Robert A. Shumsky
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robert A. Shumsky has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laurens Debo
Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
2 shared publications - Anne G. Hoen
Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth
1 shared publication - Nicos Savva
London Business School, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Quang P. Nguyen
Affiliations Department of Biomedical Data Science, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, United States of America, Department of Epidemiology, Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, United States of America
1 shared publication - Rebecca M. Lebeaux
Geisel School of Medicine at Dartmouth
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (11) , 6777-6799
Hospital Reimbursement in the Presence of Cherry Picking and Upcoding
Hospitals throughout the developed world are reimbursed based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Under this scheme, patients are divided into clinically meaningful groups, and hospitals receive a fixed fee per patient episode tied to the patient DRG. The fee is based on the average cost of providing care to patients who belong to the same DRG across all hospitals. This scheme, sometimes referred to as “yardstick competition,” provides incentives for cost reduction, as no hospital wants to operate at a higher cost than average, and can be implemented using accounting data alone. Nevertheless, if costs within a DRG are heterogeneous, this scheme may give rise to cherry-picking incentives, where providers “drop” patients who are more expensive to treat than average. To address this problem, regulators have tried to reduce within-DRG cost heterogeneity by expanding the number of DRG classes. In this paper, we show that even if cost heterogeneity is eliminated, such expansion will fail to completely eliminate patient cherry picking. In equilibrium, the market will bifurcate into two groups, one of which will continue to cherry-pick patients and underinvest in cost reduction, whereas the other group treats all patients. Furthermore, we show that DRG expansion is particularly problematic if hospitals are also able to “upcode” patients, that is, intentionally assign patients to a more resource-intensive DRG than needed to increase income. Upcoding increases within-DRG cost heterogeneity and amplifies cherry-picking incentives. We examine potential solutions involving yardstick competition based on input statistics. This paper was accepted by Carri Chan, healthcare management. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4752 .
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 69 (11) , 6777-6799
Hospital Reimbursement in the Presence of Cherry Picking and Upcoding
Hospitals throughout the developed world are reimbursed based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Under this scheme, patients are divided into clinically meaningful groups, and hospitals receive a fixed fee per patient episode tied to the patient DRG. The fee is based on the average cost of providing care to patients who belong to the same DRG across all hospitals. This scheme, sometimes referred to as “yardstick competition,” provides incentives for cost reduction, as no hospital wants to operate at a higher cost than average, and can be implemented using accounting data alone. Nevertheless, if costs within a DRG are heterogeneous, this scheme may give rise to cherry-picking incentives, where providers “drop” patients who are more expensive to treat than average. To address this problem, regulators have tried to reduce within-DRG cost heterogeneity by expanding the number of DRG classes. In this paper, we show that even if cost heterogeneity is eliminated, such expansion will fail to completely eliminate patient cherry picking. In equilibrium, the market will bifurcate into two groups, one of which will continue to cherry-pick patients and underinvest in cost reduction, whereas the other group treats all patients. Furthermore, we show that DRG expansion is particularly problematic if hospitals are also able to “upcode” patients, that is, intentionally assign patients to a more resource-intensive DRG than needed to increase income. Upcoding increases within-DRG cost heterogeneity and amplifies cherry-picking incentives. We examine potential solutions involving yardstick competition based on input statistics. This paper was accepted by Carri Chan, healthcare management. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4752 .
- 26 February 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (11)
Retail store customer flow and COVID-19 transmission
Significance: To reduce the transmission of COVID-19, many retail stores use one-way aisles, while local governments enforce occupancy limits or require “safe shopping” times for vulnerable groups. To assess the value of these interventions, we formulate and analyze a mathematical model of customer flow and COVID-19 transmission. We find that the value of specific operational changes depends on how the virus is transmitted, through close contact or suspended aerosols. If transmission is primarily due to close contact, then restricting customers to one-way movement can dramatically reduce transmission. Other interventions, such as reductions in customer density, are effective at a distance but confront store operators with trade-offs between infection rates and customer flow.
- 26 February 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (11)
Retail store customer flow and COVID-19 transmission
Significance: To reduce the transmission of COVID-19, many retail stores use one-way aisles, while local governments enforce occupancy limits or require “safe shopping” times for vulnerable groups. To assess the value of these interventions, we formulate and analyze a mathematical model of customer flow and COVID-19 transmission. We find that the value of specific operational changes depends on how the virus is transmitted, through close contact or suspended aerosols. If transmission is primarily due to close contact, then restricting customers to one-way movement can dramatically reduce transmission. Other interventions, such as reductions in customer density, are effective at a distance but confront store operators with trade-offs between infection rates and customer flow.