentralized and centralized audits. Academic/practical relevance: Decentralized food safety auditing systems are common among developing economies, that is, different tiers of a food supply chain are audited by separate government agencies. Such an auditing structure has been widely criticized as ineffective at mitigating food safety risks. Some developing countries began implementing centralized auditing systems as a remedy for the mis-coordination across local auditing agencies. We compare food safety outcomes and economical payoffs of the two auditing systems. Methodology: We study a parsimonious game-theoretic model of a one-supplier, one-buyer supply chain and two agencies auditing each tier of the supply chain, respectively. Under decentralized audits, each of the two agencies minimizes its individual cost, and their decisions are sequential; under centralized audits, the agencies minimize total agency cost and make auditing commitment up front. Results: We identify forces that drive equilibrium decisions under decentralized audits. The penalty-shield effect of an agency’s auditing capability may lead to risky behavior by the supplier. The free-riding effect between the two agencies may lead to less auditing. A centralized commitment makes the agencies the leader in the game at the expense of them losing the flexibility to respond to the actions of supply chain members. The common objective under centralization strengthens the incentives for at least one agency to conduct an audit, but it may also induce the lower-cost, less-capable agency to audit. Hence, centralized audits can be detrimental to performance regarding both food safety outcomes and system payoff. Managerial implications: Changing the auditing structure from decentralization to centralization may fail to improve food safety and system payoff insofar as it may replace one form of inefficiency with another. Addressing the new inefficiencies should be part of the ongoing effort to enhance the efficacy of centralized audits. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on Responsible Research in Operations Management. Funding: The work of D. Shi was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72102205]. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1058 .


  • 3D Printing and Product Assortment Strategy

    by Lingxiu Dong, Duo Shi, Fuqiang Zhang

    3D printing, as a production technology, differs from conventional technologies in three characteristics: design freedom—that is, it can handle certain product designs that conventional technologies cannot; quality distinction—that is, depending on the focal quality dimension, it can lead to a quality level superior or inferior to that of conventional technologies; and natural flexibility—that is, it is endowed with capacity flexibility without sacrificing operational efficiency. This paper investigates the joint impact of these characteristics when a firm selects conceptual designs to form its product assortment, taking into account the production-technology choices available for each design: 3D printing and two conventional technologies (dedicated and traditional flexible). Some designs can be processed by using any technology (generic), whereas others are specific to 3D printing (3D-specific). The firm selects designs to be handled by each technology and then invests accordingly in technology adoption, product development, capacity, and production. We characterize the structure of the optimal assortment based on the popularity of each design. Within the sets of generic designs and 3D-specific designs, respectively, the most popular designs should be included in the assortment; under a mild condition, the optimal assortment comprises the most popular ones among all the designs. Within the optimal assortment, 3D printing should handle the less popular generic designs than conventional technologies. We further demonstrate that the design freedom or improved quality associated with 3D printing may reduce the firm’s optimal product variety. In the absence of design freedom and quality distinction, natural flexibility by itself always enhances product variety; by contrast, traditional flexible technology may reduce product variety. Numerical study shows that 3D printing tends to be more valuable when popularities of the generic designs are distributed more evenly and when popularities of the 3D-specific designs are distributed less evenly. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.


  • Who Should Compensate the Sales Agent in a Distribution Channel?

    by Panos Kouvelis, Duo Shi

    We analytically study a value chain consisting of three independent parties: a manufacturer, a retailer, and a sales agent. Either the manufacturer or the retailer may compensate the sales agent, and a variety of supply contracts may be used between the manufacturer and the retailer: price‐only, buyback, and channel rebate. We first compare the efficiency of different supply contracts under either compensation scheme, and then compare the two compensation schemes when executed with the best performing supply contract for the parameter range. Under manufacturer compensation, we find that the price‐only contract may perform well in encouraging sales effort and it can dominate the distribution channel coordinating contracts in certain parameter (production and sales effort costs) range. Under retailer compensation, we find that, within the value chain, the buyback contract performs better in quantity coordination and the channel rebate contract performs better in sales effort coordination. Interestingly, our results show that an appropriate supply contract in support of a salesforce compensation scheme helps mitigate the inefficiency brought by the asymmetric sales effort information, and can lead to value chain first best for a wide range of parameters. When this is not the case, manufacturer compensation executed via the price‐only contract dominates for stable demand markets and retailer compensation executed via channel rebate contract dominates when the market’s uncertain outcomes are distinct.