Francesca Manzi

This research applies a social identity lens to show that, during the COVID‐19 pandemic, the classification of occupations and labor market sectors as essential versus nonessential negatively affected the professional identity of those categorized as nonessential workers. We hypothesized that nonessential workers would report lower professional identification (PI) during the pandemic relative to essential workers; explored whether this was partially due to mandatory shifts to working from home and working fewer hours; whether gender differences would emerge in the impact of (non)essential categorization on PI; and if lower PI would negatively relate to work productivity and performance during the pandemic. Empirical evidence based on three datasets sampled among the Dutch working population during two peak waves of COVID‐19 infections and national lockdowns (May/June 2020; Study 1: N = 371; November/December 2020, Study 2: N = 467; Study 3 = 735) confirmed nonessential workers' lower PI relative to essential workers. During the first peak wave (Study 1), nonessential workers' lower PI was partially explained by being home‐bound by reduced work hours. As the pandemic continued (second peak wave; Studies 2 and 3), gender differences emerged, with more negative consequences of being classified as nonessential for women than men. Nonessential workers' lower PI levels were associated with lower work productivity and performance. These findings underscore the importance of understanding social identity processes during the pandemic. We discuss the sociopsychological ramifications of government regulations to control health crises, given how these may inadvertently undermine the professional identity of over half a working population in society.

The commencement of a new editorial tenure within the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition (JPSP: ASC) provides an opportunity for reflection regarding the journal's core mission. The editors recognize that social psychology is at a crossroads due to competing demands that may have led to reduced submissions and posed challenges for previous editors in filling the journal's pages. Now, JPSP: ASC has been allotted more pages to allow for growth during this editorial term. Although this is desirable for the field, it adds to the pressure of identifying articles for publication given the difficulties filling the pages during previous editorial terms. As the premier outlet of social psychology since 1965, JPSP: ASC will retain its centrality if we increase submissions and publish more articles, while continuing to strive to communicate methodologically trustworthy, intellectually stimulating, and socially relevant research, in a responsible fashion. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

This study applies a social identity lens to show that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Dutch government’s classification of occupations and labor market sectors as essential versus non-essential imposed a professional identity threat to those categorized as non-essential. Specifically, we hypothesized (1) that non-essential workers in the Netherlands would report lower professional identification (PI) during the pandemic relative to essential workers; (2) that non-essential workers’ mandatory shift to working from home and working fewer hours would (partially) explain their lower PI relative to essential workers; (3) that gender differences would emerge in the impact of categorization as (non-)essential worker on PI levels; and (4) that lower PI would negatively relate to work productivity and performance during the pandemic. Empirical evidence based on three cross-sectional datasets sampled among the Dutch working population during two peak waves of COVID-19 infections and national lockdowns (May/June 2020; Study 1: N = 371; November/December 2020, Study 2: N = 467; Study 3 = 735) all confirmed that non-essential workers reported lower PI relative to essential workers. The explanation for this outcome varied at different stages in the pandemic. Study 1 results showed that lower PI among those declared non-essential was partially explained by non-essential workers’ work location (home-bound) and reduced work hours, but only during the 1st peak wave. As the pandemic continued (2nd peak wave; Study 2 and 3), gender differences emerged, with more negative consequences of being classified non-essential for women than men. Non-essential workers’ lower PI levels were also associated with lower work productivity and performance. These findings underscore the importance of understanding social identity processes during the pandemic. We discuss socio-psychological ramifications of government regulations to control health crises, given how these may inadvertently undermine the professional identity of over half a working population in society.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic drastically changed the circumstances for parents to combine work and care. We examined work-family guilt among working parents in the Netherlands during the first year of the COVID-19-pandemic (2020). In a cross-sectional survey study with two time points (March and December 2020) in a sample of working parents (N = 574) in the Netherlands, we revealed three key findings. (1) On average, mothers experienced more guilt towards their family for time and energy invested in work instead of family (work-family guilt) than fathers. (2) Parents with essential occupations (regardless of gender) reported significantly stronger experiences of work-family guilt during the first year of the pandemic compared to parents with non-essential occupations. (3) Parents who experienced stronger work-family guilt were more likely to compensate for their guilt by prioritizing family over work and self (by foregoing their leisure time or intending to reduce workhours in order to be with their family). Together these findings show that in terms of combining work and family, the situation is clearly harder on some more than others, namely mothers and essential workers. These findings demonstrate the gendered experience of work-family guilt and the asymmetrical impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the work-family experiences of parents.

The belief that the target of sexism has shifted from women to men is gaining popularity. Yet despite its potential theoretical and practical importance, the belief that men are now the primary target of sexism has not been systematically defined nor has it been reliably measured. In this paper, we define thebelief in sexism shift(BSS) and introduce a scale to measure it. We contend that BSS constitutes a new form of contemporary sexism characterized by the perception that anti-male discrimination is pervasive, that it now exceeds anti-female discrimination, and that it is caused by women’s societal advancement. In four studies (N = 666), we develop and test a concise, one-dimensional, 15-item measure of BSS: the BSS scale. Our findings demonstrate that BSS is related to, yet distinct from other forms of sexism (traditional, modern, and ambivalent sexism). Moreover, our results show that the BSS scale is a stable and reliable measure of BSS across different samples, time, and participant gender. The BSS scale is also less susceptible to social desirability concerns than other sexism measures. In sum, the BSS scale can be a valuable tool to help understand a new and potentially growing type of sexism that may hinder women in unprecedented ways.

Despite the absence of many traditional barriers to gender equality, there continues to be a gender pay gap in new job economies (i.e., the “gig economy” or “platform work”). Taking a novel approach to the study of the gender pay gap, we use a completely gender-blind online work setting to examine the effect of a covert source of gender inequality: differential pay expectations. Our findings reveal that women’s lower pay expectations lead to lower earnings. Crucially, these differential pay expectations appear to be shaped by income disparities in the traditional job economy. This research provides important new insight into the endurance of the gender pay gap, suggesting that structural inequities can carry over to new economies in subtle, yet powerful ways.

The current research challenges the assumption that the presence of women in leadership positions will automatically "break the glass ceiling" for other women. We contend that it is not just a female leader's presence, but also her performance, that influences evaluations of subsequent female candidates for leadership positions. We argue that the continued scarcity and perceived mismatch of women with high-level leadership increases gender salience, promoting perceptions of within-group similarity and fostering an evaluative generalization from the performance of a female leader to the evaluations of another, individual woman. In 5 studies, we demonstrate that the effect of exposure to a female leader on another woman's evaluations and leadership opportunities depends on whether she is successful or unsuccessful (Study 1) and whether she confirms or disconfirms stereotype-based expectations about women's leadership abilities (Study 2). Supporting the role of gender salience and shared group membership in the process, we show that this effect occurs only between women in male gender-typed leadership roles: Evaluative generalization does not occur between women in contexts that are not strongly male in gender type (Study 3) and is not observed between men in male-typed leadership (Study 4). We also explore whether there is evaluative generalization between male leaders in a female-typed context (Study 5). Our results suggest that overcoming gender imbalances in leadership may not be as simple as targeted placement, and that having women in high places should not induce complacency about the elimination of gender bias. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Nations around the world have been witnessing a gradual erosion of democracy. Explanations for why citizens increasingly support anti-democratic behavior and authoritarian leaders range from concern about changing racial demographics to growing polarization and cues from political elites. In 23 studies (total N = 16,353), we propose and test an alternative, more parsimonious account for why some people support anti-democratic behavior—and why this support often appears to be higher among those on the political right. We find that people across the political spectrum—both progressive/liberal and conservative alike—perceive that society is becoming increasingly morally liberal over time. This leads to feelings of advancement and growth among self-identified political liberals, but creates a sense of collective threat among conservatives, who fear for the continued existence of their ideological group. This sense of threat, in turn, drives conservatives to support anti-democratic behavior and authoritarian leaders as a “last resort” for protecting their group. Importantly, however, leading liberals to experience similar levels of collective threat affects their support for anti-democratic behavior in parallel ways, demonstrating that these processes are rooted in a shared psychology of threat that is common to both left and right.