Adam Hunt
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Adam Hunt has a total of 59 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adrian V. Jaeggi
Institute of Evolutionary Medicine, University of Zurich
4 shared publicationsTanay Katiyar
4 shared publications- Adrian V. Jaeggi
Institute of Evolutionary Medicine, University of Zurich
3 shared publications - Nikhil Chaudhary
University College London
3 shared publications Tom Carpenter
NHS Ayrshire & Arran/University of Glasgow
3 shared publicationsAgnish Das
King’s College London GKT School of Medical Education
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Peer Transmission of Mental Health Information Increases ADHD Self-Diagnosis
Increased sharing of mental health information online has intensified public concern that social media may amplify mental health self-diagnosis rates. While much work has examined the types of mental health information available online, little attention is paid to the mechanisms governing how this information is created and consumed. Taking a cultural evolutionary perspective, we posit that social media facilitates peer-to-peer transmission of psychiatric information in novel formats and provides new motivations to transmit such information; this alters the information people see and their reactions to it. We investigate this through an adapted transmission chain paradigm where participants sequentially modify and transmit Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) explanations amongst each other, allowing us to examine how self-diagnostic tendencies evolve during this process. Across four studies, we find that such transmission increases participants’ tendency to diagnose themselves, and another individual with subclinical traits, with ADHD. Participants’ tendency to recommend this other individual to seek professional help also increases. Transmission format (i.e. generating an example list versus narrative summary) and motivation (i.e. making an explanation for maximising likes versus accuracy) moderate some effects. These results indicate that peer-to-peer transmission may play a key role in determining psychiatric diagnostic trends and shaping the public understanding of mental health.
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessPeer Transmission of Mental Health Information Increases ADHD Self-Diagnosis
Increased sharing of mental health information online has intensified public concern that social media may amplify mental health self-diagnosis rates. While much work has examined the types of mental health information available online, little attention is paid to the mechanisms governing how this information is created and consumed. Taking a cultural evolutionary perspective, we posit that social media facilitates peer-to-peer transmission of psychiatric information in novel formats and provides new motivations to transmit such information; this alters the information people see and their reactions to it. We investigate this through an adapted transmission chain paradigm where participants sequentially modify and transmit Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) explanations amongst each other, allowing us to examine how self-diagnostic tendencies evolve during this process. Across four studies, we find that such transmission increases participants’ tendency to diagnose themselves, and another individual with subclinical traits, with ADHD. Participants’ tendency to recommend this other individual to seek professional help also increases. Transmission format (i.e. generating an example list versus narrative summary) and motivation (i.e. making an explanation for maximising likes versus accuracy) moderate some effects. These results indicate that peer-to-peer transmission may play a key role in determining psychiatric diagnostic trends and shaping the public understanding of mental health.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution, Medicine, and Public Health
- Vol. 14 (1)
Evolutionary research on mental health in non-industrialised contexts: an introduction to the special issue
Lay Summary: Mental health problems vary widely across cultures, yet evolutionary psychiatry has rarely studied non-industrialised societies. This special issue includes four papers — on cross-cultural measurement, mourning rituals in Kenya, perinatal mental health, and PTSD among Turkana warriors — that begin to fill that gap.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Evolution, Medicine, and Public Health
- Vol. 14 (1)
Open AccessEvolutionary research on mental health in non-industrialised contexts: an introduction to the special issue
Lay Summary: Mental health problems vary widely across cultures, yet evolutionary psychiatry has rarely studied non-industrialised societies. This special issue includes four papers — on cross-cultural measurement, mourning rituals in Kenya, perinatal mental health, and PTSD among Turkana warriors — that begin to fill that gap.
- Open Access
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Royal College of Psychiatrists in The British Journal of Psychiatry
- Vol. 228 (6) , 539-547
Clinicians’ attitudes to evolutionary versus genetic explanations for anxiety: cluster-randomised study of stigmatisation
Background: Explanatory frameworks for mental disorders influence stigmatisation and clinical attitudes. Mechanistic biological explanations often yield negative effects on prognostic optimism and empathy. Evolutionary framings might reduce stigma, but this has rarely been tested empirically. Aims: To experimentally test whether a brief educational intervention presenting an evolutionary explanation of anxiety, compared with a genetic explanation, would influence clinicians’ attitudes in directions consistent with anti-stigma goals. Method: In this pre-registered, multi-site, cluster-randomised trial, 171 practising mental health clinicians across the UK and Ireland were randomised by session to receive a 30 min educational presentation on either evolutionary or genetic explanations for anxiety. Pre- and post-session questionnaires assessed clinicians’ optimism regarding patient recovery, perceived efficacy of psychosocial interventions, expected patient willingness to share diagnosis and seek help and perceived usefulness of the information. Data were analysed using Bayesian cumulative ordinal regression models. Results: In line with pre-registered hypotheses, clinicians rated evolutionary explanations as substantially more useful for patients (odds ratio 5.05, 95% credible interval [2.46, 10.28], latent standard deviation shift 1.07) and for clinicians (odds ratio 3.10, 95% credible interval [1.62, 5.81], latent standard deviation shift 0.76) compared with genetic explanations. Evolutionary explanations also resulted in higher anticipated public willingness to seek psychiatric help (odds ratio 1.79, 95% credible interval [0.93, 3.35]) and share a diagnosis (odds ratio 1.62, 95% credible interval [0.88, 2.97]); optimism about patient recovery (odds ratio 1.58, 95% credible interval [0.71, 3.46]); perceived effectiveness of psychosocial interventions (odds ratio 1.62, 95% credible interval [0.84, 3.10]); and belief in the functional usefulness of negative emotions ( β = 0.25 s.d., 95% credible interval [0.01, 0.49]). These effects were driven by both positive pre–post effects of evolutionary education and negative pre–post effects of genetic education compared with pre-education baseline. Exploratory analysis showed further anti-stigma effects. Conclusions: Framing anxiety through an evolutionary lens substantially improved clinicians’ attitudes on various measures of stigmatisation compared with genetic explanations, and was rated as highly useful for both clinicians and patients.
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Royal College of Psychiatrists in The British Journal of Psychiatry
- Vol. 228 (6) , 539-547
Open AccessClinicians’ attitudes to evolutionary versus genetic explanations for anxiety: cluster-randomised study of stigmatisation
Background: Explanatory frameworks for mental disorders influence stigmatisation and clinical attitudes. Mechanistic biological explanations often yield negative effects on prognostic optimism and empathy. Evolutionary framings might reduce stigma, but this has rarely been tested empirically. Aims: To experimentally test whether a brief educational intervention presenting an evolutionary explanation of anxiety, compared with a genetic explanation, would influence clinicians’ attitudes in directions consistent with anti-stigma goals. Method: In this pre-registered, multi-site, cluster-randomised trial, 171 practising mental health clinicians across the UK and Ireland were randomised by session to receive a 30 min educational presentation on either evolutionary or genetic explanations for anxiety. Pre- and post-session questionnaires assessed clinicians’ optimism regarding patient recovery, perceived efficacy of psychosocial interventions, expected patient willingness to share diagnosis and seek help and perceived usefulness of the information. Data were analysed using Bayesian cumulative ordinal regression models. Results: In line with pre-registered hypotheses, clinicians rated evolutionary explanations as substantially more useful for patients (odds ratio 5.05, 95% credible interval [2.46, 10.28], latent standard deviation shift 1.07) and for clinicians (odds ratio 3.10, 95% credible interval [1.62, 5.81], latent standard deviation shift 0.76) compared with genetic explanations. Evolutionary explanations also resulted in higher anticipated public willingness to seek psychiatric help (odds ratio 1.79, 95% credible interval [0.93, 3.35]) and share a diagnosis (odds ratio 1.62, 95% credible interval [0.88, 2.97]); optimism about patient recovery (odds ratio 1.58, 95% credible interval [0.71, 3.46]); perceived effectiveness of psychosocial interventions (odds ratio 1.62, 95% credible interval [0.84, 3.10]); and belief in the functional usefulness of negative emotions ( β = 0.25 s.d., 95% credible interval [0.01, 0.49]). These effects were driven by both positive pre–post effects of evolutionary education and negative pre–post effects of genetic education compared with pre-education baseline. Exploratory analysis showed further anti-stigma effects. Conclusions: Framing anxiety through an evolutionary lens substantially improved clinicians’ attitudes on various measures of stigmatisation compared with genetic explanations, and was rated as highly useful for both clinicians and patients.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 133 (3) , 666-682
Digital technologies and evolutionary mismatch: Harming, but also healing mental health.
Evidence linking computer-mediated communication (CMC) to mental health is often mixed and inconclusive. Theoretical efforts to explain this have lacked critical insights from fields like anthropology and evolutionary medicine, which contextualize human health problems in relation to the discrepancy between features of human ancestral environments and contemporary industrialized lifestyles: so-called evolutionary mismatches. Although aspects of CMC may indeed represent such evolutionary mismatches, this relationship may, however, be complicated by (a) a failure to contextualize the negative mental health effects of CMC against broader societal factors (e.g., family nuclearization) which are plausible preexisting evolutionary mismatches themselves; and (b) ignoring the positive effects of CMC in mitigating these mismatches. In this article, we propose a perspective that addresses these limitations, suggesting that this serves as an antidote to the overpathologization of novel behaviors facilitated by CMC. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 April 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 133 (3) , 666-682
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDigital technologies and evolutionary mismatch: Harming, but also healing mental health.
Evidence linking computer-mediated communication (CMC) to mental health is often mixed and inconclusive. Theoretical efforts to explain this have lacked critical insights from fields like anthropology and evolutionary medicine, which contextualize human health problems in relation to the discrepancy between features of human ancestral environments and contemporary industrialized lifestyles: so-called evolutionary mismatches. Although aspects of CMC may indeed represent such evolutionary mismatches, this relationship may, however, be complicated by (a) a failure to contextualize the negative mental health effects of CMC against broader societal factors (e.g., family nuclearization) which are plausible preexisting evolutionary mismatches themselves; and (b) ignoring the positive effects of CMC in mitigating these mismatches. In this article, we propose a perspective that addresses these limitations, suggesting that this serves as an antidote to the overpathologization of novel behaviors facilitated by CMC. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 18 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine
- Vol. 43 (2) , 234-235
Housing and mental health: an evolutionary perspective
- 18 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine
- Vol. 43 (2) , 234-235
Open AccessHousing and mental health: an evolutionary perspective
- Open Access
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Clinicians' attitudes to evolutionary and genetic explanations for anxiety: a cluster-randomised study of stigmatisation
Background: Explanatory frameworks for mental disorders have an important effect on stigmatisation and clinical attitudes, with mechanistic biological explanations often yielding mixed or negative effects on prognostic optimism and empathy. Evolutionary framings may offer functional, non-pathologizing explanations which could reduce stigma and empower patients, but few attempts have been made to test this empirically.Aims: This study aimed to experimentally test whether a brief educational intervention based on an evolutionary explanation of anxiety, compared to a genetic explanation, would influence clinicians’ attitudes in directions consistent with anti-stigma goals.Method: In a pre-registered, multi-site, double-blind experiment, 171 practicing mental health clinicians across the UK and Ireland were cluster-randomised by session to receive a 30-minute educational presentation on either evolutionary or genetic explanations for anxiety. Pre- and post-session questionnaires assessed clinicians’ optimism regarding patient recovery, the efficacy of psychosocial interventions, expected patient willingness to share diagnoses and engage in help-seeking behavior, and the perceived usefulness of the information. Data were analysed using Bayesian cumulative ordinal regression and linear regression.Results: Compared to the genetic explanation, clinicians rated the evolutionary explanation as substantially more useful for patients (Odds Ratio [OR] = 5.05, 95% Credible Interval [CI] [2.46, 10.28]) and for clinicians (OR = 3.10, 95% CI [1.62, 5.81]). These showed very large mean effect sizes, of 1.07 SD (95% CI [0.65, 1.50]) and 0.76 SD CI (95% CI [0.38, 1.17]). In comparison to the genetic explanation, the evolutionary explanation was also anticipated to increase public willingness to seek psychiatric help (OR = 1.79, 95% CI [0.93, 3.35]) and share a diagnosis (OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.88, 2.97]). It also increased optimism about patient recovery (OR = 1.58, 95% CI [0.71, 3.46]), and the perceived effectiveness of psychosocial interventions (OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.84, 3.10]). Furthermore, it increased clinicians’ belief in the functional usefulness of negative emotions (β = 0.25 SD, 95% CI [0.49, 0.01]).Conclusions: Distinct explanatory frameworks may be a potent determinant of clinicians' and patients’ attitudes. This study provides robust evidence that framing anxiety through an evolutionary lens can be a powerful tool to foster more optimistic and destigmatized perspectives, compared to a genetic explanation. In particular, clinicians overwhelmingly rated evolutionary explanations of anxiety as highly useful in comparison to genetic explanations. Integrating evolutionary explanations into mainstream clinical education presents an under-explored opportunity with numerous potential benefits.
- 10 September 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessClinicians' attitudes to evolutionary and genetic explanations for anxiety: a cluster-randomised study of stigmatisation
Background: Explanatory frameworks for mental disorders have an important effect on stigmatisation and clinical attitudes, with mechanistic biological explanations often yielding mixed or negative effects on prognostic optimism and empathy. Evolutionary framings may offer functional, non-pathologizing explanations which could reduce stigma and empower patients, but few attempts have been made to test this empirically.Aims: This study aimed to experimentally test whether a brief educational intervention based on an evolutionary explanation of anxiety, compared to a genetic explanation, would influence clinicians’ attitudes in directions consistent with anti-stigma goals.Method: In a pre-registered, multi-site, double-blind experiment, 171 practicing mental health clinicians across the UK and Ireland were cluster-randomised by session to receive a 30-minute educational presentation on either evolutionary or genetic explanations for anxiety. Pre- and post-session questionnaires assessed clinicians’ optimism regarding patient recovery, the efficacy of psychosocial interventions, expected patient willingness to share diagnoses and engage in help-seeking behavior, and the perceived usefulness of the information. Data were analysed using Bayesian cumulative ordinal regression and linear regression.Results: Compared to the genetic explanation, clinicians rated the evolutionary explanation as substantially more useful for patients (Odds Ratio [OR] = 5.05, 95% Credible Interval [CI] [2.46, 10.28]) and for clinicians (OR = 3.10, 95% CI [1.62, 5.81]). These showed very large mean effect sizes, of 1.07 SD (95% CI [0.65, 1.50]) and 0.76 SD CI (95% CI [0.38, 1.17]). In comparison to the genetic explanation, the evolutionary explanation was also anticipated to increase public willingness to seek psychiatric help (OR = 1.79, 95% CI [0.93, 3.35]) and share a diagnosis (OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.88, 2.97]). It also increased optimism about patient recovery (OR = 1.58, 95% CI [0.71, 3.46]), and the perceived effectiveness of psychosocial interventions (OR = 1.62, 95% CI [0.84, 3.10]). Furthermore, it increased clinicians’ belief in the functional usefulness of negative emotions (β = 0.25 SD, 95% CI [0.49, 0.01]).Conclusions: Distinct explanatory frameworks may be a potent determinant of clinicians' and patients’ attitudes. This study provides robust evidence that framing anxiety through an evolutionary lens can be a powerful tool to foster more optimistic and destigmatized perspectives, compared to a genetic explanation. In particular, clinicians overwhelmingly rated evolutionary explanations of anxiety as highly useful in comparison to genetic explanations. Integrating evolutionary explanations into mainstream clinical education presents an under-explored opportunity with numerous potential benefits.
- Open Access
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Biological Reviews
- Vol. 100 (4) , 1484-1511
The DCIDE framework: systematic investigation of evolutionary hypotheses, exemplified with autism
Evolutionary explanations of mental disorders are a longstanding aim of evolutionary psychiatry, but have suffered from complexities including within‐disorder heterogeneity and environmental effects of contemporary societies obscuring possible ancestral functions. Studying the relevant processes of human evolution directly is not possible, so hypotheses have remained speculative, exaggerating “just‐so storytelling” critiques. This is despite significant evidence existing in genetics, neuroscience and epidemiology, all of which bears some inferential relevance to evolutionary hypotheses, but which is often not marshalled in a systematic way. To utilise this evidence best to investigate evolutionary explanations of psychiatric (or other) traits we present a novel framework of evidence synthesis and analysis and exemplify it by systematically reviewing evidence related to autism. In the five stages of this “DCIDE framework” analysis, Description identifies a trait to explain and Categorisation initially excludes verifiably non‐adaptive cases by utilising evidence from genetics, neuroscience, and environmental factors. Integration then hones a target for adaptive explanation by considering evidence of age of onset, environmental effects, duration, prevalence and sex differences, incorporating relevant correlated traits visible to selection. Evolutionary hypotheses are then Depicted and Evaluated for their ability to explain all the evidence at hand, using standardised areas of evidence and theoretically motivated principles (e.g. traits arising at birth and lasting for life have different plausible explanations than traits arising in adolescence and receding in adulthood). Competing evolutionary hypotheses can thus be systematically compared for their sufficiency in explaining a wide range of available evidence. In the DCIDE review of autism, when Described with current diagnostic criteria, up to 20% of cases Categorise as non‐adaptive, primarily caused by de novo mutations and environmental trauma. The remaining cases are eligible for adaptive explanation. For Integrating genetically correlated phenotypes, evidence of high prevalence of subclinical familial traits and camouflaged female cases is necessary. Competing Depictions contrast a high intelligence by‐product hypothesis with social niche specialisation for high “systemising” cognition. In Evaluation, broad evidence supports the social niche hypothesis while the intelligence by‐product hypothesis fails to predict various lines of evidence. This provides not only the most robust synthesis of autism research relevant to evolutionary explanation to date, but is a first example of how the structure of the DCIDE framework can allow improved systematic evolutionary analysis across psychiatric conditions, and may also be adopted to strengthen evolutionary psychology more generally, countering just‐so storytelling and cherry‐picking critiques.
- 11 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Biological Reviews
- Vol. 100 (4) , 1484-1511
Open AccessThe DCIDE framework: systematic investigation of evolutionary hypotheses, exemplified with autism
Evolutionary explanations of mental disorders are a longstanding aim of evolutionary psychiatry, but have suffered from complexities including within‐disorder heterogeneity and environmental effects of contemporary societies obscuring possible ancestral functions. Studying the relevant processes of human evolution directly is not possible, so hypotheses have remained speculative, exaggerating “just‐so storytelling” critiques. This is despite significant evidence existing in genetics, neuroscience and epidemiology, all of which bears some inferential relevance to evolutionary hypotheses, but which is often not marshalled in a systematic way. To utilise this evidence best to investigate evolutionary explanations of psychiatric (or other) traits we present a novel framework of evidence synthesis and analysis and exemplify it by systematically reviewing evidence related to autism. In the five stages of this “DCIDE framework” analysis, Description identifies a trait to explain and Categorisation initially excludes verifiably non‐adaptive cases by utilising evidence from genetics, neuroscience, and environmental factors. Integration then hones a target for adaptive explanation by considering evidence of age of onset, environmental effects, duration, prevalence and sex differences, incorporating relevant correlated traits visible to selection. Evolutionary hypotheses are then Depicted and Evaluated for their ability to explain all the evidence at hand, using standardised areas of evidence and theoretically motivated principles (e.g. traits arising at birth and lasting for life have different plausible explanations than traits arising in adolescence and receding in adulthood). Competing evolutionary hypotheses can thus be systematically compared for their sufficiency in explaining a wide range of available evidence. In the DCIDE review of autism, when Described with current diagnostic criteria, up to 20% of cases Categorise as non‐adaptive, primarily caused by de novo mutations and environmental trauma. The remaining cases are eligible for adaptive explanation. For Integrating genetically correlated phenotypes, evidence of high prevalence of subclinical familial traits and camouflaged female cases is necessary. Competing Depictions contrast a high intelligence by‐product hypothesis with social niche specialisation for high “systemising” cognition. In Evaluation, broad evidence supports the social niche hypothesis while the intelligence by‐product hypothesis fails to predict various lines of evidence. This provides not only the most robust synthesis of autism research relevant to evolutionary explanation to date, but is a first example of how the structure of the DCIDE framework can allow improved systematic evolutionary analysis across psychiatric conditions, and may also be adopted to strengthen evolutionary psychology more generally, countering just‐so storytelling and cherry‐picking critiques.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 159, 105603
Evolutionary perspectives on substance and behavioural addictions: Distinct and shared pathways to understanding, prediction and prevention
- 24 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 159, 105603
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessEvolutionary perspectives on substance and behavioural addictions: Distinct and shared pathways to understanding, prediction and prevention
- Open Access
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Autism Research
- Vol. 17 (3) , 459-466
Changing perspectives on autism: Overlapping contributions of evolutionary psychiatry and the neurodiversity movement
Perspectives on autism and psychiatric conditions are affected by a mix of scientific and social influences. Evolutionary psychiatry (EP) and the neurodiversity movement are emerging paradigms that reflect these distinct influences, with the former grounded in scientific theory and the latter driven by political and social principles. Despite their separate foundations, there is a significant overlap between EP and neurodiversity that has not been explored. Specifically, both paradigms reframe disorders as natural cognitive differences rather than disease; expand the concept of “normal” beyond that implied in modern psychiatry; focus on relative strengths; recognize that modern environments disadvantage certain individuals to cause functional impairment; emphasize cognitive variation being socially accommodated and integrated rather than treated or cured; and can help reduce stigmatization. However, in other ways, they are distinct and sometimes in conflict. EP emphasizes scientific explanation, defines “dysfunction” in objective terms, and differentiates heterogenous cases based on underlying causes (e.g. autism due to de novo genetic mutations). The neurodiversity movement emphasizes social action, removes barriers to inclusion, promotes inclusive language, and allows unrestricted identification as neurodivergent. By comparing and contrasting these two approaches, we find that EP can, to some extent, support the goals of neurodiversity. In particular, EP perspectives could be convincing to groups more responsive to scientific evidence and help achieve a middle ground between neurodiversity advocates and critics of the movement.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Autism Research
- Vol. 17 (3) , 459-466
Open AccessChanging perspectives on autism: Overlapping contributions of evolutionary psychiatry and the neurodiversity movement
Perspectives on autism and psychiatric conditions are affected by a mix of scientific and social influences. Evolutionary psychiatry (EP) and the neurodiversity movement are emerging paradigms that reflect these distinct influences, with the former grounded in scientific theory and the latter driven by political and social principles. Despite their separate foundations, there is a significant overlap between EP and neurodiversity that has not been explored. Specifically, both paradigms reframe disorders as natural cognitive differences rather than disease; expand the concept of “normal” beyond that implied in modern psychiatry; focus on relative strengths; recognize that modern environments disadvantage certain individuals to cause functional impairment; emphasize cognitive variation being socially accommodated and integrated rather than treated or cured; and can help reduce stigmatization. However, in other ways, they are distinct and sometimes in conflict. EP emphasizes scientific explanation, defines “dysfunction” in objective terms, and differentiates heterogenous cases based on underlying causes (e.g. autism due to de novo genetic mutations). The neurodiversity movement emphasizes social action, removes barriers to inclusion, promotes inclusive language, and allows unrestricted identification as neurodivergent. By comparing and contrasting these two approaches, we find that EP can, to some extent, support the goals of neurodiversity. In particular, EP perspectives could be convincing to groups more responsive to scientific evidence and help achieve a middle ground between neurodiversity advocates and critics of the movement.
- Open Access
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
An Antidote to Overpathologizing Computer-Mediated Communication
Mixed associations are recurrently found between computer-mediated communication (CMC) and mental health & well-being. Recently, different theoretical efforts have emerged to parse these mixed results. However, evolutionary considerations in such efforts remain largely on the periphery, despite fields like evolutionary medicine and anthropology often theorising about mental health problems arising due to evolutionarily novel environmental circumstances: so-called evolutionary mismatch. While certain aspects of CMC have been previously identified as plausible evolutionary mismatches, two important limitations emerge: (a) a failure to contextualise the negative mental health effects of CMC against other broader societal factors which are plausible pre-existing evolutionary mismatches themselves; (b) ignoring the positive effects of CMC in mitigating these mismatches. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary perspective that addresses these two limitations while noting distinct epistemic and empirical benefits of such a perspective (e.g. providing a culturally invariant theory-driven baseline of ‘normal behaviour’, renewed theoretical focus on alternative variables, concrete design recommendations). Importantly, we contend that our perspective serves as an antidote to the overpathologisation of novel behaviours facilitated by CMC by framing such behaviours within the hunter-gatherer social environment characterising the majority of our evolutionary history.
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAn Antidote to Overpathologizing Computer-Mediated Communication
Mixed associations are recurrently found between computer-mediated communication (CMC) and mental health & well-being. Recently, different theoretical efforts have emerged to parse these mixed results. However, evolutionary considerations in such efforts remain largely on the periphery, despite fields like evolutionary medicine and anthropology often theorising about mental health problems arising due to evolutionarily novel environmental circumstances: so-called evolutionary mismatch. While certain aspects of CMC have been previously identified as plausible evolutionary mismatches, two important limitations emerge: (a) a failure to contextualise the negative mental health effects of CMC against other broader societal factors which are plausible pre-existing evolutionary mismatches themselves; (b) ignoring the positive effects of CMC in mitigating these mismatches. In this paper, we propose an evolutionary perspective that addresses these two limitations while noting distinct epistemic and empirical benefits of such a perspective (e.g. providing a culturally invariant theory-driven baseline of ‘normal behaviour’, renewed theoretical focus on alternative variables, concrete design recommendations). Importantly, we contend that our perspective serves as an antidote to the overpathologisation of novel behaviours facilitated by CMC by framing such behaviours within the hunter-gatherer social environment characterising the majority of our evolutionary history.