ACAnna Ciaunica

Anna Ciaunica

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Anna Ciaunica has a total of 100 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Becoming Hybrid Selves: Interacting with Artificial Minds and Bodies

    by Anna Ciaunica, Shaun Gallagher

    Humans have long tried to make artificial versions of our minds and bodies and other life forms. Recent technological advances are poised to open the Pandora box and explore whether these artificial agents will become more human or alive. In this paper we argue that this question needs to be addressed in tandem with the equally valid counterpart: to what extent do interactions with artificial others make humans less human and more artificial? Living systems such as human organisms are fundamentally open systems, continuously shaped and constituted by exchanges and interactions with the physical and social world. Thus, we suggest that we ourselves may become hybrid through our interactions with our artificial creations. Being surrounded by artificial agents from the cradle and across the lifespan may transform us, humans, into hybrid creatures. It is not only the passive and rapid absorption of the increasingly complex cognitive content that matters, nor the mere sophistication of the conversational exchanges with AI agents or embodied interactions with robots. Rather, the very nature of interaction itself matters too. It’s not what we learn, but how we learn and with whom we learn and what happens in between us and our creations.

  • Open Access

    (Dis)Embodied Joint Agency in Human-Virtual Agents Interactions

    by Altea Vanni, Jan Pohl, Shihan Liu, Jiaqi Yin, Sylvia Xueni Pan, Antonia Hamilton, Amir Jahanian Najafabadi, Anna Ciaunica

    The sense of agency is a fundamental feature of the human mind and deeply connected with its embodied roots. Recent advances in artificial agents such as robots and Virtual Reality (VR) lead to the rapid emergence of new types of embodied interactions and joint agencies. While it is well established that humans readily assign human-like attributes to artificial others, less is known how the human embodiment affects human-artificial agents interactions. We conducted a study (n°43) looking at the relationship between Depersonalisation (DP) experiences and joint agency in human-virtual agent interactions. DP is condition that makes people feel detached from their self and body, with atypical sense of agency over one’s own actions, and distressing subjective feelings of "being a robot” or an “automatic pilot”. Specifically, we have created a VR environment where participants with low versus high levels of DP experiences perform the classic Joint Simon Task while embodying either a human or a humanoid robot avatar in tandem with either another human avatar or robotic avatar. Our findings suggest a significant effect of the DP experiences on the sense of joint agency as measured by the Joint Simon task. Specifically, participants with high levels of DP experiences displayed faster reaction times (RTs) when they embody the Human avatar as compared to when they embodied the robotic avatar. In addition, using the classic Intentional Binding task, we found that time estimations were shorter in high DP participants (but not in Low DP participants) when they embodied a robotic avatar as compared to a human avatar. Our study provides for the first time evidence that the human embodiment matters too in joint agency tasks in addition to the artificial embodiment. Our results pave the way towards more human-body centred design in creating interactions with artificial others, especially when these interactions permeate our daily lives.

  • Physicalisme et qualia : limites de la rationalité scientifique au XXe siècle

    by Anna Ciaunica

    Réduit à sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face à face deux acteurs s’affrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et l’argument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clé autour de laquelle s’agencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que « Tout est physique » ? Le coeur de la thèse que nous défendons peut être résumé ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivées et les formes subjectivées de la pensée, provoque des fossés explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (très souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystérieux), intercalés entre les étapes d’une argumentation. Il sera argumenté ici que la distribution actuelle des débats sur l’axe états physiques (objectifs) / états qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. Conséquemment, une bonne partie de l’énergie des penseurs actuels est dépensée à la recherche du « bon saut » ou « crochet » conceptuel permettant d’attacher les rives du mental à celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problème ne consiste pas à résoudre le différend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutôt à trouver la réponse à la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivés là, i.e., à ce clivage sur l’axe phénoménal/physique ?

  • Open Access

    Why Is Anything Conscious?

    by Michael Timothy Bennett, Sean Welsh, Anna Ciaunica

    We tackle the problem of consciousness by taking the naturally selected, embodied organism as our starting point. We provide a formalism describing how biological systems such as human bodies self-organize to hierarchically interpret unlabelled sensory information according to valence. The system is attracted and repelled at different spatial and temporal scales. This is a qualitative interpretation of an unlabelled physical state. We show how such interpretations imply behavioural policies which are differentiated from each other only by this qualitative aspect of information processing. Natural selection favours systems that actively intervene in the world to achieve homeostatic and reproductive goals. Put provocatively, death grounds meaning. This means that in living systems information processing is necessarily subjective, that is, it has quality embedded into its very core. Qualitative information processing involves interoceptive and exteroceptive classifiers, and determines priorities for self-survival. We formulate The Psychophysical Principle of Causality as a theorem, and prove generalisation optimal learning forces this valence first ontology. Qualitative good or bad processing necessarily comes \textit{before} quality neutral representations of properties (i.e. ``red’’ is constructed from valence). Under selection pressures like sophisticated predation this produces a hierarchy of selves, of which reafference and reflective self awareness are a consequence. We discuss this in light of the seminal distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. We claim that phenomenal consciousness without access is likely common, but the reverse is implausible. Our proposal lays the foundation of a formal science of consciousness, closer to human fact than zombie fiction.

  • Open Access

    Baby Steps in Conscious Experiences: a Developmental Perspective

    by Anna Ciaunica

    This chapter addresses the problem of conscious subjective experiences from a developmental perspective. The aim is to argue that tackling the nature of conscious experiences from the priviledged standpoint of adult (mostly) visual perception is misleading. Instead, I claim, the realy interesting question is : how do we open the doors of bodily sensory experiences at the dawn of our conscious life? How self, body and world perception gets off the ground? Humans rely on high level cognitive abilities to investigate sensory perception, yet bodily sensory perception is present and functional in developing individuals way before we are able to build scientific models of it as adults. Hence we must start with the body, and specifically with the developing body. I then introduce two notions of experience and suggest that this distinction may help us dissipate some of the foggy mystery around the “hard problem” of consciousness.

  • Open Access

    It Is Movement All the Way Down: Broken Rhythms and Embodied Selfhood in Depersonalization

    by Veronika Alekseeva, Anna Ciaunica

    From the moment we are born, and even before, in the womb, and until our last breath, our bodies move all the time. Adaptive behaviors necessarily depend not only on the successful integration of multisensory bodily signals but also on how we move our bodies in the world. This paper considers the notion of embodied selfhood through the perspective of dynamic and rhymical coupling between bodily movements and bodily actions. We propose a new theoretical framework suggesting that the dynamic coupling between bodily movements and bodily actions in the world are fundamental in constructing and maintaining a coherent sense of self. To support this idea, we use the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference frameworks as our background theoretical canvas. Specifically, we will focus on the phenomenon of somatosensory attenuation in relation to dynamic selfhood and argue that rhythmic bodily signals such as heartbeats, breathing, and walking patterns are predictable and, thus, can be smoothly attenuated, i.e., processed in the background. We illustrate this hypothesis by discussing the case of Depersonalization Disorder as a failure to self-attenuate self-related information processing, leading to feelings of unreality and self ‘loss’. We conclude with potential implications of our hypothesis for therapy.


  • Open Access

    It’s Movement all the Way Down: Broken Rhythms and Embodied Selfhood in Depersonalization

    by Veronika Alekseeva, Anna Ciaunica

    From the moment we are born, and even before, in the womb, and until our last breath, our bodies move all the time. Adaptive behaviors necessarily depend not only on successful integration of multisensory bodily signals but also on how we move our body in the world. This paper considers the notion of embodied selfhood through the perspective of dynamic and rhythmic coupling between bodily movements and bodily actions. We propose a new theoretical framework suggesting that the dynamic coupling between bodily movements and bodily actions in the world are fundamental in constructing and maintaining a coherent sense of self. To support this idea, we use the Predictive Processing (PP) and Active Inference framework as our background theoretical canvas. Specifically, we will focus on the phenomenon of somatosensory attenuation in relation to dynamic selfhood, and argue that rhythmic bodily signals such as heartbeats, breathing, and walking patterns are predictable and thus, can be smoothly attenuated, i.e. processed in the background. We illustrate this hypothesis by discussing the case of Depersonalisation Disorder as a failure to self-attenuate self-related information processing, leading to feelings of unreality and self loss. Because living systems such as human bodies are finite systems resisting entropy, it is crucial to strike a balance between what sensory information to ignore, and what sensory information to prioritize on the fly. Hence the vital role of the phenomenon of somatosensory attenuation linked to dynamic embodied selfhood, which is designed precisely to deal with this fine balance between attending and dis-attending self- and world-related information in time. When this fragile balance is disrupted, instead of fixing the self alone, or the individual per se, one needs to address the relationship between the individuals’ sense of self, bodily movements and bodily actions in the physical and social world. We conclude with potential implications of our hypothesis for therapy.

  • Open Access

    The No Body Problem: Intelligence and Selfhood in Biological and Artificial Systems

    by Anna Ciaunica

    Do you need a body to be an intelligent system? Clearly not. Artificial systems such as Large Language Models do not have a body and yet they are promptly qualified as intelligent and even conscious. But what exactly is intelligence? And do you need a body to be “somebody”, i.e. a self? What is the relationship between selfhood and intelligence in biological and artificial (dis)embodied systems? This paper aims to address this question by looking at the link be-tween information processing and homeostatic self-regulation. I propose to distinguish between cumulative (i.e. quan-titative) versus qualitative information processing in artificial and biological self-organising systems. Specifically, I argue that the latter but not the former have to face major time limit constraints due to impending death (i.e. homeosta-sis failure). For living systems there is an end, hence there is an end, a finality, a goal. As finite beings, biological sys-tems must first learn to carefully strike a balance between what information is worth qualitatively processing for their body survival, and what information the system must “let go” and discard. By contrast, artificial intelligence pro-cesses rapidly a quantitatively impressive amount of information in a purely cumulative way, as if eternity and infi-nite, unlimited energetic resources were available to them. By having a no body problem, these systems have no death problem. However, in real worlds (as opposed to abstract formal worlds), resources are not infinite, and thus eternity is not available to artificial systems either. Since the latter are a product of human mind design, they remain depend-ent on human computing and earthly energetic resources. I conclude that from the wider perspective of biological life (i.e. limited time and energy constrained self-organising systems), artificial intelligence-based systems are less adap-tive and hence less “smart” than biological intelligence-based systems.


  • Open Access

    Explicit and implicit sense of agency in depersonalisation experiences

    by Anna Ciaunica, Julia Ayache, Patrick Haggard, Estelle Nakul, Emmanuelle Bonnet, Malika Auvray

    The sense of agency, the feeling of controlling one’s bodily actions and the world is altered in Depersonalisation (DP), a condition that makes people feel detached from one’s self and body. To investigate the link between depersonalisation and both implicit and explicit sense of agency, an online study was conducted using the influential Intentional Binding paradigm in a sample of non-clinical DP participants. The results did not reveal significant differences between individuals with low and high occurrences of DP experiences on the implicit and explicit sense of agency. However, participants with high occurrences of DP experiences showed a more time-sensitive explicit sense of agency and greater temporal distortions for short intervals in the absence of self-initiated motion. These results suggest that there is a discrepancy between implicit and explicit sense of agency in people with high levels of depersonalisation. Altogether, these findings call for further investigations of the key role of time perception on altered sense of self and agency in both non-clinical and clinical populations, to disentangle the mechanisms associated with the explicit and implicit sense of agency.