PGPiyush Ghasiya

Piyush Ghasiya

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Piyush Ghasiya has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    From Generation to Detection: Leveraging Empirically Derived Linguistic Hints for LLM-Based Fake News Detection

    by Piyush Ghasiya

    The rapid advancement and widespread use of Large Language Models (LLMs) have raisedconcerns about their potential to generate persuasive and deceptive content at scale. As LLM-generated text becomes increasingly indistinguishable from human writing, identifying linguisticfeatures in LLM-generated fake news is critical for both the detection and mitigation of fakenews. This research examines linguistic differences between real news and LLM-generated fakenews headlines across four dimensions: toxicity, sentiment, moral framing, and lexical similarity.Using prompt engineering, we created five datasets of AI-generated fake news headlines (∼22,000each) and compared them with a dataset of real news headlines of the same size. Our analysisshows that LLM-generated fake news are more toxic, negative, and subjective, and rely moreheavily on authority-based language. To verify the effectiveness of these linguistic features,we conducted classification experiments using two state-of-the-art LLMs (GPT-4o-mini andGPT-5-mini) under zero-shot, few-shot, and linguistically guided conditions. Our results showthat while zero-shot performance is modest (GPT-4o-mini mean F1 = 67.89%, GPT-5-minimean F1 = 58.47%), both few-shot and linguistic hint approaches achieve consistent and robustimprovements over zero-shot, with mean F1 scores in a similar range (≈ 70%), indicating thatlinguistic markers can be systematically leveraged to improve automated fake news detection.Overall, these findings suggest that LLMs produce consistent linguistic features and that suchfeatures can be effectively exploited in scalable fake news detection strategies.

  • Open Access

    Mapping Polarized News Ecosystems on YouTube: Legacy Vs Digital, Evidence from India

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    The increasing polarization within India’s media landscape necessitates empirical investigation into how legacy and digital media differ in content strategies and audience engagement. This study examines the distinct operational patterns between legacy and digital media in India’s increasingly polarized news landscape. Using computational methods, we analyzed 1,074 YouTube news videos and over 400,000 user comments to address critical research gaps in understanding how institutional origins shape content strategies and audience engagement within platform environments. The analysis reveals that legacy media predominantly features government-aligned narratives and polarizing Hindu-Muslim issues, while digital media cover a broader range of socioeconomic issues, civil movements, and public concerns. Audience/Users engagement mirrors this division. While English comments show comparable levels of toxicity across both media types, Hindi comments on digital media markedly more toxic, suggesting more contentious vernacular discussions. Network analysis further demonstrates the polarization among users, with only 2.7% of users engaging across both, a structural marker of echo chambers. These findings highlight how media ownership structures and platform dynamics intersect to reinforce polarization and shaping the public discourse in the world’s largest democracy.

  • Open Access

    Identifying Themes of Right-Wing Extremism in Hindutva Discourse on Twitter

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Georg Ahnert, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    Hindutva, the core political ideology of India’s current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seeks to transform constitutionally secular India into a Hindu Rashtra (“Hindu nation”). Although Hindutva has all of the features of right-wing extremism (RWE), it is nevertheless viewed as an insular sociopolitical phenomenon, due to the Eurocentric nature of RWE discourse. Recent theoretical and analytical research has sought to showcase the similarity between RWE and Hindutva, but empirical research on their relationship has been largely absent. To fill this gap, in our study, we collected 15 million tweets and used network analysis to identify prominent themes of RWE—including exclusionary nationalism, conspiracy theories, and anti-minority violence and hate speech—among the supporters of Hindutva and the BJP. Furthermore, in our toxicity analysis (performed to understand which themes produced higher levels of toxicity), we found that Hindi-language tweets related to conspiracy theories and anti-minority violence or hate speech were more toxic than English-language tweets. Given that the growing global presence and normalization of RWE-based ideas and movements are sources of concern for everyone invested in the idea of liberal democratic society, our research broadens the discussion on RWE to include the Indian context and invites researchers to further investigate Hindutva from the perspective of RWE.


  • Open Access

    Identifying Themes of Right-Wing Extremism in Hindutva Discourse on Twitter

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Georg Ahnert, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    Hindutva, the core political ideology of India's current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), seeks to transform constitutionally secular India into a Hindu Rashtra (`Hindu nation'). Although Hindutva has all of the features of right-wing extremism (RWE), it is nevertheless viewed as an insular sociopolitical phenomenon due to the Eurocentric nature of RWE discourse. Recent theoretical and analytical research has sought to showcase the similarity between RWE and Hindutva, whereas empirical research on their relationship has been largely missing. To fill that gap, in our study we collected 15 million tweets, and in network analysis, identified prominent themes of RWE, including exclusionary nationalism, conspiracy theories, and anti-minority violence and hate speech among the supporters of Hindutva and BJP. Furthermore, in our toxicity analysis performed to understand which themes produced higher levels of toxicity, we found that Hindi-language tweets related to conspiracy theories and anti-minority violence or hate speech were more toxic than English-language tweets. Given that the growing global presence and normalization of RWE-based ideas and movements are sources of concern for everyone invested in the idea of liberal democratic society, our research broadens the discussion on RWE in the Indian context and invites researchers to further investigate Hindutva from the perspective of RWE.

  • Open Access

    Messaging Strategies of Ukraine and Russia on Telegram during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    The popularity of the instant messaging app Telegram in Ukraine and Russia was strong even before the still-ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, since 24 February 2022 (when the Russian invasion began), it has seen huge increases in subscribers and even become the primary communication and news source in Ukraine. In this exploratory research, we analysed Telegram channels from both Ukraine (@UkraineNow — the official channel of the Ukrainian government, and @V_Zelenskiy_ official — the official channel of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy) and Russia (@rt_russian — the official channel of the news network RT) to discern the content of posts during this invasion. Our analysis of 37,172 posts in total showed that while @UkraineNow is particularly being used to communicate invasion-related news, @rt_russian is working as merely an extension of RT, which is part of the pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation ecosystem. However, Zelenskyy has opted for a completely different approach: he has used his Telegram channel to encourage Ukrainians and garner support from the World. The present conflict is at a critical juncture, and our timely research seeks to determine how both countries’ governments are utilizing Telegram as a weapon for the information war and what impact this has on ground.

  • Open Access

    Rapid Sharing of Islamophobic Hate on Facebook: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat Controversy

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    The COVID-19 pandemic brought about several challenges in addition to the virus itself. The rise of Islamophobic hate speech on social media is one such challenge. As countries were coping with economic collapse due to mass lockdown, hateful people, especially those associated with far-right groups, were targeting and blaming Muslims for the spread of the coronavirus. In India, where intense religious/communal polarization is taking place under the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government, one such prominent instance of Islamophobia—the “Tablighi Jamaat Controversy” (TJC)—occurred. This article analyzes Facebook posts by public groups over a 5-month period (March–August 2020) to find the major actors and track their link-sharing behavior. We found that the Pro-BJP groups with a right-wing ideology spread Islamophobic hate speech, while other groups (anti-hate) worked to counter the hate. We also found that the hate disseminators were extremely active (three times faster) in sharing their content as compared with the anti-hate groups. Finally, our research indicated that the links most widely shared by the hate spreaders were mostly misinformation. These results explain the use of the Facebook platform to spread hate and misinformation, demonstrating how BJP’s pro-Hindu ideology and its attitude toward Muslims is directly and indirectly enabling these actors to spew hate against Muslims with no legal consequences.


  • Deepfakes and Society: What Lies Ahead?

    by Dilrukshi Gamage, Jiayu Chen, Piyush Ghasiya, Kazutoshi Sasahara


  • Open Access

    Rapid Sharing of Islamophobic Hate on Facebook: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat Controversy

    by Piyush Ghasiya, Kazutoshi Sasahara

    The COVID-19 pandemic brought about several challenges in addition to the virus itself. The rise of Islamophobic hate speech on social media is one such challenge. As countries were coping with economic collapse due to mass lockdown, hateful people, especially those associated with far-right groups, were targeting and blaming Muslims for the spread of the coronavirus. In India where intense religious/communal polarization is taking place under the right-wing Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) led government, one such prominent instance of Islamophobia—the “Tablighi Jamaat Controversy” (TJC)—occurred. This article analyzes Facebook posts by public groups over a five-month period (March to August 2020) to find the major actors and track their link-sharing behavior. We found that the Pro-BJP groups with a right-wing ideology spread Islamophobic hate speech, while other groups (anti-hate) worked to counter the hate. We also found that the hate disseminators were extremely active (three times faster) in sharing their content as compared to the anti-hate groups. Finally, our research indicated that the links most widely shared by the hate spreaders were mostly misinformation. These results explain the use of the Facebook platform to spread hate and misinformation, demonstrating how BJP’s pro-Hindu ideology and its attitude towards Muslims is directly and indirectly enabling these actors to spew hate against Muslims with no legal consequences.