DVDavid G. Victor

David G. Victor

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


David G. Victor has a total of 102 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Modelling the impacts of policy sequencing on energy decarbonization

    by Huilin Luo, Wei Peng, Allen Fawcett, Jessica F. Green, Gokul Iyer, Jonas Meckling, Jonas Nahm, David G. Victor


  • Open Access

    The scalability and carbon removal potential of ocean alkalinity enhancement

    by Connor Mack, Ryan Hanna, Daniela Dias, David Victor

    Most studies on economy-wide deep decarbonization find the need for widespread deployment of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) yet almost none of those studies pay much attention to real-world scalability of such novel technologies. We assess the scalability of ocean alkalinity enhancement (OAE), a promising CDR approach, and find a global removal potential of 0.64–2.7 Gt CO 2 yr -1 by 2100. Most of that growth occurs late in the century. The scalability of the industry beyond mid-century depends heavily on early investment; key policy interventions, today, would include direct support for early projects that can help get the industry going. Looking to the geography of scaling, we find a tension between deployment strategies restricted only to a small number of countries highly motivated to pay the cost of this technology and the value, soon, of global deployment and scaling.

  • Open Access

    Removing atmospheric CO2 through mass scaleup of crops with enhanced root systems

    by Daniela Faggiani Dias, Ryan Hanna, Jeffrey Sachnik, Yangyang Xu, Jack Gilbert, Wolfgang Busch, David G Victor

    The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that societies may need to remove 5–16 GtCO2 from the atmosphere annually to reach global net-zero CO2 emissions within this century. Yet there has been little analysis of how quickly carbon dioxide removal (CDR) strategies could scale to meet this expected need. We develop a new integrated modeling approach for assessing scalability that combines insights from the history of analogous technological revolutions with information about the efficacy and specific constraints of CDR strategies. We illustrate our approach with genetically enhanced crops that grow larger roots and, in turn, increase soil carbon. Unlike many CDR technologies whose deployment will be slowed by the need for novel and costly infrastructures, history suggests that crop innovations can scale rapidly in countries that admit them. Within 13 years of first deployment, diffusion of enhanced crops could peak and remove 0.9–1.2 GtCO2 yr–1—about 7 times larger than all CO2 offsets supplied today to the global voluntary offsets market. Upscaling depends on policy and politics, as they affect the total land area on which carbon-absorbing crops are allowed. Early scaling could allow crop engineering to play an outsized role in a portfolio of CDR strategies that, overall, scales to IPCC-like levels of carbon removal, even though carbon storage in soils is less permanent than geological storage.


  • How to sustain scientific collaboration amid worsening US–China relations

    by Valerie J. Karplus, Lan Xue, M. Granger Morgan, Kebin He, David G. Victor, Shuang-Nan Zhang


  • Open Access

    Growing deviations between elite and non-elite media coverage of climate change in the United States

    by Parker Bolstad, David G. Victor

    Empirical research aimed at understanding public awareness and opinion on climate change has focused heavily on media coverage. Nearly all prior media studies focus on the United States and on a small number of elite news sources, notably the national newspapers of record. To widen the aperture, we take advantage of a database (MediaCloud) that covers a much larger array of print and word media: 168 million articles about all subjects, derived from 9000 unique U.S. news sources. Coverage of climate change from the “heartland” sources—dominated by state and local news outlets far from the headquarters of national newspapers of record—has risen 144% from 2011 until 2022. Elite news coverage, however, has risen at twice that pace (299%). Over time, the propensity to cover climate change has diverged. In 2011 there were 104 days when the heartland news sources had more coverage of climate change than elite news outlets such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. By 2022 there were only 11 such days. That year, elite news outlets produced roughly three times the coverage of climate change as heartland news outlets. We also find some differences in the topics covered by these two categories of news sources. Such disparities in the intensity of attention to climate change, along with apparently more subtle variations in topical coverage, are variations that deserve future explanation. They are also a reminder that analysis of climate coverage should choose data sources with care since the narrative around what the public is learning about climate appears to vary substantially between heartland and elite new sources.


  • Open Access

    Growing Deviations Between Elite and Non-Elite Media Coverage of Climate Change: The American Story

    by Parker Bolstad, David G. Victor

    Empirical research aimed at understanding public awareness and opinion on climate change has focused heavily on media coverage. Nearly all prior media studies focus on the United States and on a small number of elite news sources, including the national newspapers of record. Here we take advantage of a database (MediaCloud) that covers a much larger array of print and word media: 168 million articles about all subjects, derived from 9000 unique U.S. news sources. Coverage of climate change from these “heartland” sources—dominated by state and local news outlets far from the headquarters of national newspapers of record—has risen 144% from 2011 until 2022. Elite news coverage, however, has risen at twice that pace (299%). Both news sources show spikes in coverage related to similar events (e.g. negotiation of the Paris Accords or President Trump’s withdrawal from Paris); both see a decline in coverage when other events become more prominent (e.g., the first COVID-19 cases). Heartland news sources pay close attention to events such as the discussion of climate change by Pope Francis and to right-wing media campaigns; elite news sources are more focused on climate conferences and extreme weather. Over time, the propensity to cover climate change has diverged. In 2011 there were 104 days when the heartland news sources had more coverage of climate change than elite news outlets such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. By 2022 there were only 11 such days. That year, elite news outlets produced roughly three times the coverage of climate change as heartland news outlets, most of which cover state and local matters.

  • Open Access

    Determining the willingness to link climate and trade policy

    by Marcel Lumkowsky, Emily K. Carlton, David G. Victor, Astrid Dannenberg

    Analysts have long advocated a linkage between international cooperation on climate change and trade measures, such as border tariffs, as a means of enforcing agreements to achieve deeper cooperation. Nevertheless, it has remained difficult to evaluate whether policy makers will allow such linkages and whether linking climate and trade would, in reality, yield beneficial effects to international cooperation. Working with a large sample of climate experts who are highly experienced in climate diplomacy and policy, we elicited how they view the legitimacy and usefulness of linking trade and climate and what factors can explain those views. We find that experts from richer countries, especially Europe, are more likely to see linkage as legitimate and effective. These experts are particularly likely to favor universal border adjustments (UBAs) that apply to all countries to level the economic playing field, rather than trade measures that define an exclusive “club” of countries making extra efforts to cut emissions while punishing non-club members. This finding reveals tensions between a shift in academic thinking about the value of club-based strategies—including clubs that use border measures for enforcement—and what climate policy experts see as valuable. European experts are particularly likely to favor UBAs and they are also least likely to see risks in implementing trade measures. In general, countries with high quality national institutions see lower risks in using trade measures to enforce greater cooperation on climate change. A particularly robust finding is that experts who perceive their home country’s emissions reduction pledge as ambitious are more likely to see risks from using trade measures. While these are the countries that could benefit the most from using trade measures, they are also the countries that are offering the most under the existing Paris Agreement. Experts seem to be increasingly aware of the dissonance between the voluntarism of the Paris Agreement and growing political pressures to apply trade measures. We also find the attributes of experts, such as training and career experience, can affect their assessments. In some models, experts with economic or business backgrounds are more likely to favor trade measures while those with careers in natural science, diplomacy, and national government are less sanguine. Our results suggest that diverging views on the need for trade-based enforcement are robust, associated with important attributes of countries such as their commitments, and likely to persist—suggesting that policy strategies favoring the use of trade measures must pay close attention to the conditions that will determine where and how trade measures can be implemented. Experts from many countries that are the biggest supporters of the Paris approach to climate cooperation also doubt the legitimacy of trade measures.


  • Open Access

    Technology to solve global problems: an emerging consensus for green industrial policy?

    by David G Victor, Emily K Carlton

    Even as most mainstream policy analysts support the idea of active industrial policy to create new green industries and cut carbon pollution, important dissenting voices still question whether government intervention is possible without extreme waste. We suggest that many of today’s debates, which echo debates of the 1970s, need updating to reflect the reality that a lot has been learned about where and how government can pursue effective industrial policy. The more transformative the goals, the harder it is to know which policies, technologies and business models will work, and the greater the need for ‘experimental’ approaches to policy that put uncertainty as the centerpiece. Creating industrial transformation in the context of deep uncertainty is the central challenge for industrial policy. Solving this problem requires not just attention to policy design and industrial response but also possible reforms to the institutions that design and implement policies. Today’s policy institutions, like today’s firms, are mostly organized for the current industrial system—not necessarily the future.