Liangliang Yi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Liangliang Yi has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Haibo Zhou
School of Education, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China
3 shared publications - Xinxin Xiang
School of Education, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China
3 shared publications - Yaru Yang
School of Education, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China
3 shared publications - Yutong Liu
School of Education, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China
3 shared publications - Chun Lin
School of Education, Hunan University of Science and Technology, Xiangtan 411201, China
2 shared publications - Daoqun Ding
Hunan Normal University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 October 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (10) , 1119
Correction: Yi et al. Time Overestimation Devalues Future Rewards: Electroencephalogram Evidence from Intertemporal Choice. Brain Sci. 2026, 16, 271
- 16 October 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (10) , 1119
Open AccessCorrection: Yi et al. Time Overestimation Devalues Future Rewards: Electroencephalogram Evidence from Intertemporal Choice. Brain Sci. 2026, 16, 271
- Open Access
- 18 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (8) , 879
Present-Biased Preferences Associated with Socioeconomic Status in Intertemporal Decision-Making: Evidence from Behavioral and Electroencephalographic Measures
Background: The role of socioeconomic status (SES) in individual intertemporal decision-making has received widespread research attention. However, findings regarding its underlying psychological mechanisms remain inconclusive. This study investigates not only the association between SES and intertemporal decision-making but also the underlying cognitive neural mechanisms from both behavioral and electrophysiological perspectives. Methods: Individuals with high and low SES were recruited. In Experiment 1, a behavioral experiment used the Monetary Choice Questionnaire to measure delay discounting rates using the Kirby method and hierarchical Bayesian modeling, as well as choice consistency using the inverse temperature parameter of the softmax function, to examine differences in decision-making between the two groups. In Experiment 2, event-related potential techniques were employed to examine differences in dynamic neural activity during an intertemporal choice task between the high- and low-SES groups. Results: The behavioral results revealed that, in Experiment 1, the low-SES group exhibited a larger delay discounting rate than the high-SES group. The hierarchical Bayesian modeling further indicated that the low-SES group had lower choice consistency. Experiment 2 found that the low-SES group showed a significantly higher proportion of smaller-sooner (SS) choices than the high-SES group. Electroencephalographic results revealed that, compared with the high-SES group, the low-SES group exhibited larger P200 amplitudes but smaller N2 and P300 amplitudes. Within the high-SES group, the larger-later (LL) option elicited more negative N2 and larger P300 amplitudes than the SS option. Conversely, in the low-SES group, P300 amplitudes did not differ significantly between the SS and LL options during the later stage of intertemporal decision-making. Conclusions: The results showed that the low-SES group was more inclined toward immediate gains, made more random choices, displayed higher variability, relied more on intuitive heuristic strategies, and exhibited weaker cognitive control and reduced cognitive resource allocation during intertemporal decision-making. However, at the later stage, the absence of a significant difference between SS and LL options provided preliminary EEG evidence consistent with the possibility that individuals in the low-SES group did not completely disregard future outcomes.
- 18 August 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (8) , 879
Open AccessPresent-Biased Preferences Associated with Socioeconomic Status in Intertemporal Decision-Making: Evidence from Behavioral and Electroencephalographic Measures
Background: The role of socioeconomic status (SES) in individual intertemporal decision-making has received widespread research attention. However, findings regarding its underlying psychological mechanisms remain inconclusive. This study investigates not only the association between SES and intertemporal decision-making but also the underlying cognitive neural mechanisms from both behavioral and electrophysiological perspectives. Methods: Individuals with high and low SES were recruited. In Experiment 1, a behavioral experiment used the Monetary Choice Questionnaire to measure delay discounting rates using the Kirby method and hierarchical Bayesian modeling, as well as choice consistency using the inverse temperature parameter of the softmax function, to examine differences in decision-making between the two groups. In Experiment 2, event-related potential techniques were employed to examine differences in dynamic neural activity during an intertemporal choice task between the high- and low-SES groups. Results: The behavioral results revealed that, in Experiment 1, the low-SES group exhibited a larger delay discounting rate than the high-SES group. The hierarchical Bayesian modeling further indicated that the low-SES group had lower choice consistency. Experiment 2 found that the low-SES group showed a significantly higher proportion of smaller-sooner (SS) choices than the high-SES group. Electroencephalographic results revealed that, compared with the high-SES group, the low-SES group exhibited larger P200 amplitudes but smaller N2 and P300 amplitudes. Within the high-SES group, the larger-later (LL) option elicited more negative N2 and larger P300 amplitudes than the SS option. Conversely, in the low-SES group, P300 amplitudes did not differ significantly between the SS and LL options during the later stage of intertemporal decision-making. Conclusions: The results showed that the low-SES group was more inclined toward immediate gains, made more random choices, displayed higher variability, relied more on intuitive heuristic strategies, and exhibited weaker cognitive control and reduced cognitive resource allocation during intertemporal decision-making. However, at the later stage, the absence of a significant difference between SS and LL options provided preliminary EEG evidence consistent with the possibility that individuals in the low-SES group did not completely disregard future outcomes.
- Open Access
- 28 February 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (3) , 271
Time Overestimation Devalues Future Rewards: Electroencephalogram Evidence from Intertemporal Choice
Background/Objectives: The perceived-time-based model posits that time perception is a critical factor in intertemporal decision-making; however, the mechanisms underlying this influence remain inadequately explored. Despite growing behavioral and neuroimaging findings, no study has directly compared the temporal neural dynamics of individuals who overestimate or underestimate time during intertemporal choices. Methods: This study screened participants with time overestimation or underestimation to examine differences in their electroencephalogram (EEG) activity during an intertemporal choice task. Results: Behavioral results revealed that the time overestimation group selected the smaller-sooner (SS) option at a higher rate than the time underestimation group, exhibiting a myopic decision-making tendency. EEG results revealed that, compared to the time overestimation group, the time underestimation group exhibited a more pronounced N2 amplitude, an enhanced P300 amplitude, and greater beta band oscillations. Within the time overestimation group, the larger-later (LL) option elicited a more negative N2 amplitude than the SS option. Conversely, in the time underestimation group, the LL option elicited a more positive P300 amplitude than the SS option. Conclusions: The results indicate that, during intertemporal decision-making, the time overestimation group experienced more conflict in the LL option, demonstrating lower cognitive control and fewer cognitive resources. This tendency may be driven by a hot system, resulting in more impulsive choices.
- 28 February 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 16 (3) , 271
Open AccessTime Overestimation Devalues Future Rewards: Electroencephalogram Evidence from Intertemporal Choice
Background/Objectives: The perceived-time-based model posits that time perception is a critical factor in intertemporal decision-making; however, the mechanisms underlying this influence remain inadequately explored. Despite growing behavioral and neuroimaging findings, no study has directly compared the temporal neural dynamics of individuals who overestimate or underestimate time during intertemporal choices. Methods: This study screened participants with time overestimation or underestimation to examine differences in their electroencephalogram (EEG) activity during an intertemporal choice task. Results: Behavioral results revealed that the time overestimation group selected the smaller-sooner (SS) option at a higher rate than the time underestimation group, exhibiting a myopic decision-making tendency. EEG results revealed that, compared to the time overestimation group, the time underestimation group exhibited a more pronounced N2 amplitude, an enhanced P300 amplitude, and greater beta band oscillations. Within the time overestimation group, the larger-later (LL) option elicited a more negative N2 amplitude than the SS option. Conversely, in the time underestimation group, the LL option elicited a more positive P300 amplitude than the SS option. Conclusions: The results indicate that, during intertemporal decision-making, the time overestimation group experienced more conflict in the LL option, demonstrating lower cognitive control and fewer cognitive resources. This tendency may be driven by a hot system, resulting in more impulsive choices.
- Open Access
- 17 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (11) , 1560
Scarcity Enhances Outcome Evaluation in the Present: Electroencephalography Evidence
Scarcity goods have generally been perceived as high in value in real-world and empirical studies. However, few studies have investigated this value over time, such as performance in intertemporal decision making. This study’s chief objective was to determine how scarcity evaluation changes temporally. We used the electroencephalogram technique and an outcome evaluation task with the valuation of scarcity and ordinary rewards delivered at different times to explore the effect of scarcity on delay discounting. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) results show that ordinary goods were associated with a more negative amplitude than scarcity goods, and that rewards delivered in the future evoked more negative deflection compared to those delivered immediately. The prominent FRN effect was derived mainly from ordinary trials rather than scarcity trials in the immediate condition and in the future rather than only in the immediate condition. The Frontal Asymmetry Index (FAI) results show that the scarcity condition was associated with greater relative left frontal cortical activity than the ordinary condition when delivered immediately. The frontal asymmetry indicated greater approach motivation. Our electrophysiology data indicate that scarcity goods have a perceived high value, particularly when delivered immediately.
- 17 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 12 (11) , 1560
Open AccessScarcity Enhances Outcome Evaluation in the Present: Electroencephalography Evidence
Scarcity goods have generally been perceived as high in value in real-world and empirical studies. However, few studies have investigated this value over time, such as performance in intertemporal decision making. This study’s chief objective was to determine how scarcity evaluation changes temporally. We used the electroencephalogram technique and an outcome evaluation task with the valuation of scarcity and ordinary rewards delivered at different times to explore the effect of scarcity on delay discounting. The feedback-related negativity (FRN) results show that ordinary goods were associated with a more negative amplitude than scarcity goods, and that rewards delivered in the future evoked more negative deflection compared to those delivered immediately. The prominent FRN effect was derived mainly from ordinary trials rather than scarcity trials in the immediate condition and in the future rather than only in the immediate condition. The Frontal Asymmetry Index (FAI) results show that the scarcity condition was associated with greater relative left frontal cortical activity than the ordinary condition when delivered immediately. The frontal asymmetry indicated greater approach motivation. Our electrophysiology data indicate that scarcity goods have a perceived high value, particularly when delivered immediately.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Healthcare
- Vol. 8 (4) , 505
Do High Psychopaths Care More about Moral Consequences than Low Psychopaths in Chinese Culture? An Exploration Using the CNI Model
Purpose: Fewer studies are about the influence of psychopath traits on moral judgment and the underlying psychological mechanism in Chinese cultural background. In this paper, we use the creative CNI (Consequences, Norms, Inaction versus action) model to quantify the subject’s reaction to moral dilemmas. Method: In this research, the Chinese version of the Levenson Psychopathic Scale, CNI model materials, and a multinomial model to further analyze the associations among the psychopathy characteristics and utilitarian moral judgment are applied. The CNI model is proposed by Gawronski et al., which can quantify the subjects’ sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and the general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Result: This study finds that there were significant differences in the utilitarian moral judgment between the groups, t (360) = 3.24, p = 0.001, and Cohen’s d = 0.36. The analysis results of the CNI model show that the high psychopathy group on the N parameter was significantly lower than the group of low psychopathy, ΔG2 (2) = 79.70, p = 0.001. In terms of the C parameter, we found no significant distinctions between the two groups, ΔG2 (2) = 1.356, p = 0.244. For the I parameter, the two groups also have no significant differences, ΔG2 (2) = 0.093, p = 0.76. Conclusion: Persons with high psychopathy traits prefer to make more utilitarian moral judgments and have a weak sensitivity to moral norms (N). The sensitivity to consequences (C) of the two groups is no significant difference. The general preference for inaction versus action (I) also has no significant differences between those two groups. Moreover, the CNI model fits well in Chinese subjects.
- 21 November 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Healthcare
- Vol. 8 (4) , 505
Open AccessDo High Psychopaths Care More about Moral Consequences than Low Psychopaths in Chinese Culture? An Exploration Using the CNI Model
Purpose: Fewer studies are about the influence of psychopath traits on moral judgment and the underlying psychological mechanism in Chinese cultural background. In this paper, we use the creative CNI (Consequences, Norms, Inaction versus action) model to quantify the subject’s reaction to moral dilemmas. Method: In this research, the Chinese version of the Levenson Psychopathic Scale, CNI model materials, and a multinomial model to further analyze the associations among the psychopathy characteristics and utilitarian moral judgment are applied. The CNI model is proposed by Gawronski et al., which can quantify the subjects’ sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and the general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Result: This study finds that there were significant differences in the utilitarian moral judgment between the groups, t (360) = 3.24, p = 0.001, and Cohen’s d = 0.36. The analysis results of the CNI model show that the high psychopathy group on the N parameter was significantly lower than the group of low psychopathy, ΔG2 (2) = 79.70, p = 0.001. In terms of the C parameter, we found no significant distinctions between the two groups, ΔG2 (2) = 1.356, p = 0.244. For the I parameter, the two groups also have no significant differences, ΔG2 (2) = 0.093, p = 0.76. Conclusion: Persons with high psychopathy traits prefer to make more utilitarian moral judgments and have a weak sensitivity to moral norms (N). The sensitivity to consequences (C) of the two groups is no significant difference. The general preference for inaction versus action (I) also has no significant differences between those two groups. Moreover, the CNI model fits well in Chinese subjects.