Shoei Nashimoto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Shoei Nashimoto has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Naofumi Homma
Tohoku University
2 shared publications - Tomoyuki Nagatsuka
Mitsubishi Electric Engineering Company Limited, Kamakura, Japan
2 shared publications Daisuke Suzuki
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Kamakura, Japan
1 shared publicationHitoshi Fuji
NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Musashino-shi, Japan
1 shared publication- Junko Takahashi
NTT Secure Platform Laboratories, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Musashino-shi, Japan
1 shared publication Kohei Matsuda
Kobe University, Kobe, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 15 (4) , 23
Cover chirp jamming: hybrid jamming–deception attack on FMCW radar and its countermeasure
- 1 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 15 (4) , 23
Cover chirp jamming: hybrid jamming–deception attack on FMCW radar and its countermeasure
- Open Access
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-12
Comparative Analysis and Implementation of Jump Address Masking for Preventing TEE Bypassing Fault Attacks
Attacks on embedded devices continue to evolve with the increasing number of applications in actual products. A trusted execution environment (TEE) enhances the security of embedded devices by isolating and protecting sensitive applications such as cryptography from malicious or vulnerable applications. However, the emergence of TEE bypass attacks using faults exposes TEEs to threats. In CHES’22, jump address masking (JAM) was proposed as a countermeasure against TEE bypass attacks, specifically targeting RISC-V. JAM prevents modifications of protected data by calculating jump addresses using the protected data, and is expected to provide promising resistance to TEE bypass attacks, for which traditional countermeasures are ineffective. However, JAM was originally proposed for bare metal applications. Therefore, its application to TEEs that operate with an OS presents technical and security challenges. This study proposes a method for applying JAM to Keystone, a major TEE framework for RISC-V, and validates its practical effectiveness and performance through a comparative evaluation with existing countermeasures such as memory encryption, random delays, and instruction duplication. Our evaluation reveals that the proposed JAM implementation is the first countermeasure that achieves complete resistance to TEE bypass attacks with an execution time overhead of approximately 340% for context switches and 1.0% across the entire program, which is acceptable compared with other countermeasures.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-12
Open AccessComparative Analysis and Implementation of Jump Address Masking for Preventing TEE Bypassing Fault Attacks
Attacks on embedded devices continue to evolve with the increasing number of applications in actual products. A trusted execution environment (TEE) enhances the security of embedded devices by isolating and protecting sensitive applications such as cryptography from malicious or vulnerable applications. However, the emergence of TEE bypass attacks using faults exposes TEEs to threats. In CHES’22, jump address masking (JAM) was proposed as a countermeasure against TEE bypass attacks, specifically targeting RISC-V. JAM prevents modifications of protected data by calculating jump addresses using the protected data, and is expected to provide promising resistance to TEE bypass attacks, for which traditional countermeasures are ineffective. However, JAM was originally proposed for bare metal applications. Therefore, its application to TEEs that operate with an OS presents technical and security challenges. This study proposes a method for applying JAM to Keystone, a major TEE framework for RISC-V, and validates its practical effectiveness and performance through a comparative evaluation with existing countermeasures such as memory encryption, random delays, and instruction duplication. Our evaluation reveals that the proposed JAM implementation is the first countermeasure that achieves complete resistance to TEE bypass attacks with an execution time overhead of approximately 340% for context switches and 1.0% across the entire program, which is acceptable compared with other countermeasures.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 62, 39-50
Cover Chirp Jamming: Hybrid Jamming--Deception Attack on FMCW Radar and Its Countermeasure
The reliability of measurements is crucial for ensuring the safety of control systems that depend on such measurements. Frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar is an active sensor used to measure distance and speed. Security evaluations of commercial FMCW radars have focused primarily on deception attacks, assuming that jamming attacks are easier to address. In this study, we propose a novel and efficient jamming attack called cover chirp jamming. This attack utilizes deception techniques and concentrates energy near the target, resulting in higher efficiency compared to conventional jamming methods. Furthermore, it can bypass existing countermeasures against noise, interference, and jamming. We demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the attack through field and simulation experiments using a modern 77-GHz multi-input multi-output FMCW radar. Moreover, we propose a software-based countermeasure that detects and mitigates the attack. Our quantitative evaluation shows that the power of cover chirp jamming is 17.4 dB higher than conventional jamming. In addition, the countermeasure effectively mitigates the attack if the jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR) is below 0.6 dB, whereas the cover chirp jamming cannot be mitigated when the JSR exceeds 0.6 dB.
- 26 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 62, 39-50
Open AccessCover Chirp Jamming: Hybrid Jamming--Deception Attack on FMCW Radar and Its Countermeasure
The reliability of measurements is crucial for ensuring the safety of control systems that depend on such measurements. Frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar is an active sensor used to measure distance and speed. Security evaluations of commercial FMCW radars have focused primarily on deception attacks, assuming that jamming attacks are easier to address. In this study, we propose a novel and efficient jamming attack called cover chirp jamming. This attack utilizes deception techniques and concentrates energy near the target, resulting in higher efficiency compared to conventional jamming methods. Furthermore, it can bypass existing countermeasures against noise, interference, and jamming. We demonstrate the effectiveness and feasibility of the attack through field and simulation experiments using a modern 77-GHz multi-input multi-output FMCW radar. Moreover, we propose a software-based countermeasure that detects and mitigates the attack. Our quantitative evaluation shows that the power of cover chirp jamming is 17.4 dB higher than conventional jamming. In addition, the countermeasure effectively mitigates the attack if the jamming-to-signal ratio (JSR) is below 0.6 dB, whereas the cover chirp jamming cannot be mitigated when the JSR exceeds 0.6 dB.
- 7 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (3) , 289-298
Low-cost distance-spoofing attack on FMCW radar and its feasibility study on countermeasure
- 7 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 11 (3) , 289-298
Low-cost distance-spoofing attack on FMCW radar and its feasibility study on countermeasure
- 20 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 7 (1) , 35-46
Buffer overflow attack with multiple fault injection and a proven countermeasure
- 20 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 7 (1) , 35-46
Buffer overflow attack with multiple fault injection and a proven countermeasure