ESEric Schnell

Eric Schnell

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Eric Schnell has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Indirect reciprocity undermines indirect reciprocity destabilizing large-scale cooperation

    by Eric Schnell, Michael Muthukrishna

    Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation [K. Panchanathan, R. Boyd, Nature 432 , 499–502 (2004)]. The logic behind these models and experiments [J. Gross et al. , Sci. Adv. 9 , eadd8289 (2023) and O. P. Hauser, A. Hendriks, D. G. Rand, M. A. Nowak, Sci. Rep. 6 , 36079 (2016)] is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here, we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, “local” group embedded within a larger, “global” group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.


  • Open Access

    Indirect Reciprocity Undermines Indirect Reciprocity Destabilizing Large-Scale Cooperation

    by Eric Schnell, Michael Muthukrishna

    Previous models suggest that indirect reciprocity (reputation) can stabilize large-scale human cooperation 1 . The logic behind these models 2–7 and experiments 6,8 is that a strategy in which individuals conditionally aid others based on their reputation for engaging in costly cooperative behavior serves as a punishment that incentivizes large-scale cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. However, these models and experiments fail to account for individuals belonging to multiple groups with reputations that can be in conflict. Here we extend these models such that individuals belong to a smaller, “local” group embedded within a larger, “global” group. This introduces competing strategies for conditionally aiding others based on their cooperative behavior in the local or global group. Our analyses reveal that the reputation for cooperation in the smaller local group can undermine cooperation in the larger global group, even when the theoretical maximum payoffs are higher in the larger global group. This model reveals that indirect reciprocity alone is insufficient for stabilizing large-scale human cooperation because cooperation at one scale can be considered defection at another. These results deepen the puzzle of large-scale human cooperation.

  • Open Access

    Paradox of diversity in the collective brain

    by Robin Schimmelpfennig, Layla Razek, Eric Schnell, Michael Muthukrishna

    Human societies are collective brains. People within every society have cultural brains—brains that have evolved to selectively seek out adaptive knowledge and socially transmit solutions. Innovations emerge at a population level through the transmission of serendipitous mistakes, incremental improvements and novel recombinations. The rate of innovation through these mechanisms is a function of (1) a society's size and interconnectedness (sociality), which affects the number of models available for learning; (2) fidelity of information transmission, which affects how much information is lost during social learning; and (3) cultural trait diversity, which affects the range of possible solutions available for recombination. In general, and perhaps surprisingly, all three levers can increase and harm innovation by creating challenges around coordination, conformity and communication. Here, we focus on the ‘paradox of diversity’—that cultural trait diversity offers the largest potential for empowering innovation, but also poses difficult challenges at both an organizational and societal level. We introduce ‘cultural evolvability’ as a framework for tackling these challenges, with implications for entrepreneurship, polarization and a nuanced understanding of the effects of diversity. This framework can guide researchers and practitioners in how to reap the benefits of diversity by reducing costs. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue ‘The emergence of collective knowledge and cumulative culture in animals, humans and machines’.


  • Open Access

    The Cooperation Ladder: Scale-dependent payoffs and population dynamics create surges, stalls and reversals

    by Eric Schnell, Robin Schimmelpfennig, Michael Muthukrishna

    Human societies have expanded from small bands to large nation-states over the past 12,000 years. Yet, how groups scale up cooperation and why cooperation varies widely between societies, remains a central puzzle. We present a theoretical model that addresses these puzzles by extending the classic Stag Hunt game to (a) multiple players, (b) multiple rewards (“stags”) of different sizes, and (c) endogenous population growth. This framework reveals a “cooperation ladder” where each rung corresponds to a reward that requires a threshold number of cooperators. As cooperation increases, larger rewards become attainable. Securing a larger reward raises carrying capacity (e.g. by providing more food or energy), enabling subsequent population growth and unlocking the possibility of further cooperative gains. However, between these thresholds, cooperation can stagnate or reverse, effectively incentivizing free-riders at intermediate levels. We show that history matters. Early cooperation and population growth can set groups on divergent, path-dependent trajectories. Our model predicts multiple stable equilibria, with surges in cooperation when a new threshold is within reach, and stalls when higher rewards seem unattainable. This framework helps explain key patterns including why cooperation can sometimes accelerate rapidly, why some societies get stuck at smaller scales, and how seemingly selfish behavior can persist in cooperative groups. Expanding the scale of cooperation may depend on how incentives correspond to both environmental conditions, existing levels of cooperation, and population dynamics, offering a new lens on historical transitions in social complexity and insights for modern coordination challenges such as climate change. Significance Statement: Small groups can sometimes grow into large-scale cooperative societies, while other societies stagnate at smaller scales. Our theoretical model reveals that population growth and cooperative thresholds for accessing resources or energy create a “cooperation ladder.” As a group’s population increases, new larger-scale payoffs become attainable, which in turn fuels further growth. However, between these critical thresholds, cooperation tends to stall and some free-riding is tolerated. This mechanism offers a new explanation for historical bursts in population and cooperation (such as the agricultural and Industrial revolutions), why some societies remain small, and how selfish behavior can persist in cooperative groups. It also provides insights into global coordination challenges like climate change by highlighting the material conditions needed to sustain and expand large-scale cooperation.