Alison Johnston
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Alison Johnston has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Aida A. Hozić
University of Florida
7 shared publicationsKevin L. Young
University of Massachusetts
7 shared publications- Zsófia Barta
Sciences Po , Paris , France
6 shared publications Hongying Wang
University of Waterloo
5 shared publicationsJuanita Elias
University of Warwick Coventry, UK
5 shared publicationsManuela Moschella
University of Bologna
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 503-508
RIPE 2025 diversity statement
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 33 (1) , 503-508
RIPE 2025 diversity statement
- Open Access
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 49-70
Bent into Submission? Domestic Investors and Populist Governments
Do populist governments bend their economic policies to the preferences of bondholders? Populist governments should be a “least likely” case for the market discipline hypothesis. Populist parties typically run on platforms that scapegoat wealthy elites as “enemies of the people” and hence should be more resistant to changing policy positions in the face of market pressure, given their reluctance to alienate their base. Employing most-different case studies of the Five Star Movement/Lega coalition in Italy and Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, we find that populists do bend to market pressure but that this “disciplining effect” does not stem primarily from foreign investors. Rather, it was the inaction of domestic investors in bond auctions that caused these governments to reverse course on headline economic policies. Because domestic investors served as both governments’ “buyers of last resort,” they needed to maintain their favor amidst foreign capital flight.
- 12 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 49-70
Open AccessBent into Submission? Domestic Investors and Populist Governments
Do populist governments bend their economic policies to the preferences of bondholders? Populist governments should be a “least likely” case for the market discipline hypothesis. Populist parties typically run on platforms that scapegoat wealthy elites as “enemies of the people” and hence should be more resistant to changing policy positions in the face of market pressure, given their reluctance to alienate their base. Employing most-different case studies of the Five Star Movement/Lega coalition in Italy and Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, we find that populists do bend to market pressure but that this “disciplining effect” does not stem primarily from foreign investors. Rather, it was the inaction of domestic investors in bond auctions that caused these governments to reverse course on headline economic policies. Because domestic investors served as both governments’ “buyers of last resort,” they needed to maintain their favor amidst foreign capital flight.
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 258-262
RIPE 2024 diversity statement
- 2 January 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 32 (1) , 258-262
RIPE 2024 diversity statement
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1342-1343
2023 Timothy Sinclair Best Article Award
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1342-1343
2023 Timothy Sinclair Best Article Award
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1344-1345
2023 Susan K Sell best reviewer award
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1344-1345
2023 Susan K Sell best reviewer award
- Open Access
- 23 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (13) , 2152-2192
So Right It’s Wrong? Right Governments, Far Right Populism, and Investment Risk
Political economy literature documents how financial investors are more partial to right executives than left ones. Right cabinets face lower interest rates, less volatile stock prices and exchange rates, and higher credit ratings than left cabinets, even after accounting for fiscal differences. But does this advantage persist if right governments accommodate far right parties or ideas? I hypothesize that because far right populism can introduce political instability, markets’ evaluation of right executives might deteriorate if they enter coalition with far right parties or adopt their positions. Employing a panel analysis of bond spread data, and a comparative case study of the Netherlands and Sweden, I find that right executives enjoy significantly lower spreads than their left-wing counter-parts, but this advantage disappears if they rule in coalition with the far right or produce overly right-wing manifestos. These findings highlight that right parties may encounter tangible borrowing costs and market rebuke if they accommodate far right populism.
- 23 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (13) , 2152-2192
Open AccessSo Right It’s Wrong? Right Governments, Far Right Populism, and Investment Risk
Political economy literature documents how financial investors are more partial to right executives than left ones. Right cabinets face lower interest rates, less volatile stock prices and exchange rates, and higher credit ratings than left cabinets, even after accounting for fiscal differences. But does this advantage persist if right governments accommodate far right parties or ideas? I hypothesize that because far right populism can introduce political instability, markets’ evaluation of right executives might deteriorate if they enter coalition with far right parties or adopt their positions. Employing a panel analysis of bond spread data, and a comparative case study of the Netherlands and Sweden, I find that right executives enjoy significantly lower spreads than their left-wing counter-parts, but this advantage disappears if they rule in coalition with the far right or produce overly right-wing manifestos. These findings highlight that right parties may encounter tangible borrowing costs and market rebuke if they accommodate far right populism.
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (1) , 409-412
RIPE 2023 diversity statement
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (1) , 409-412
RIPE 2023 diversity statement
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-92
The score: how do ratings correlate with politics and policy?
This chapter presents a quantitative analysis of the relationship between rating scores and politics and policy, mapping out the pattern of rating penalties and rewards on particular political and policy choices. This pattern is more consistent with the logic of insurance than with neoliberal orthodoxy. Ratings are significantly lower in the presence of generous entitlement systems, heavy personal income and consumption taxes, checks and balances and left and center governments. Spending on social services, public employment, and corporate taxation have either neutral or positive effects on ratings. The examination of the reaction of bond yields to the same variables demonstrates significant differences in how investors and rating agencies treat politics and policy, but rewards and penalties on certain political and policy choices enter into bond yields via ratings.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-92
The score: how do ratings correlate with politics and policy?
This chapter presents a quantitative analysis of the relationship between rating scores and politics and policy, mapping out the pattern of rating penalties and rewards on particular political and policy choices. This pattern is more consistent with the logic of insurance than with neoliberal orthodoxy. Ratings are significantly lower in the presence of generous entitlement systems, heavy personal income and consumption taxes, checks and balances and left and center governments. Spending on social services, public employment, and corporate taxation have either neutral or positive effects on ratings. The examination of the reaction of bond yields to the same variables demonstrates significant differences in how investors and rating agencies treat politics and policy, but rewards and penalties on certain political and policy choices enter into bond yields via ratings.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-26
The puzzle: how do sovereign ratings react to politics and policy?
This introductory chapter lays the groundwork for the investigation of the reactions of ratings to politics and policy. The chapter explains the increased importance of sovereign ratings for developed countries by pointing to the growing significance of global institutional investors as a source of funding for increasingly indebted governments and documenting the impact of rating changes on the conditions under which governments can borrow. It explains why our understanding of the response of sovereign ratings to politics and policy remains incomplete without an appreciation of the logic of the rating business and an awareness of the factors that determine market share and profitability. The chapter lays out the argument about the insurance function of incorporating the assessment of politics and policy into ratings, and briefly describes the empirical evidence presented in the book. It concludes with discussion of the wider contributions of the book beyond the world of sovereign ratings.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-26
The puzzle: how do sovereign ratings react to politics and policy?
This introductory chapter lays the groundwork for the investigation of the reactions of ratings to politics and policy. The chapter explains the increased importance of sovereign ratings for developed countries by pointing to the growing significance of global institutional investors as a source of funding for increasingly indebted governments and documenting the impact of rating changes on the conditions under which governments can borrow. It explains why our understanding of the response of sovereign ratings to politics and policy remains incomplete without an appreciation of the logic of the rating business and an awareness of the factors that determine market share and profitability. The chapter lays out the argument about the insurance function of incorporating the assessment of politics and policy into ratings, and briefly describes the empirical evidence presented in the book. It concludes with discussion of the wider contributions of the book beyond the world of sovereign ratings.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 27-59
The business: why do ratings incorporate politics and policy?
This chapter clarifies what rating agencies do and why rating stability and reliability are key to retaining market share in the rating market. It explains that while sovereign ratings play a pivotal role in the stability and reliability of the entire rating portfolio, they are also particularly vulnerable to failures that threaten rating agency credibility. The chapter cites the Big Three’s official methodologies as evidence that sovereign ratings consider politics and policy in judging the willingness and ability of governments to prioritize the prompt restoration of fiscal balance in economic distress, in order to adjust ratings for the likelihood that, in the event of unexpected economic shocks, the government might fail to cut spending and raise taxes to forestall market panic that leads to rating failures.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 27-59
The business: why do ratings incorporate politics and policy?
This chapter clarifies what rating agencies do and why rating stability and reliability are key to retaining market share in the rating market. It explains that while sovereign ratings play a pivotal role in the stability and reliability of the entire rating portfolio, they are also particularly vulnerable to failures that threaten rating agency credibility. The chapter cites the Big Three’s official methodologies as evidence that sovereign ratings consider politics and policy in judging the willingness and ability of governments to prioritize the prompt restoration of fiscal balance in economic distress, in order to adjust ratings for the likelihood that, in the event of unexpected economic shocks, the government might fail to cut spending and raise taxes to forestall market panic that leads to rating failures.