Marco Facchin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Marco Facchin has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Giacomo Zanotti
Politecnico di Milano
2 shared publications - Marco Viola
Department of Philosophy, Communication and Performing Arts, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy
2 shared publications - Zuzanna Rucińska
University of Antwerp
2 shared publications - Elia Zanin
Ospedale Riabilitativo di Alta Specializzazione (ORAS)-ULSS 2 TV, Motta di Livenza, Italy
1 shared publication - Giulia Leonetti
Department of Human and Life Sciences, Candidate Istituto Universitario Di Studi Superiori IUSS Pavia Linguistics & Philosophy, IUSS Center (L&PIC), Pavia, Italy
1 shared publication Niccolò Negro
Monash University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-28
Making emotional transparency transparent
From LLM-based artificial friends to social robots, an increasing number of artificial agents are explicitly designed to interact with us in an emotionally salient way. The notion of emotional transparency has recently been proposed to describe the mechanisms behind users’ emotional involvement with such systems. However, the details and theoretical boundaries of emotional transparency have been left largely unspecified. This article provides an in-depth analysis of emotional transparency. First, emotional transparency is characterized as a form of transparency in use and situated in the current theoretical landscape of varieties of transparency in the philosophy of mind and technology. Then, the drivers of emotional transparency are investigated, focusing on the features of artificial systems, users, and context of use. Finally, the epistemic state of users interacting with emotionally transparent artificial agents is analyzed, focusing on the apparent paradox by which users behave as if such agents had emotions even if they are perfectly aware that this is not the case.
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- p. 1-28
Open AccessMaking emotional transparency transparent
From LLM-based artificial friends to social robots, an increasing number of artificial agents are explicitly designed to interact with us in an emotionally salient way. The notion of emotional transparency has recently been proposed to describe the mechanisms behind users’ emotional involvement with such systems. However, the details and theoretical boundaries of emotional transparency have been left largely unspecified. This article provides an in-depth analysis of emotional transparency. First, emotional transparency is characterized as a form of transparency in use and situated in the current theoretical landscape of varieties of transparency in the philosophy of mind and technology. Then, the drivers of emotional transparency are investigated, focusing on the features of artificial systems, users, and context of use. Finally, the epistemic state of users interacting with emotionally transparent artificial agents is analyzed, focusing on the apparent paradox by which users behave as if such agents had emotions even if they are perfectly aware that this is not the case.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 17 (2) , 433-460
Defusing the Representation-Hungry Challenge
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 17 (2) , 433-460
Defusing the Representation-Hungry Challenge
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-29
Is mental content an illusion?
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 206 (5) , 1-29
Is mental content an illusion?
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (6) , 1-26
Structure and function in the predictive brain
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (6) , 1-26
Structure and function in the predictive brain
- 9 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 45 (2) , 373-389
Radically Embodied Introspection
- 9 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Topoi
- Vol. 45 (2) , 373-389
Radically Embodied Introspection
- Open Access
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Is mental content an illusion?
When we perceive, there is something we perceive. When we think, there is something we thinkof. When we dream, something is dreamt. These seem all platitudes: obvious and unproblematictruths. And, given that the things perceived, thought of, or dreamed are what philosophers call themental contents of our states, few things should seem as obvious and unproblematic as theexistence of mental contents. And yet, I shall here argue that, when closely examined, mentalcontents appear to be illusions. Just like the proverbial sawn-in-half assistant on the magicianstage, they merely appear to exist, without actually existing. To substantiate this view I will first fixthe reference of “mental content” and “illusion” in an innocent, theory neutral manner - that is, byrelying on paradigmatic positive and negative examples of them (sections 2 and 3). I will also showthat such paradigmatic examples allow us to extract a list of features that such examples allow usto identify features that paradigmatically identify contents and illusions as such, enabling us torecognize them. With these features at hand, I will thus argue that mental contents bear all thefeatures that paradigmatically identify illusions. Otherwise put, I will argue that mental contentsare anomalous, causally insulated, systematic, persistent and bound to a single mode of access inthe same way paradigmatic examples of illusions are (Section 4). Having argued for my main claim,I will defend it from a couple of intuitive objections; namely that it is to silly to be taken seriously,given that mental content is given in a way that does not permit to seriously doubt of its existence(section 5), and that my claim is incoherent (section 6). I’ll show that, intuitive as they are, theobjections are not compelling, and indeed they can be easily answered. Lastly, I will conclude thepaper sketching the possible developments of an illusionistic view of content (section 7).
- 17 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessIs mental content an illusion?
When we perceive, there is something we perceive. When we think, there is something we thinkof. When we dream, something is dreamt. These seem all platitudes: obvious and unproblematictruths. And, given that the things perceived, thought of, or dreamed are what philosophers call themental contents of our states, few things should seem as obvious and unproblematic as theexistence of mental contents. And yet, I shall here argue that, when closely examined, mentalcontents appear to be illusions. Just like the proverbial sawn-in-half assistant on the magicianstage, they merely appear to exist, without actually existing. To substantiate this view I will first fixthe reference of “mental content” and “illusion” in an innocent, theory neutral manner - that is, byrelying on paradigmatic positive and negative examples of them (sections 2 and 3). I will also showthat such paradigmatic examples allow us to extract a list of features that such examples allow usto identify features that paradigmatically identify contents and illusions as such, enabling us torecognize them. With these features at hand, I will thus argue that mental contents bear all thefeatures that paradigmatically identify illusions. Otherwise put, I will argue that mental contentsare anomalous, causally insulated, systematic, persistent and bound to a single mode of access inthe same way paradigmatic examples of illusions are (Section 4). Having argued for my main claim,I will defend it from a couple of intuitive objections; namely that it is to silly to be taken seriously,given that mental content is given in a way that does not permit to seriously doubt of its existence(section 5), and that my claim is incoherent (section 6). I’ll show that, intuitive as they are, theobjections are not compelling, and indeed they can be easily answered. Lastly, I will conclude thepaper sketching the possible developments of an illusionistic view of content (section 7).
- 10 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (7) , 1-24
Fictional minds extend for real
- 10 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (7) , 1-24
Fictional minds extend for real
- 6 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- p. 1-22
Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics: On Distinguishing Types of Structural Representations
- 6 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- p. 1-22
Maps, Simulations, Spaces and Dynamics: On Distinguishing Types of Structural Representations
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (5) , 2095-2117
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 90 (5) , 2095-2117
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense