Norman Mohd Saleh

This study examines whether adaptation-oriented local governance is associated with changes in corporate climate risk disclosure when firms face no direct reporting mandate. Using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2023 and China’s Climate Adaptation City Pilot Program (CACPP), we find higher climate risk disclosure intensity in pilot locations after policy implementation. Because the full pre-treatment joint test rejects jointly zero leads, we interpret the DID evidence cautiously; the positive estimate remains under treated-group linear and linear-plus-quadratic trend specifications, reweighting, nonlinear outcome models, concurrent climate-policy controls, and alternative treatment definitions. Further evidence is consistent with an external information-demand channel. The statistically detectable increase is concentrated in transition-risk terms, while we do not detect a significant increase in the physical-risk measure. This pattern is consistent with a possible gap between the adaptation-oriented policy signal and the composition of measured reporting, but it does not imply that physical-risk disclosure or real resilience is unchanged. The findings therefore distinguish greater climate disclosure from the risk composition of that disclosure and highlight the importance of considering both disclosure intensity and risk category in climate reporting.

This study examines the relationship between CEO power and corporate climate risk disclosure (CCRD) and the moderating role of institutional pressures in this relationship. The panel data from Chinese A‐share‐listed firms over 2010–2024 indicate that firms led by powerful CEOs disclose low levels of climate risk. However, this negative association is attenuated when firms operate under strong government environmental regulation, receive extensive media attention and face heightened public environmental concern, consistent with the view that formal enforcement and informal scrutiny constrain managerial discretion over strategically sensitive transparency choices. Our results remain robust across alternative specifications and lag structures and persist after endogeneity concerns are addressed using propensity score matching and instrumental‐variable estimation, with CEO dismissal serving as an instrument for CEO power. Additional heterogeneity tests show that the negative CEO power–CCRD association is present in SOEs and non‐SOEs and highly pronounced outside manufacturing. This notion indicates that sectoral contexts shape the extent to which executive power translates into selective transparency. Further analyses indicate that the negative association is stronger for transition risk disclosure than for physical risk disclosure. The overall effect is primarily driven by structural, ownership and prestige power, whereas expert power is positively related to disclosure. The findings have important implications for environmental policymakers, investors and the design of corporate environmental strategy in emerging markets transitioning towards standardised climate reporting.

As artificial intelligence is increasingly used for monitoring and anomaly detection, it may be especially relevant for constraining hidden executive corruption embedded in seemingly legitimate internal activities. This study examines whether corporate artificial intelligence adoption is associated with hidden executive corruption among Chinese A-share listed firms from 2011 to 2023. Hidden executive corruption is measured using the abnormal component of perk consumption, while corporate AI adoption is captured by a composite index based on AI disclosure, AI investment, and AI patent grants. Using firm-level panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects, we find that corporate AI adoption is significantly negatively associated with hidden executive corruption. The result remains robust when we replace the baseline AI measure with a PCA-based index, use lagged and future specifications, and employ a shift-share instrumental-variable approach. Cross-sectional analyses further show that this negative association is stronger in firms with weaker internal control and lower analyst coverage. Additional tests indicate that AI disclosure and AI patent grants are more closely related to lower hidden executive corruption than AI investment, while no significant association is found between AI adoption and overt executive corruption. Overall, the evidence suggests that AI adoption is linked to lower concealed managerial rent extraction within firms and that its governance value is especially visible when traditional monitoring mechanisms are weaker.

This study investigates whether enterprise risk management (ERM) functions as a mediating mechanism through which audit committee effectiveness (ACE) and internal audit (reflected by its arrangement and expenses) influence financial reporting lag (FRL). This study also tests (a) the nonlinearity of the ERM–FRL relationship and (b) the heterogeneity in the FRL that affects the relationship. The analysis is grounded in agency theory and the resource-based view and draws on 2,352 firm-year observations of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2012 to 2015. The study employs panel static models to account for unobserved heterogeneity across firms alongside threshold regression and quantile regression methodologies. This approach captures nonlinear and distributional effects in the relationship between the variables. The findings indicate that investment in internal audit is essential to enhancing ERM effectiveness, which subsequently contributes to reducing FRL. Additionally, the results show that ERM mediates the relationship between ACE and FRL particularly at low levels of ERM effectiveness and when FRL is not excessively prolonged. The study highlights the importance of ERM in preparing financial reports, thus emphasising its role in ensuring a short FRL for timely decision-making by shareholders. It contributes to the financial reporting literature by offering novel insights into the nonlinear and heterogeneous effects of ERM on reporting timeliness.

This study examines the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) controversies and the factors that moderate this relationship. It is motivated by the need to understand the determinants of ESG controversies and the lack of consensus in the academic literature regarding the corporate governance role of MLS. Using a panel dataset of Chinese-listed firms from 2008 to 2023, we found that firms with MLS have fewer ESG controversies than non-MLS firms, including those in the environmental, social, and governance dimensions. The findings are robust across different model specifications and alternative variable measurements. Further analyses revealed that the effect of MLS on ESG controversies is more pronounced when the ownership distribution between non-controlling MLS and the controlling shareholder is more balanced, when they have the same identity, and when institutional investors are part of non-controlling MLS. Additionally, this effect is stronger in firms with severe agency conflicts and weaker governance mechanisms. Finally, and more importantly, we found that ESG controversies have a significant negative impact on firm value and that MLS monitoring can help mitigate these adverse effects. In summary, our results suggest that MLS play a monitoring role in ESG controversies and contribute to firm value by reducing their negative consequences.

The 2017 COSO framework highlights the increasing need to incorporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into firms’ internal control and risk management practices. Top managers play a crucial role in risk management and control. However, it remains unclear whether managerial ability affects ESG risk management. This study investigates the relationship between firms’ ESG risk exposure and managerial ability, and examines whether the quality of internal control (ICQ) influences this relationship. Based on panel data from Chinese listed firms between 2008 and 2022, we found that firms led by more capable managers have lower overall ESG risk exposure, including reduced environmental, social, and governance risks. Furthermore, our findings indicate that higher ICQ strengthens the association between managerial ability and ESG risks. Specifically, an analysis of the five internal control components showed that the mechanisms through which ICQ influences this relationship involve enhancing control environments, risk assessment, control activities, and information and communication channels. Further analysis indicated that the moderating effect of ICQ on the relationship between managerial ability and ESG risks is influenced by management power and the effectiveness of external governance mechanisms.