John Bengson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
John Bengson has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marc A. Moffett
University of Wyoming
2 shared publications - Jennifer C. Wright
University of Wyoming
1 shared publication - Jennifer Cole Wright
Department of Psychology, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 24 (1) , 24-50
Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action
Abstract: Recent experimental research on the ‘Knobe effect’ suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi‐directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this account while disconfirming various currently prominent alternative accounts. We end by discussing some implications of this account for folk psychology.
- 21 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 24 (1) , 24-50
Asymmetries in Judgments of Responsibility and Intentional Action
Abstract: Recent experimental research on the ‘Knobe effect’ suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that there is a bi‐directional relation between attributions of intentional action and evaluative considerations. We defend a novel account of this phenomenon that exploits two factors: (i) an intuitive asymmetry in judgments of responsibility (e.g. praise/blame) and (ii) the fact that intentionality commonly connects the evaluative status of actions to the responsibility of actors. We present the results of several new studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this account while disconfirming various currently prominent alternative accounts. We end by discussing some implications of this account for folk psychology.
- 25 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 142 (3) , 387-401
The folk on knowing how
- 25 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 142 (3) , 387-401
The folk on knowing how
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 136 (1) , 31-57
Know-how and concept possession
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 136 (1) , 31-57
Know-how and concept possession