JSJoseph P. Simmons

Joseph P. Simmons

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Joseph P. Simmons has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Are frogs more forgiving than acorns anticipate? How response pressure confounds can generate (apparent) biases in metaperceptions.

    by Rebecca L. Schaumberg, Joseph P. Simmons

    Much research suggests that people are remarkably poor at understanding how others judge them, particularly regarding the impact of their actions on others. People appear to succumb to a host of nominally distinct biases that take a similar form: They overestimate how harshly they will be judged for bad actions and underestimate how positively they will be judged for good actions. In this article, we demonstrate that these biases can arise from "response pressure" confounds that are baked into how metaperceptions are typically studied. Specifically, we show that socially appropriate responses differ between those asked to predict how another person will feel about their actions and those asked to report how they feel about another person's actions. Predicting that someone will feel extremely grateful for your good deed is less appropriate than reporting that you are extremely grateful for someone else's good deed, while predicting that someone will feel extremely upset for your minor transgression is more appropriate than reporting that you are extremely upset at someone else's minor transgression. So if some participants provide inauthentic but socially appropriate responses, apparent biases will emerge, even if they do not exist. Across 13 preregistered studies, we show that differences in response pressures between predicting "how others will judge me" versus reporting "how I would judge others" can generate apparent biases and produce fanciful ones, such as people overestimating how negatively a frog would judge them if they were an acorn that fell on its head. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

  • Pre‐registration is a Game Changer. But, Like Random Assignment, it is Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient for Credible Science

    by Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, Uri Simonsohn

    We identify 15 claims Pham and Oh (2020) make to argue against pre‐registration. We agree with 7 of the claims, but think that none of them justify delaying the encouragement and adoption of pre‐registration. Moreover, while the claim they make in their title is correct—pre‐registration is neither necessary nor sufficient for a credible science—this is also true of many our science’s most valuable tools, such as random assignment. Indeed, both random assignment and pre‐registration lead to more credible research. Pre‐registration is a game changer.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Pre‐registration: Why and How

    by Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, Uri Simonsohn

    In this article, we (1) discuss the reasons why pre‐registration is a good idea, both for the field and individual researchers, (2) respond to arguments against pre‐registration, (3) describe how to best write and review a pre‐registration, and (4) comment on pre‐registration’s rapidly accelerating popularity. Along the way, we describe the (big) problem that pre‐registration can solve (i.e., false positives caused by p‐hacking), while also offering viable solutions to the problems that pre‐registration cannot solve (e.g., hidden confounds or fraud). Pre‐registration does not guarantee that every published finding will be true, but without it you can safely bet that many more will be false. It is time for our field to embrace pre‐registration, while taking steps to ensure that it is done right.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Psychology's Renaissance

    by Leif D. Nelson, Joseph Simmons, Uri Simonsohn

    In 2010–2012, a few largely coincidental events led experimental psychologists to realize that their approach to collecting, analyzing, and reporting data made it too easy to publish false-positive findings. This sparked a period of methodological reflection that we review here and call Psychology's Renaissance. We begin by describing how psychologists’ concerns with publication bias shifted from worrying about file-drawered studies to worrying about p-hacked analyses. We then review the methodological changes that psychologists have proposed and, in some cases, embraced. In describing how the renaissance has unfolded, we attempt to describe different points of view fairly but not neutrally, so as to identify the most promising paths forward. In so doing, we champion disclosure and preregistration, express skepticism about most statistical solutions to publication bias, take positions on the analysis and interpretation of replication failures, and contend that meta-analytical thinking increases the prevalence of false positives. Our general thesis is that the scientific practices of experimental psychologists have improved dramatically.


  • Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence

    by Joseph P. Simmons, Uri Simonsohn


  • Open Access

    Data from Paper “False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant”

    by Joseph P Simmons, Leif D Nelson, Uri Simonsohn

    The data includes measures collected for the two experiments reported in “False-Positive Psychology” [1] where listening to a randomly assigned song made people feel younger (Study 1) or actually be younger (Study 2). These data are useful because they illustrate inflations of false positive rates due to flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting of results. Data are useful for educational purposes.


  • Is optimism real?

    by Joseph P. Simmons, Cade Massey

    Is optimism real, or are optimistic forecasts just cheap talk? To help answer this question, we investigated whether optimistic predictions persist in the face of large incentives to be accurate. We asked National Football League football fans to predict the winner of a single game. Roughly half (the partisans) predicted a game involving their favorite team, and the other half (the neutrals) predicted a game involving 2 teams they were neutral about. Participants were promised either a small incentive ($5) or a large incentive ($50) for correctly predicting the game's winner. Optimism emerged even when incentives were large, as partisans were much more likely than neutrals to predict partisans' favorite teams to win. Strong optimism also emerged among participants whose responses to follow-up questions strongly suggested that they believed the predictions they made. This research supports the claim that optimism is real.


  • Top Cited Papers

    False-Positive Psychology

    by Joseph P. Simmons, Leif D. Nelson, Uri Simonsohn

    In this article, we accomplish two things. First, we show that despite empirical psychologists’ nominal endorsement of a low rate of false-positive findings (≤ .05), flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting dramatically increases actual false-positive rates. In many cases, a researcher is more likely to falsely find evidence that an effect exists than to correctly find evidence that it does not. We present computer simulations and a pair of actual experiments that demonstrate how unacceptably easy it is to accumulate (and report) statistically significant evidence for a false hypothesis. Second, we suggest a simple, low-cost, and straightforwardly effective disclosure-based solution to this problem. The solution involves six concrete requirements for authors and four guidelines for reviewers, all of which impose a minimal burden on the publication process.