Matthias Krönke
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Interests
Matthias Krönke has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Robert Mattes
Department of Politics - University of Strathclyde, UK
4 shared publications - Sarah J. Lockwood
University of Bristol
4 shared publications Joan Ponce
Center for Biomedical Modeling, Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles
2 shared publications- Nicholas Philip Simpson
University of Cape Town
2 shared publications - Sally Blower
Center for Biomedical Modeling, Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, David Geffen School of Medicine, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, USA
2 shared publications - Andreas Luiz Schwarz Meyer
Climate Risk Lab, African Climate and Development Initiative, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Earth & Environment
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-9
Most Africans place primary responsibility for climate action on their own government
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Earth & Environment
- Vol. 6 (1) , 1-9
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessMost Africans place primary responsibility for climate action on their own government
- Open Access
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (SI) , 608-631
Where Are the Sore Losers? Competitive Authoritarianism, Incumbent Defeat, and Electoral Trust in Zambia’s 2021 Election
How do electoral turnovers shape citizen perceptions of election quality in competitive authoritarian regimes? We argue that electoral outcomes are crucial for determining perceptions of electoral quality. While detailed evaluation of electoral trust is complex in competitive autocracies with institutional uncertainty and polarized electoral environments, turnovers send strong and unequivocal signals about election quality. Previous literature has noted a strong partisan divide in electoral trust in competitive authoritarian regimes, but turnovers can boost trust among both incumbent and opposition supporters. We test this argument in the case of Zambia’s 2021 election, a case where a ruling party lost despite electoral manipulation and strong control over the Election Management Body (EMB). Empirically, we leverage the first-ever panel survey carried out during Zambian elections. Comparing trust in elections before and after the election, we find that perceived election quality increased after the 2021 electoral turnover among both losers and winners. We find that trust in elections increased the most among winning opposition supporters. Moreover, despite the outgoing president’s attempt to portray the election as fraudulent, losing ruling-party supporters also increased their trust in elections after the turnover. The study has important implications for the literature on democratic consolidation and institutional trust.
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Opinion Quarterly
- Vol. 88 (SI) , 608-631
Open AccessWhere Are the Sore Losers? Competitive Authoritarianism, Incumbent Defeat, and Electoral Trust in Zambia’s 2021 Election
How do electoral turnovers shape citizen perceptions of election quality in competitive authoritarian regimes? We argue that electoral outcomes are crucial for determining perceptions of electoral quality. While detailed evaluation of electoral trust is complex in competitive autocracies with institutional uncertainty and polarized electoral environments, turnovers send strong and unequivocal signals about election quality. Previous literature has noted a strong partisan divide in electoral trust in competitive authoritarian regimes, but turnovers can boost trust among both incumbent and opposition supporters. We test this argument in the case of Zambia’s 2021 election, a case where a ruling party lost despite electoral manipulation and strong control over the Election Management Body (EMB). Empirically, we leverage the first-ever panel survey carried out during Zambian elections. Comparing trust in elections before and after the election, we find that perceived election quality increased after the 2021 electoral turnover among both losers and winners. We find that trust in elections increased the most among winning opposition supporters. Moreover, despite the outgoing president’s attempt to portray the election as fraudulent, losing ruling-party supporters also increased their trust in elections after the turnover. The study has important implications for the literature on democratic consolidation and institutional trust.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Southern African Studies
- Vol. 50 (4) , 619-641
African Legislators: Unrepresentative Power Elites?
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Southern African Studies
- Vol. 50 (4) , 619-641
Open AccessAfrican Legislators: Unrepresentative Power Elites?
- Open Access
- 1 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (9) , 1441-1474
Drivers of Political Participation: The Role of Partisanship, Identity, and Incentives in Mobilizing Zambian Citizens
Scholars and policymakers widely view identity as a key driver of African citizens’ political engagement. In doing so, however, they have emphasized ethnicity and largely sidelined other identities, including gender, local origin, shared residency, and partisanship. In this paper, we explore which identities drive political engagement and why they do so. We employ an original survey experiment that includes various identities and other incentives that may drive citizens’ participation around Zambia’s 2021 national elections. We find that partisanship most influences individuals’ stated willingness to campaign for a candidate or meet with an MP, while ethnicity and social incentives play less significant roles. Finally, we explore the mechanisms underpinning these results and find that citizens anticipate sanctions if they fail to support a co-partisan but not a co-ethnic candidate. These findings have important implications for understanding political engagement and democratic development throughout the region.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (9) , 1441-1474
Open AccessDrivers of Political Participation: The Role of Partisanship, Identity, and Incentives in Mobilizing Zambian Citizens
Scholars and policymakers widely view identity as a key driver of African citizens’ political engagement. In doing so, however, they have emphasized ethnicity and largely sidelined other identities, including gender, local origin, shared residency, and partisanship. In this paper, we explore which identities drive political engagement and why they do so. We employ an original survey experiment that includes various identities and other incentives that may drive citizens’ participation around Zambia’s 2021 national elections. We find that partisanship most influences individuals’ stated willingness to campaign for a candidate or meet with an MP, while ethnicity and social incentives play less significant roles. Finally, we explore the mechanisms underpinning these results and find that citizens anticipate sanctions if they fail to support a co-partisan but not a co-ethnic candidate. These findings have important implications for understanding political engagement and democratic development throughout the region.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2022
- Published by eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd in eLife
- Vol. 11
Lack of ownership of mobile phones could hinder the rollout of mHealth interventions in Africa
Mobile health (mHealth) interventions, which require ownership of mobile phones, are being investigated throughout Africa. We estimate the percentage of individuals who own mobile phones in 33 African countries, identify a relationship between ownership and proximity to a health clinic (HC), and quantify inequities in ownership. We investigate basic mobile phones (BPs) and smartphones (SPs): SPs can connect to the internet, BPs cannot. We use nationally representative data collected in 2017–2018 from 44,224 individuals in Round 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. We use Bayesian multilevel logistic regression models for our analyses. We find 82% of individuals in 33 countries own mobile phones: 42% BPs and 40% SPs. Individuals who live close to an HC have higher odds of ownership than those who do not (aOR: 1.31, Bayesian 95% highest posterior density [HPD] region: 1.24–1.39). Men, compared with women, have over twice the odds of ownership (aOR: 2.37, 95% HPD region: 1.96–2.84). Urban residents, compared with rural residents, have almost three times the odds (aOR: 2.66, 95% HPD region: 2.22–3.18) and, amongst mobile phone owners, nearly three times the odds of owning an SP (aOR: 2.67, 95% HPD region: 2.33–3.10). Ownership increases with age, peaks in 26–40 year olds, then decreases. Individuals under 30 are more likely to own an SP than a BP, older individuals more likely to own a BP than an SP. Probability of ownership decreases with the Lived Poverty Index; however, some of the poorest individuals own SPs. If the digital devices needed for mHealth interventions are not equally available within the population (which we have found is the current situation), rolling out mHealth interventions in Africa is likely to propagate already existing inequities in access to healthcare.
- 18 October 2022
- Published by eLife Sciences Publications, Ltd in eLife
- Vol. 11
Open AccessLack of ownership of mobile phones could hinder the rollout of mHealth interventions in Africa
Mobile health (mHealth) interventions, which require ownership of mobile phones, are being investigated throughout Africa. We estimate the percentage of individuals who own mobile phones in 33 African countries, identify a relationship between ownership and proximity to a health clinic (HC), and quantify inequities in ownership. We investigate basic mobile phones (BPs) and smartphones (SPs): SPs can connect to the internet, BPs cannot. We use nationally representative data collected in 2017–2018 from 44,224 individuals in Round 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. We use Bayesian multilevel logistic regression models for our analyses. We find 82% of individuals in 33 countries own mobile phones: 42% BPs and 40% SPs. Individuals who live close to an HC have higher odds of ownership than those who do not (aOR: 1.31, Bayesian 95% highest posterior density [HPD] region: 1.24–1.39). Men, compared with women, have over twice the odds of ownership (aOR: 2.37, 95% HPD region: 1.96–2.84). Urban residents, compared with rural residents, have almost three times the odds (aOR: 2.66, 95% HPD region: 2.22–3.18) and, amongst mobile phone owners, nearly three times the odds of owning an SP (aOR: 2.67, 95% HPD region: 2.33–3.10). Ownership increases with age, peaks in 26–40 year olds, then decreases. Individuals under 30 are more likely to own an SP than a BP, older individuals more likely to own a BP than an SP. Probability of ownership decreases with the Lived Poverty Index; however, some of the poorest individuals own SPs. If the digital devices needed for mHealth interventions are not equally available within the population (which we have found is the current situation), rolling out mHealth interventions in Africa is likely to propagate already existing inequities in access to healthcare.
- Open Access
Lack of ownership of mobile phones could hinder the rollout of mHealth interventions in Africa
Background Mobile Health interventions, which require ownership of mobile phones, are being investigated throughout Africa. We estimate the percentage of individuals who own mobile phones in 33 African countries, identify a relationship between ownership and proximity to a health clinic (HC), and quantify inequities in ownership. We investigate basic mobile phone (BPs) and smartphones (SPs): SPs can connect to the internet, BPs cannot. Methods We use nationally representative data collected in 2017—2018 from 45,823 individuals in Round 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. We use Bayesian Multilevel Logistic regression models for our analyses. Results 82% of individuals in the 33 countries own mobile phones: 42% BPs, 40% SPs. Individuals who live close to an HC have higher odds of ownership than those who do not (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 1.31, Bayesian 95% Highest Posterior Density [HPD] region: 1.24— 1.39). Men, compared with women, have over twice the odds of ownership (aOR: 2.37, 95% HPD region: 1.96—2.84). Urban residents, compared with rural residents, have almost three times the odds (aOR: 2.66, 95% HPD region: 2.22—3.18) and, amongst mobile phone owners, nearly three times the odds of owning an SP (aOR: 2.67, 95% HPD region: 2.33—3.10). Ownership increases with age, peaks in 26—40 year olds, then decreases. Individuals under 30 are more likely to own an SP than a BP, older individuals more likely to own a BP than an SP. Probability of ownership decreases with the Lived Poverty Index; however, some of the poorest individuals own SPs. Conclusions If the digital devices needed for mHealth interventions are not equally available within the population (which we have found is the current situation), rolling out mHealth interventions in Africa is likely to propagate already existing inequities in access to healthcare. Funding National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
Open AccessLack of ownership of mobile phones could hinder the rollout of mHealth interventions in Africa
Background Mobile Health interventions, which require ownership of mobile phones, are being investigated throughout Africa. We estimate the percentage of individuals who own mobile phones in 33 African countries, identify a relationship between ownership and proximity to a health clinic (HC), and quantify inequities in ownership. We investigate basic mobile phone (BPs) and smartphones (SPs): SPs can connect to the internet, BPs cannot. Methods We use nationally representative data collected in 2017—2018 from 45,823 individuals in Round 7 of the Afrobarometer surveys. We use Bayesian Multilevel Logistic regression models for our analyses. Results 82% of individuals in the 33 countries own mobile phones: 42% BPs, 40% SPs. Individuals who live close to an HC have higher odds of ownership than those who do not (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 1.31, Bayesian 95% Highest Posterior Density [HPD] region: 1.24— 1.39). Men, compared with women, have over twice the odds of ownership (aOR: 2.37, 95% HPD region: 1.96—2.84). Urban residents, compared with rural residents, have almost three times the odds (aOR: 2.66, 95% HPD region: 2.22—3.18) and, amongst mobile phone owners, nearly three times the odds of owning an SP (aOR: 2.67, 95% HPD region: 2.33—3.10). Ownership increases with age, peaks in 26—40 year olds, then decreases. Individuals under 30 are more likely to own an SP than a BP, older individuals more likely to own a BP than an SP. Probability of ownership decreases with the Lived Poverty Index; however, some of the poorest individuals own SPs. Conclusions If the digital devices needed for mHealth interventions are not equally available within the population (which we have found is the current situation), rolling out mHealth interventions in Africa is likely to propagate already existing inequities in access to healthcare. Funding National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
- 7 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Climate Change
- Vol. 11 (11) , 937-944
Climate change literacy in Africa
- 7 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Climate Change
- Vol. 11 (11) , 937-944
Climate change literacy in Africa
- 5 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 203-207
Party structures and organization building in Africa
Political parties are a vital element in the quality of representative democracy, playing a crucial role in mobilization, competition, governance, and accountability. Despite their importance, however, we currently know relatively little about how political parties in Africa are organized, with most evidence restricted to journalistic accounts or country-specific scholarly accounts. This symposium, which comes out of a conference on political parties held at the University of Cape Town, takes a closer look at the development of party structures and organization across the continent. It seeks to answer a number of critical questions including: What affects the organizational structure of parties? How do party primaries affect party-building and electoral success? And what effect does the shrinking of open political space have on the ways in which parties organize? Taken as a whole, this symposium brings together established and emerging scholars, to systematically explore, for the first time, what party organization looks like on the African continent, and how it affects critical issues of governance, mobilization, and accountability.
- 5 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 203-207
Party structures and organization building in Africa
Political parties are a vital element in the quality of representative democracy, playing a crucial role in mobilization, competition, governance, and accountability. Despite their importance, however, we currently know relatively little about how political parties in Africa are organized, with most evidence restricted to journalistic accounts or country-specific scholarly accounts. This symposium, which comes out of a conference on political parties held at the University of Cape Town, takes a closer look at the development of party structures and organization across the continent. It seeks to answer a number of critical questions including: What affects the organizational structure of parties? How do party primaries affect party-building and electoral success? And what effect does the shrinking of open political space have on the ways in which parties organize? Taken as a whole, this symposium brings together established and emerging scholars, to systematically explore, for the first time, what party organization looks like on the African continent, and how it affects critical issues of governance, mobilization, and accountability.
- 18 May 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 208-222
Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent
The conventional view of Africa’s political parties holds that they are organizationally weak, with little presence at the grass roots. Yet, few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this situation, by focusing on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters during and between elections – and developing the first systematic, survey-based measure of the extent of this presence across 35 countries. We draw on a wide variety of data to demonstrate the validity and reliability of this new index, and in the process showcase its ability to be calculated at a number of different levels. Finally, we illustrate its utility by applying it to a key substantive question in the literature.
- 18 May 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (2) , 208-222
Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent
The conventional view of Africa’s political parties holds that they are organizationally weak, with little presence at the grass roots. Yet, few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we attempt to remedy this situation, by focusing on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters during and between elections – and developing the first systematic, survey-based measure of the extent of this presence across 35 countries. We draw on a wide variety of data to demonstrate the validity and reliability of this new index, and in the process showcase its ability to be calculated at a number of different levels. Finally, we illustrate its utility by applying it to a key substantive question in the literature.
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 28 (3) , 583-603
Do electoral systems affect how citizens hold their government accountable? Evidence from Africa
A large body of literature suggests that electoral system type has an impact on voting behaviour, but little work has been done looking at its effects on other forms of democratic accountability, such as contacting elected representatives and protesting. Using data from 36 African countries, we find that the type of electoral system has a significant relationship with these other forms of participation. Citizens in PR systems are significantly more likely to protest than those in majoritarian ones, while those in majoritarian systems are more likely to contact elected representatives. We argue that this is because the connection between citizens and representatives in majoritarian systems is clearer, closer, and more responsive, making contact an effective strategy and providing an efficient “safety valve” when citizens want to hold their government accountable. The lack of a similar connection in most PR systems, in contrast, leads citizens to turn to protest more regularly.
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 28 (3) , 583-603
Do electoral systems affect how citizens hold their government accountable? Evidence from Africa
A large body of literature suggests that electoral system type has an impact on voting behaviour, but little work has been done looking at its effects on other forms of democratic accountability, such as contacting elected representatives and protesting. Using data from 36 African countries, we find that the type of electoral system has a significant relationship with these other forms of participation. Citizens in PR systems are significantly more likely to protest than those in majoritarian ones, while those in majoritarian systems are more likely to contact elected representatives. We argue that this is because the connection between citizens and representatives in majoritarian systems is clearer, closer, and more responsive, making contact an effective strategy and providing an efficient “safety valve” when citizens want to hold their government accountable. The lack of a similar connection in most PR systems, in contrast, leads citizens to turn to protest more regularly.