Florian Spychiger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Florian Spychiger has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael Lustenberger
ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, School of Management and Law, Institute for Organizational Viability, Theaterstrasse 17, 8400 Winterthur, Switzerland
6 shared publications - Claudio Juan Tessone
University of Zürich
4 shared publications - Lukas Küng
ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, Winterthur, Switzerland
4 shared publications Paolo Tasca
Center of Enterprise Development, School of Management and Law, Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW), Winterthur, Switzerland
2 shared publications- Sasa Malesevic
School of Management and Law, ZHAW Zurich University of Applied Sciences, 8401 Winterthur, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Chuanyun Li
CAS Key Laboratory of Nano system and Hierarchical Fabrication, National Center for Nanoscience and Technology, Beijing, PR China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Blockchain: Research and Applications
- Vol. 7 (4)
Governance and Maintenance for DAOs With Physical Assets – The Case of No1s1
- 12 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Blockchain: Research and Applications
- Vol. 7 (4)
Open AccessGovernance and Maintenance for DAOs With Physical Assets – The Case of No1s1
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 March 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 15 (7) , 3491
DAO Research Trends: Reflections and Learnings from the First European DAO Workshop (DAWO)
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represent a transformative shift in organizational structures, combining decentralized governance with blockchain-based smart contracts. While DAOs present significant opportunities for innovation, they are confronted with several unresolved challenges, such as the centralization of power, the design of effective governance mechanisms, and the legal uncertainties surrounding their operation. Drawing on insights from recent studies and discussions presented in July 2024 at DAWO24, the first European DAO Workshop, this article explores these issues. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the critical research streams in DAO studies, particularly in governance mechanisms, technical frameworks, value assessment, and legal dimensions. A systematic approach, following the PRISMA methodology, was employed to analyze contributions from 14 extended abstracts and 11 full papers presented at DAWO24. The findings highlight the need for more equitable governance structures, secure and scalable technical frameworks, standardized tools for assessing DAOs’ value, and coherent legal frameworks to support decentralized operations. The article concludes by outlining future research directions, urging interdisciplinary collaboration to address current gaps and optimize DAO design, operation, and regulation.
- 22 March 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 15 (7) , 3491
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDAO Research Trends: Reflections and Learnings from the First European DAO Workshop (DAWO)
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) represent a transformative shift in organizational structures, combining decentralized governance with blockchain-based smart contracts. While DAOs present significant opportunities for innovation, they are confronted with several unresolved challenges, such as the centralization of power, the design of effective governance mechanisms, and the legal uncertainties surrounding their operation. Drawing on insights from recent studies and discussions presented in July 2024 at DAWO24, the first European DAO Workshop, this article explores these issues. The purpose of this article is to identify and analyze the critical research streams in DAO studies, particularly in governance mechanisms, technical frameworks, value assessment, and legal dimensions. A systematic approach, following the PRISMA methodology, was employed to analyze contributions from 14 extended abstracts and 11 full papers presented at DAWO24. The findings highlight the need for more equitable governance structures, secure and scalable technical frameworks, standardized tools for assessing DAOs’ value, and coherent legal frameworks to support decentralized operations. The article concludes by outlining future research directions, urging interdisciplinary collaboration to address current gaps and optimize DAO design, operation, and regulation.
- Open Access
- 19 March 2025
- Published by The British Blockchain Association in The Journal of The British Blockchain Association
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-9
Designing Community Governance – Learnings from DAOs
This work examines how decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) can improve transparency, fairness, and inclusivity in community-based decision-making, using the case of research grant allocation within a university community in Switzerland. The current voting mechanism has been criticised for fostering partiality and favouring personal networks over merit, highlighting the need to improve fairness and objectivity without increasing administrative effort. Drawing on insights from DAO governance, this study aims to propose methods for improving decision-making processes through innovative mechanisms. Adopting an action design research (ADR) methodology, the study integrates theoretical and practical perspectives to design and evaluate innovative methods that address real-world challenges. Schematic analysis of decision-making processes in DAOs provides the foundation for the development of methods applicable to the university’s community context. Proposed solutions are iteratively refined through workshops with community stakeholders to ensure relevance and feasibility. The results present a generalisable model for community-based decision-making processes inspired by DAOs, alongside tailored recommendations for the university’s community-based voting and decision-making process. The findings demonstrate that innovative mechanisms built for large online communities to reach consensus, such as DAO voting systems, can promote impartiality and increase inclusivity, ultimately fostering trust and encouraging broader participation in community governance. This study contributes to the discourse on community governance by bridging theoretical DAO insights with practical applications in a university community setting. Limitations and directions for future research, including implementation and evaluation of the proposed methods in practice, are discussed to pave the way for further exploration of DAO-informed community-based governance models.
- 19 March 2025
- Published by The British Blockchain Association in The Journal of The British Blockchain Association
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-9
Open AccessDesigning Community Governance – Learnings from DAOs
This work examines how decentralised autonomous organisations (DAOs) can improve transparency, fairness, and inclusivity in community-based decision-making, using the case of research grant allocation within a university community in Switzerland. The current voting mechanism has been criticised for fostering partiality and favouring personal networks over merit, highlighting the need to improve fairness and objectivity without increasing administrative effort. Drawing on insights from DAO governance, this study aims to propose methods for improving decision-making processes through innovative mechanisms. Adopting an action design research (ADR) methodology, the study integrates theoretical and practical perspectives to design and evaluate innovative methods that address real-world challenges. Schematic analysis of decision-making processes in DAOs provides the foundation for the development of methods applicable to the university’s community context. Proposed solutions are iteratively refined through workshops with community stakeholders to ensure relevance and feasibility. The results present a generalisable model for community-based decision-making processes inspired by DAOs, alongside tailored recommendations for the university’s community-based voting and decision-making process. The findings demonstrate that innovative mechanisms built for large online communities to reach consensus, such as DAO voting systems, can promote impartiality and increase inclusivity, ultimately fostering trust and encouraging broader participation in community governance. This study contributes to the discourse on community governance by bridging theoretical DAO insights with practical applications in a university community setting. Limitations and directions for future research, including implementation and evaluation of the proposed methods in practice, are discussed to pave the way for further exploration of DAO-informed community-based governance models.
- Open Access
- 26 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Organization Design
- Vol. 14 (2) , 127-143
DAOs as property owners: a conceptual exploration from the perspective of organizational system theory
The development of Bitcoin and its underlying technology blockchain has enabled a new phenomenon called decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). DAOs can be perceived as self-governing organizations whose management is based on programmed and encoded rules on a decentralized and distributed peer-to-peer network. These DAOs typically manage and allocate funds, often in the form of cryptocurrencies. However, in recent years, a variety of DAOs have been established to provide services (e.g., currency exchange, project financing), curate collections (e.g., art collections), or own and manage real assets (e.g., land). Currently, DAO literature focuses mainly on online communities managing digital assets; however, DAOs owning physical properties differ from them in localized communities, asset indivisibility, and additional complexity in collective acquisition, ownership, limited physical capacity, and decentralized governance. Such property-owning DAOs are interesting, because they fuel the transition from purely online organizations into organizations integrating with the physical world. From an organizational system theory perspective this article explores how a DAO owning properties could be designed by exploring three DAO projects that own properties. Applying a conceptual research design, we first identify DAO Design Principles obtained by traditional organizational system theory, followed by examining and describing the core organizational principles for property-owning DAOs. Based on a comprehensive discussion of the conceptual findings, we present a research agenda for further studies on DAOs owning properties.
- 26 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Organization Design
- Vol. 14 (2) , 127-143
Open AccessDAOs as property owners: a conceptual exploration from the perspective of organizational system theory
The development of Bitcoin and its underlying technology blockchain has enabled a new phenomenon called decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs). DAOs can be perceived as self-governing organizations whose management is based on programmed and encoded rules on a decentralized and distributed peer-to-peer network. These DAOs typically manage and allocate funds, often in the form of cryptocurrencies. However, in recent years, a variety of DAOs have been established to provide services (e.g., currency exchange, project financing), curate collections (e.g., art collections), or own and manage real assets (e.g., land). Currently, DAO literature focuses mainly on online communities managing digital assets; however, DAOs owning physical properties differ from them in localized communities, asset indivisibility, and additional complexity in collective acquisition, ownership, limited physical capacity, and decentralized governance. Such property-owning DAOs are interesting, because they fuel the transition from purely online organizations into organizations integrating with the physical world. From an organizational system theory perspective this article explores how a DAO owning properties could be designed by exploring three DAO projects that own properties. Applying a conceptual research design, we first identify DAO Design Principles obtained by traditional organizational system theory, followed by examining and describing the core organizational principles for property-owning DAOs. Based on a comprehensive discussion of the conceptual findings, we present a research agenda for further studies on DAOs owning properties.
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 142-163
Decision-making in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 142-163
Decision-making in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs)
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 366-376
Aspects for Implementations of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) in Switzerland
- 14 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 366-376
Aspects for Implementations of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAO) in Switzerland
- Open Access
- 23 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 134136-134145
Reward Distribution in Proof-of-Stake Protocols: A Trade-Off Between Inclusion and Fairness
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) variants provide an energy-efficient alternative to Proof-of-Work (PoW). However, it is not clear whether practical PoS implementations are fair with respect to wealth, stake, and reward distribution. In this paper, we analyse the fairness of the four wellknown PoS platforms Tezos, Polkadot, Cardano, and Casper through a data-driven approach. For this, we collect data on stakes and rewards for all the four platforms over several years. We then apply four measures to study the fairness along different dimensions. We calculate the Gini coefficient to explore the wealth inequality, the Nakamoto coefficient to investigate the degree of decentralization, and the expectational and robust fairness of the stake-reward proportions, i.e., if the validators receive their fair share of the rewards given their stake share. We can show that there are dynamics of high wealth inequalities and stake centralization in all the systems with Polkadot being the exception. With respect to stake-reward fairness, the platforms differ in the distributions of deviations from the fair share, i.e., in Cardano and Tezos, the differences have a lower magnitue as many small validators participate. However, by examining specific outcomes, we can show that platforms with a limited validator set such as Polkadot and Casper tend to be fairer regarding the reward payoffs, but it is not possible for smaller validators to participate. This mechanism sheds light on a trade-off that the platforms face: the more inclusive (open) the validation process is designed, the unfairer the reward distribution tends to be. Our results allow us to conclude that the way of how PoS is implemented matters greatly for its fairness.
- 23 November 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 134136-134145
Open AccessReward Distribution in Proof-of-Stake Protocols: A Trade-Off Between Inclusion and Fairness
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) variants provide an energy-efficient alternative to Proof-of-Work (PoW). However, it is not clear whether practical PoS implementations are fair with respect to wealth, stake, and reward distribution. In this paper, we analyse the fairness of the four wellknown PoS platforms Tezos, Polkadot, Cardano, and Casper through a data-driven approach. For this, we collect data on stakes and rewards for all the four platforms over several years. We then apply four measures to study the fairness along different dimensions. We calculate the Gini coefficient to explore the wealth inequality, the Nakamoto coefficient to investigate the degree of decentralization, and the expectational and robust fairness of the stake-reward proportions, i.e., if the validators receive their fair share of the rewards given their stake share. We can show that there are dynamics of high wealth inequalities and stake centralization in all the systems with Polkadot being the exception. With respect to stake-reward fairness, the platforms differ in the distributions of deviations from the fair share, i.e., in Cardano and Tezos, the differences have a lower magnitue as many small validators participate. However, by examining specific outcomes, we can show that platforms with a limited validator set such as Polkadot and Casper tend to be fairer regarding the reward payoffs, but it is not possible for smaller validators to participate. This mechanism sheds light on a trade-off that the platforms face: the more inclusive (open) the validation process is designed, the unfairer the reward distribution tends to be. Our results allow us to conclude that the way of how PoS is implemented matters greatly for its fairness.
- Open Access
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Project Leadership and Society
- Vol. 4
Organizing projects with blockchain through a decentralized autonomous organization
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Project Leadership and Society
- Vol. 4
Open AccessOrganizing projects with blockchain through a decentralized autonomous organization
- 26 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 20 (3) , 2760-2770
The Miner’s Dilemma With Migration: The Control Effect of Solo-Mining
We consider the “block withholding attack” as introduced by Eyal, where mining pools may infiltrate others to decrease their revenues. However, when two mining pools attack each other and neither controls a strict majority, the so-called miner’s dilemma arises. Both pools are worse off than without an attack. Knowing this, pools may make implicit non-attack agreements. Having said this, the miner’s dilemma is known to emerge only if no pool controls the majority of the mining power. In this work, we allow for miner migration and show that the miner’s dilemma emerges even for pools whose mining power exceeds 50%. We construct a game, where two mining pools attack each other and use simulation analysis methods to analyze the evolution the pools’ mining power, infiltration preferences and revenue densities under the influence of different mining pool sizes and miner migration preferences. The results show that underlying game experiences a phase transition fueled by miners’ migration preference. Without migration, it is profitable for a large mining pool to attack the other pool. The higher the migration preference of the miners, the more the game transitions into the miner’s dilemma and attacking makes both pools worse off. In a second step, we introduce solo-mining into the system. Introducing solo-mining cannot prevent the miner’s dilemma, however, it improves the efficiency of the mining process as the infiltration preferences of the mining pools are lowered. Thus, solo-mining has a control effect on the miner’s dilemma by keeping the infiltration preference below a certain threshold.
- 26 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 20 (3) , 2760-2770
The Miner’s Dilemma With Migration: The Control Effect of Solo-Mining
We consider the “block withholding attack” as introduced by Eyal, where mining pools may infiltrate others to decrease their revenues. However, when two mining pools attack each other and neither controls a strict majority, the so-called miner’s dilemma arises. Both pools are worse off than without an attack. Knowing this, pools may make implicit non-attack agreements. Having said this, the miner’s dilemma is known to emerge only if no pool controls the majority of the mining power. In this work, we allow for miner migration and show that the miner’s dilemma emerges even for pools whose mining power exceeds 50%. We construct a game, where two mining pools attack each other and use simulation analysis methods to analyze the evolution the pools’ mining power, infiltration preferences and revenue densities under the influence of different mining pool sizes and miner migration preferences. The results show that underlying game experiences a phase transition fueled by miners’ migration preference. Without migration, it is profitable for a large mining pool to attack the other pool. The higher the migration preference of the miners, the more the game transitions into the miner’s dilemma and attacking makes both pools worse off. In a second step, we introduce solo-mining into the system. Introducing solo-mining cannot prevent the miner’s dilemma, however, it improves the efficiency of the mining process as the infiltration preferences of the mining pools are lowered. Thus, solo-mining has a control effect on the miner’s dilemma by keeping the infiltration preference below a certain threshold.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice
- Vol. 1 (1) , 1-27
Incentivizing Data Quality in Blockchain-Based Systems—The Case of the Digital Cardossier
Inspired by an industry initiative to address the celebrated market for lemons (poor-quality used cars), we investigate how incentives for a permissioned blockchain-based system in the automobile ecosystem can be designed to ensure high-quality data storage and use by different stakeholders. The peer-to-peer distributed ledger platform connects organizations and car owners with disparate interests and hidden intentions. While previous literature has chiefly examined incentives for permissionless platforms, we leverage studies about crowdsensing applications to stimulate research on incentives in permissioned blockchains. This article uses the action design research approach to create an incentive system featuring a rating mechanism influenced by data correction measures. Furthermore, we propose relying on certain institutions capable of assessing data generated within the system. This combined approach of a decentralized data correction and an institutionalized data assessment is distinct from similar incentive systems suggested by literature. By using an agent-based model with strategy evolution, we evaluate the proposed incentive system. Our findings indicate that a rating-based revenue distribution leads to markedly higher data quality in the system. Additionally, the incentive system reveals hidden information of the agents and alleviates agency problems, contributing to an understanding of incentive design in inter-organizational blockchain-based data platforms. Furthermore, we explore incentive design in permissioned blockchains and discuss its latest implications.
- 9 September 2022
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice
- Vol. 1 (1) , 1-27
Open AccessIncentivizing Data Quality in Blockchain-Based Systems—The Case of the Digital Cardossier
Inspired by an industry initiative to address the celebrated market for lemons (poor-quality used cars), we investigate how incentives for a permissioned blockchain-based system in the automobile ecosystem can be designed to ensure high-quality data storage and use by different stakeholders. The peer-to-peer distributed ledger platform connects organizations and car owners with disparate interests and hidden intentions. While previous literature has chiefly examined incentives for permissionless platforms, we leverage studies about crowdsensing applications to stimulate research on incentives in permissioned blockchains. This article uses the action design research approach to create an incentive system featuring a rating mechanism influenced by data correction measures. Furthermore, we propose relying on certain institutions capable of assessing data generated within the system. This combined approach of a decentralized data correction and an institutionalized data assessment is distinct from similar incentive systems suggested by literature. By using an agent-based model with strategy evolution, we evaluate the proposed incentive system. Our findings indicate that a rating-based revenue distribution leads to markedly higher data quality in the system. Additionally, the incentive system reveals hidden information of the agents and alleviates agency problems, contributing to an understanding of incentive design in inter-organizational blockchain-based data platforms. Furthermore, we explore incentive design in permissioned blockchains and discuss its latest implications.