Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Marina Meester has a total of 80 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Breeding Pig Trade drives Influenza A Virus Dispersal in Swine Across Europe

    by Marina Meester, Bram Vrancken, Fabiana Gámbaro, Simon Dellicour

    Pigs serve as a reservoir of former human influenza A virus (IAV) H1N1 and H3N2 lineages and act as mixing vessels for diverse strains, facilitating the emergence of novel IAVs. Understanding the spread and evolution of swine IAVs (swIAVs) is therefore crucial to assess the risk of strains with zoonotic potential emerging. This study uses a phylogeographic framework to investigate the predictors of swIAV dispersal across Europe. All publicly available swIAV genomic sequences were retrieved and subsampled for the ten largest European pig-producing countries. Discrete phylogeographic reconstructions were conducted for H1, H3, N1, N2 encoding genes and all internal gene segments. Our analyses indicate that viral dispersal predominantly occurred from north-western to southern and eastern Europe, with frequent long-distance transitions between non-adjacent countries. We also extended the discrete phylogeographical analyses with generalized linear models to test the association between viral movement and potential predictors, such as live pig trade, pork trade, pig densities, farm sizes, or the geographic distance between key pig production zones. We find that breeding pig trade is the strongest supported predictor of between-country transition events across all segment analyses, while larger average farm size in the country of origin of swIAV strains predicted transition events for five out of ten gene segments. Pork trade and geographic distance did not predict the viral dispersal in any analysis. Our results highlight that farms importing breeding pigs from multiple countries could act as hotspots for reassortment of diverse swIAV strains. Strengthening external biosecurity on farms with emphasis on quarantining breeding pigs, limiting long-distance transport, and implementing a One Health surveillance system for earlier detection of emerging strains, could help curb the rapid spread and evolution of swIAV in Europe.

  • Open Access

    Breeding pig transport drives the dispersal of swine influenza A virus across Europe

    by Marina Meester, Bram Vrancken, Fabiana Gámbaro, Simon Dellicour

    Pigs serve as reservoirs of former human influenza A virus (IAV) H1N1 and H3N2 lineages and act as mixing vessels for diverse strains, facilitating the emergence of novel IAVs. Understanding the spread and evolution of swine IAVs (swIAVs) is therefore crucial to assess the risk of strains with zoonotic potential emerging. This study uses a phylogeographic framework to investigate the predictors of swIAV dispersal across Europe. All publicly available swIAV genomic sequences were retrieved and subsampled for the ten largest European pig-producing countries. Discrete phylogeographic reconstructions were conducted for H1, H3, N1, N2 encoding genes and all internal gene segments. Our analyses indicate that viral dispersal predominantly occurred from north-western to southern and eastern Europe, with frequent long-distance transitions between non-adjacent countries. We also extended the discrete phylogeographical analyses with generalized linear models to test the association between viral movement and potential predictors, such as live pig trade, pork trade, pig densities, farm sizes, or the geographic distance between key pig production zones. We find that breeding pig trade is the only consistently well-supported predictor of between-country transition events, whereas pork trade and geographic distance were not supported. This highlights that farms importing breeding pigs from multiple countries could act as hotspots for reassortment of diverse swIAV strains. Strengthening external biosecurity on farms with emphasis on quarantining breeding pigs, limiting long-distance transport, and implementing a One Health surveillance system for earlier detection of emerging strains, could help curb the rapid spread and evolution of swIAV in Europe. Author summary: Influenza A viruses that originally came from humans are now circulating in pigs. This is a public health concern because these viruses continue to evolve in pigs and may eventually return to humans in new forms that could cause more severe disease. To better prevent this risk, we need to understand the dispersal dynamics of influenza viruses infecting pigs. For this purpose, we retrieved all publicly available European swine influenza A virus genomic sequences. Using this genomic dataset, we reconstructed how the virus has spread across Europe and investigated the external factors that may have driven the spread. Our results indicate that swine influenza A viruses frequently spread between European countries, in particular from north-western to southern and eastern Europe, and that the trade of pigs intended for breeding is strongly associated with these patterns of spread. Consequently, measures such as quarantining of breeding pigs, could help preventing swine influenza variants from spreading between and becoming established in new regions. We also find major gaps in available genomic data from several European countries. We therefore recommend stronger European surveillance programs that include monitoring influenza viruses in both animals and humans to improve early detection of new emerging viral variants.


  • Open Access

    Efficacy of swine Influenza A virus vaccines on transmission, viral shedding and clinical signs: Systematic review and meta-analysis

    by Oumaima Mtaallah, Evelien A. Germeraad, Gavrila Amadea Puspitarani, Bastien Bayle, Uyen H.P. Nguyen, Marina Meester, Arjan Stegeman, Andrea Apolloni, Claire Hautefeuille


  • Open Access

    Zoonotic hepatitis E virus spreads through environmental routes in pig herds – A phylodynamic analysis

    by Marina Meester, Cecilia Valenzuela Agüí, Tijs J. Tobias, Renate W. Hakze van der Honing, Claire Guinat, Martijn Bouwknegt, Louis du Plessis, Egil A.J. Fischer, Mirlin Spaninks, Tanja Stadler, et al.

    Worldwide, many pig farms are affected by hepatitis E virus (HEV) genotype 3, a zoonotic virus that causes hepatitis in humans. People can become infected after eating contaminated pork, making HEV control in pig farms crucial for public health. However, knowledge of HEV transmission dynamics and control options within farms is limited. Our findings reveal that HEV persists in the farm environment, enabling transmission between pigs separated in space and time. We investigated HEV transmission on two Dutch finishing farms for nine months in 2022. In both farms, samples from three compartments (confined rooms), holding 12 pens with pigs each, were collected and tested weekly across three batches (consecutively housed groups of pigs). Additionally, at least one sample per HEV-positive pen was sequenced per batch, retrieving 89 near-complete sequences. We integrated epidemiological data on duration and timing of infection with phylogenetic data to quantify transmission. We observed phylogenetic clustering of pens per compartment in both farms. In farm A, some sequences from different compartments and different batches also clustered, suggesting transmission between pigs housed separately. In farm B, only one compartment became HEV-positive during one batch. Within that compartment, between-pen transmission was efficient, with an effective reproduction number (R e ) of 3.6 (95% HPD interval 1.3–6.7). The other compartments and batch may have remained HEV-negative thanks to stringent biosecurity measures applied on that farm. In farm A, the R e ’s for transmission between pens within and across compartments were not significantly above 1, yet all sampled pens became positive in all batches. A combination of transmission routes, in conjunction with persistence of HEV in the environment, is required to explain why all pens tested positive. These findings show not only how HEV effectively spreads without pigs sharing housing, yet also that reduction of HEV’s zoonotic risk may be achieved by improved biosecurity within farms.


  • Open Access

    HogDSim - A within-farm modeling framework for infectious diseases of swine

    by Jerrold M. Tubay, Egil A.J. Fischer, Marina Meester, Tijs Tobias, Arjan Stegeman


  • Open Access

    Biosecurity measures reducing Salmonella spp. and hepatitis E virus prevalence in pig farms—a systematic review and meta-analysis

    by Nikolaus Huber, Marina Meester, Elena L. Sassu, Elisabeth S. L. Waller, Gergana Krumova-Valcheva, Giuseppe Aprea, Daniela D’aNgelantonio, Veit Zoche-Golob, Silvia Scattolini, Emily Marriott, et al.

    Salmonella spp. and hepatitis E virus (HEV) are significant foodborne zoonotic pathogens that impact the health of livestock, farmers, and the general public. This study aimed to identify biosecurity measures (BSMs) against these pathogens on swine farms in Europe, the United States, and Canada. Overall, 1,529 articles from three scientific databases were screened manually and with the artificial intelligence (AI) tool ASReview. We identified 54 BSMs from 32 articles, primarily focused on Salmonella spp. control. Amongst the extracted BSMs, only five measures for Salmonella spp. control, namely, ‘acidification of feed’, ‘acidification of drinking water’, ‘rodent control’, ‘all-in and all-out production’, and ‘disinfection’ had sufficient observations to conduct a meta-analysis. Of these five, acidification and rodent control were found to be protective measures, that is, their summary odds ratios in the corresponding meta-analyses were lower than 1, indicating lower odds of Salmonella spp. presence on farms which implemented these BSM compared to farms which did not implement them (odds ratio [OR] around 0.25). All-in and all-out production showed a non-significant protective effect (OR = 0.71), while disinfection showed a statistically non-significant lack of association between disinfection and the presence of Salmonella spp. on the farm (OR = 1.03). For HEV, no meta-analysis could be performed. According to multiple articles, two BSMs were significantly associated with a lower risk of HEV presence, namely, disinfecting vehicles (OR = 0.30) and quarantining pigs before introducing them on the farm (OR = 0.48). A risk of bias assessment for each included article revealed a high risk in the majority of the articles, mainly due to selection and performance bias. This emphasises the lack of standardised, high-quality study designs and robust empirical evidence linking BSM implementation to pathogen reduction. The limited data available for meta-analysis, coupled with the high risk of bias (RoB) in the literature, highlights the urgent need for more substantial evidence on the effectiveness of BSMs in mitigating the transmission and spread of zoonotic pathogens, such as Salmonella spp. and HEV on pig farms.


  • Open Access

    Farm biosecurity measures to prevent hepatitis E virus infection in finishing pigs on endemically infected pig farms

    by Marina Meester, Tijs J. Tobias, Jan van Den Broek, Carmijn B. Meulenbroek, Martijn Bouwknegt, Wim H.M. van der Poel, Arjan Stegeman


  • Open Access

    Evaluation of Non-Invasive Sampling Methods for Detection of Hepatitis E Virus Infected Pigs in Pens

    by Marina Meester, Aniek Rademaker, Martijn Bouwknegt, Renate W. Hakze-Van der Honing, Arjan Stegeman, Wim H. M. van der Poel, Tijs J. Tobias

    Pigs are a reservoir of hepatitis E virus (HEV), which causes hepatitis in humans. To study the epidemiology of HEV in pig farms, sampling methods are currently used that cause discomfort to pigs, such as rectal sampling. In line with the 3Rs principle, we aimed to evaluate non-invasive methods to detect pens with HEV-shedding pigs. Twenty-eight pens of one farm were sampled cross-sectionally. Individual rectal swabs (IRS) were collected to determine prevalence within pens. Four pen-level samples were compared: a pool of IRS per pen (P), boot socks (BS), oral fluid (OF) and pooled faecal droppings (FD). Each sample was tested by RT-PCR and the sensitivity and specificity of each method was determined by Bayesian latent class analysis. According to IRS, 19/28 pens were HEV positive. BS had a sensitivity of 95% and detected HEV in pens with 10% of pigs shedding; however, specificity was below 30%. FD were comparably accurate to P, with a sensitivity and specificity of 94% and 86%, respectively. BS sampling is thus advised to detect early shedding of HEV or pen contamination, and FD to determine the duration of shedding. This study demonstrates that non-invasive sampling can replace rectal swabs in research on HEV in pigs.


  • Open Access

    Repeated cross-sectional sampling of pigs at slaughter indicates varying age of hepatitis E virus infection within and between pig farms

    by Marina Meester, Martijn Bouwknegt, Renate Hakze-Van der Honing, Hans Vernooij, Manon Houben, Sophie van Oort, Wim H. M. van der Poel, Arjan Stegeman, Tijs Tobias

    Humans can become infected with hepatitis E virus (HEV) by consumption of undercooked pork. To reduce the burden of HEV in humans, mitigation on pig farms is needed. HEV is found on most pig farms globally, yet within-farm seroprevalence estimates vary considerably. Understanding of the underlying variation in infection dynamics within and between farms currently lacks. Therefore, we investigated HEV infection dynamics by sampling 1711 batches of slaughter pigs from 208 Dutch farms over an 8-month period. Four farm types, conventional, organic, and two types with strict focus on biosecurity, were included. Sera were tested individually with an anti-HEV antibody ELISA and pooled per batch with PCR. All farms delivered seropositive pigs to slaughter, yet batches (resembling farm compartments) had varying results. By combining PCR and ELISA results, infection moment and extent per batch could be classified as low transmission, early, intermediate or late. Cluster analysis of batch infection moments per farm resulted in four clusters with distinct infection patterns. Cluster 1 farms delivered almost exclusively PCR negative, ELISA positive batches to slaughter (PCR−ELISA+), indicating relatively early age of HEV infection. Cluster 2 and 3 farms delivered 0.3 and 0.7 of batches with intermediate infection moment (PCR+ELISA+) respectively and only few batches with early infection. Cluster 4 farms delivered low transmission (PCR−ELISA−) and late infection (PCR+ELISA−) batches, demonstrating that those farms can prevent or delay HEV transmission to farm compartments. Farm type partly coincided with cluster assignment, indicating that biosecurity and management are related to age of HEV infection.


  • Open Access

    Experimental and field investigations of exposure, replication and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in pigs in the Netherlands

    by Reina S. Sikkema, Tijs Tobias, Nadia Oreshkova, Erwin de Bruin, Nisreen Okba, Felicity Chandler, Marcel M. Hulst, Jordi Rodon, Manon Houben, Kees van Maanen, et al.

    Knowledge on host species susceptibility and transmission of emerging pathogens is essential to assess the risk for reservoir development. SARS-CoV-2 can infect multiple animal species, which has b...