Jaechul Sung
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jaechul Sung has a total of 58 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Seokhie Hong
Contec
13 shared publications - Deukjo Hong
Department of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, Jeonbuk National University, Jeonju, Jeollabuk, Republic of Korea
5 shared publications Kitae Jeong
Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea
5 shared publications- Kitae Jeong
Korea University
5 shared publications Seokhie Hong
Center for Information Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul 136-701, Republic of Korea
5 shared publications- Dongjae Lee
Kangwon National University, Chuncheon, Republic of Korea
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 20 June 2025
- Published byย Springer Nature
- p. 367-390
Recovering S-Box Design Structures and Quantifying Distances Between S-Boxes Using Deep Learning
- 20 June 2025
- Published byย Springer Nature
- p. 367-390
Recovering S-Box Design Structures and Quantifying Distances Between S-Boxes Using Deep Learning
- 13 May 2025
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol.ย 12 ย (15) , 29989-30002
SAECHAM: Secure and Efficient Lightweight Block Cipher CHAM Variant
The ARX structure, which comprises three fundamental operationsโAddition, Rotation, and XORโmakes it well-suited for lightweight cryptography. To design a secure and efficient ARX cipher, it is necessary to find the optimal structure by properly combining the order, number of operations, and rotation amounts. CHAM64 is an ARX block cipher with a 64-bit block size, which is proposed as an attempt to enhance the lightweight characteristics of LEA. In this paper, we present Secure And Efficient CHAM (SAECHAM), a variant of CHAM64 with a rearranged order of operations and adjusted rotation amounts. By changing the order of the operations in CHAM64, six different CHAM-like structures can be created. We propose the properties that can be eliminated in the implementation process depending on the rotation amount in each structure. To improve suitability for constrained environments such as 8-bit and 16-bit microcontrollers, we reduce the search space for rotation amounts and analyze the number of instructions. Using an SMT solver-based automatic search method, we analyze the security of 62 CHAM64 variants through differential and linear analysis. Among them, we find four variants with equal or better resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis compared to CHAM64. As a result, we propose the variant with the fewest instructions among them as SAECHAM. Through software implementations on 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4 platforms, we demonstrate that SAECHAM is efficient in terms of encryption speed and also performs efficiently when implemented using SIMD operations in high-performance CPUs.
- 13 May 2025
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol.ย 12 ย (15) , 29989-30002
SAECHAM: Secure and Efficient Lightweight Block Cipher CHAM Variant
The ARX structure, which comprises three fundamental operationsโAddition, Rotation, and XORโmakes it well-suited for lightweight cryptography. To design a secure and efficient ARX cipher, it is necessary to find the optimal structure by properly combining the order, number of operations, and rotation amounts. CHAM64 is an ARX block cipher with a 64-bit block size, which is proposed as an attempt to enhance the lightweight characteristics of LEA. In this paper, we present Secure And Efficient CHAM (SAECHAM), a variant of CHAM64 with a rearranged order of operations and adjusted rotation amounts. By changing the order of the operations in CHAM64, six different CHAM-like structures can be created. We propose the properties that can be eliminated in the implementation process depending on the rotation amount in each structure. To improve suitability for constrained environments such as 8-bit and 16-bit microcontrollers, we reduce the search space for rotation amounts and analyze the number of instructions. Using an SMT solver-based automatic search method, we analyze the security of 62 CHAM64 variants through differential and linear analysis. Among them, we find four variants with equal or better resistance to differential and linear cryptanalysis compared to CHAM64. As a result, we propose the variant with the fewest instructions among them as SAECHAM. Through software implementations on 8-bit AVR, 16-bit MSP430, 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4 platforms, we demonstrate that SAECHAM is efficient in terms of encryption speed and also performs efficiently when implemented using SIMD operations in high-performance CPUs.
- 5 November 2024
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol.ย 12 ย (6) , 6805-6817
Redefining Security in Shadow Cipher for IoT Nodes: New Full-Round Practical Distinguisher and the Infeasibility of Key-Recovery Attacks
Shadow is a block cipher for Internet of Things (IoT) Nodes proposed in the IEEE IoT Journal in 2021. The primary design principle of shadow is the adoption of a variant 4-branch Feistel structure to ensure a fast diffusion. We refer to this structure as the shadow structure and prove that it is almost identical to the Feistel structure, which invalidates the design principle. We also present a new structural distinguisher that can distinguish the shadow structure from a random permutation with only two plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Additionally, we demonstrate that the key-recovery attacks utilizing the impossible differential proposed by Liu et al. in the Cybersecurity Journal in 2023 and the integral characteristic proposed by Mirzaie et al. in the IEEE IoT Journal are infeasible. Instead, we extend our distinguisher to a key-recovery attack using only one plaintext/ciphertext pair by exploiting the key schedule. Moreover, upon investigating shadowโs round function, we observe that only specific forms of monomials can appear in the ciphertext, leading to an integral distinguisher involving four plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Notably, the algebraic degree does not exceed 12 for shadow-32 and 20 for shadow-64, regardless of the number of rounds used. Our results show that shadow is highly vulnerable to algebraic attacks, emphasizing the need for careful consideration of algebraic attacks when incorporating AND, rotation, and xor operations in cipher design.
- 5 November 2024
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol.ย 12 ย (6) , 6805-6817
Redefining Security in Shadow Cipher for IoT Nodes: New Full-Round Practical Distinguisher and the Infeasibility of Key-Recovery Attacks
Shadow is a block cipher for Internet of Things (IoT) Nodes proposed in the IEEE IoT Journal in 2021. The primary design principle of shadow is the adoption of a variant 4-branch Feistel structure to ensure a fast diffusion. We refer to this structure as the shadow structure and prove that it is almost identical to the Feistel structure, which invalidates the design principle. We also present a new structural distinguisher that can distinguish the shadow structure from a random permutation with only two plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Additionally, we demonstrate that the key-recovery attacks utilizing the impossible differential proposed by Liu et al. in the Cybersecurity Journal in 2023 and the integral characteristic proposed by Mirzaie et al. in the IEEE IoT Journal are infeasible. Instead, we extend our distinguisher to a key-recovery attack using only one plaintext/ciphertext pair by exploiting the key schedule. Moreover, upon investigating shadowโs round function, we observe that only specific forms of monomials can appear in the ciphertext, leading to an integral distinguisher involving four plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Notably, the algebraic degree does not exceed 12 for shadow-32 and 20 for shadow-64, regardless of the number of rounds used. Our results show that shadow is highly vulnerable to algebraic attacks, emphasizing the need for careful consideration of algebraic attacks when incorporating AND, rotation, and xor operations in cipher design.
- Open Access
- 29 February 2024
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 12, 35502-35511
Revisiting the Multiple-of Property for SKINNY: The Exact Computation of the Number of Right Pairs
At EUROCRYPT 2017, Grassi et al. proposed the multiple-of-8 property for 5-round AES, where the number n of right pairs is a multiple of 8. At ToSC 2019, Boura et al. generalized the multiple-of property for a general SPN block cipher and applied it to block cipher SKINNY. In this paper, we present that n is not only a multiple but also a fixed value for SKINNY. Unlike the previous proof of generalization of multiple-of property using equivalence class, we investigate the propagation of the set to compute the exact number n . We experimentally verified that presented property holds. We extend this property one round more using the lack of the whitening key on the SKINNY and use this property to construct 6-round distinguisher on SKINNY-64 and SKINNY-128. The probability of success of both distinguisher is almost 1 and the total complexities are 2 16 and 2 32 respectively. We verified that this property only holds for SKINNY, not for AES and MIDORI, and provide the conditions under which it exists for AES-like ciphers.
- 29 February 2024
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 12, 35502-35511
Open AccessRevisiting the Multiple-of Property for SKINNY: The Exact Computation of the Number of Right Pairs
At EUROCRYPT 2017, Grassi et al. proposed the multiple-of-8 property for 5-round AES, where the number n of right pairs is a multiple of 8. At ToSC 2019, Boura et al. generalized the multiple-of property for a general SPN block cipher and applied it to block cipher SKINNY. In this paper, we present that n is not only a multiple but also a fixed value for SKINNY. Unlike the previous proof of generalization of multiple-of property using equivalence class, we investigate the propagation of the set to compute the exact number n . We experimentally verified that presented property holds. We extend this property one round more using the lack of the whitening key on the SKINNY and use this property to construct 6-round distinguisher on SKINNY-64 and SKINNY-128. The probability of success of both distinguisher is almost 1 and the total complexities are 2 16 and 2 32 respectively. We verified that this property only holds for SKINNY, not for AES and MIDORI, and provide the conditions under which it exists for AES-like ciphers.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2023
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 11, 44519-44530
A Practical Ciphertext-Only Attack on GMR-2 System
We present a ciphertext-only attack on the GEO-Mobile Radio Interface-2 (GMR-2) system for the first time. The GMR-2 is a satellite communication standard adopted by Inmarsat, a British satellite telecommunications company that offers global mobile services. The best publicly known attack on GMR-2 is a known plaintext attack called the inversion attack, proposed by Hu et al. in 2018. It recovers the 64-bit session key in 20 milliseconds when one keystream frame (15-byte) is available. Our contributions are twofold. First, we improve the previous inversion attack using a novel approach, pre-filtration. With our improvement, we can recover the session key in 4.5 milliseconds and 0.62 milliseconds using one and two keystream frames, respectively. Second, we propose a practical ciphertext-only attack on the GMR-2 by exploiting a vulnerability in the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message type. We find that this message type only has 2 11 degrees of freedom despite being transmitted in a 184-bit format. Additionally, we find that two or more keystream frames can be derived from a single message in four of the six channels through which this message type may be transmitted. Assuming the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message type is transmitted using one of these four channels, we can iteratively guess the message and conduct a known plaintext attack to recover the session key. Thanks to the speed improvement achieved by our pre-filtration method, our ciphertext-only attack can recover the session key in 1.3 seconds.
- 1 May 2023
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 11, 44519-44530
Open AccessA Practical Ciphertext-Only Attack on GMR-2 System
We present a ciphertext-only attack on the GEO-Mobile Radio Interface-2 (GMR-2) system for the first time. The GMR-2 is a satellite communication standard adopted by Inmarsat, a British satellite telecommunications company that offers global mobile services. The best publicly known attack on GMR-2 is a known plaintext attack called the inversion attack, proposed by Hu et al. in 2018. It recovers the 64-bit session key in 20 milliseconds when one keystream frame (15-byte) is available. Our contributions are twofold. First, we improve the previous inversion attack using a novel approach, pre-filtration. With our improvement, we can recover the session key in 4.5 milliseconds and 0.62 milliseconds using one and two keystream frames, respectively. Second, we propose a practical ciphertext-only attack on the GMR-2 by exploiting a vulnerability in the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message type. We find that this message type only has 2 11 degrees of freedom despite being transmitted in a 184-bit format. Additionally, we find that two or more keystream frames can be derived from a single message in four of the six channels through which this message type may be transmitted. Assuming the CIPHERING MODE COMMAND message type is transmitted using one of these four channels, we can iteratively guess the message and conduct a known plaintext attack to recover the session key. Thanks to the speed improvement achieved by our pre-filtration method, our ciphertext-only attack can recover the session key in 1.3 seconds.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2022
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 10, 110195-110204
Integral Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Block Cipher PIPO
PIPO is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ICISC 2020, which has a byte-oriented structure suitable for bit-sliced implementation and allows for efficient higher-order masking implementations. In this study, we use bit-based division property techniques to construct 6-round integral distinguishers, and propose key-recovery attacks on 8 rounds of PIPO-64/128 and 10 rounds of PIPO-64/256. The data complexity of both attacks is 2 63 chosen plaintexts and the time complexities are 2 125 and 2 253.8 respectively. Our results complement the security analysis of PIPO, and show that the PIPO structure is resistant to recently researched cryptanalysis methods. Because only differential and linear attacks were carefully considered to determine the number of rounds of PIPO, our work, based on division property, is important for verifying the security margin.
- 13 October 2022
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 10, 110195-110204
Open AccessIntegral Cryptanalysis of Lightweight Block Cipher PIPO
PIPO is a lightweight block cipher proposed at ICISC 2020, which has a byte-oriented structure suitable for bit-sliced implementation and allows for efficient higher-order masking implementations. In this study, we use bit-based division property techniques to construct 6-round integral distinguishers, and propose key-recovery attacks on 8 rounds of PIPO-64/128 and 10 rounds of PIPO-64/256. The data complexity of both attacks is 2 63 chosen plaintexts and the time complexities are 2 125 and 2 253.8 respectively. Our results complement the security analysis of PIPO, and show that the PIPO structure is resistant to recently researched cryptanalysis methods. Because only differential and linear attacks were carefully considered to determine the number of rounds of PIPO, our work, based on division property, is important for verifying the security margin.
- Open Access
- 30 December 2021
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 10, 1979-1989
Improved Ciphertext-Only Attack on GMR-1
The GEO-Mobile Radio Interface-1 (GMR-1) is a satellite communication standard used in Thuraya, a United Arab Emirates-based regional mobile satellite service provider. The specification of the encryption algorithm used in GMR-1 was not disclosed until it was uncovered by Driessen et al. in 2012 through reverse engineering. Given that A5-GMR-1, a stream cipher used in GMR-1, is primarily based on A5/2, Driessen et al. presented a ciphertext-only attack from the attacks on A5/2. Their ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 24 ciphertexts in an average of 32.1 min and requires 400 GB of pre-computed data. This study enhances Driessen et al. โs ciphertext-only attack on A5-GMR-1 in all aspects of time, memory, and data. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we optimize the inefficient part of the previous attack. As a result, our ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 13 ciphertexts in less than 1 second and requires 400 MB of pre-computed data. Second, we propose novel memory-saving techniques. These techniques reduce the memory complexity to 216 ~ 289 MB without increasing the time and data complexity. Third, we present several time-memory-data tradeoff techniques. Using these techniques, we can present an attack that meets the desired conditions, such as memory minimization or data minimization. Furthermore, while the complexity of the previous attack is presented vaguely as โmultiple setsโ of 24 ciphertexts, these techniques allow us to accurately calculate the time, memory, and data complexity of the attack. Finally, we demonstrate that A5-GMR-1 can be attacked without frame numbers. To find out the frame number of each ciphertext, it is necessary to analyze and synchronize multiple channels. We present a plaintext recovery attack that does not require these processes.
- 30 December 2021
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 10, 1979-1989
Open AccessImproved Ciphertext-Only Attack on GMR-1
The GEO-Mobile Radio Interface-1 (GMR-1) is a satellite communication standard used in Thuraya, a United Arab Emirates-based regional mobile satellite service provider. The specification of the encryption algorithm used in GMR-1 was not disclosed until it was uncovered by Driessen et al. in 2012 through reverse engineering. Given that A5-GMR-1, a stream cipher used in GMR-1, is primarily based on A5/2, Driessen et al. presented a ciphertext-only attack from the attacks on A5/2. Their ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 24 ciphertexts in an average of 32.1 min and requires 400 GB of pre-computed data. This study enhances Driessen et al. โs ciphertext-only attack on A5-GMR-1 in all aspects of time, memory, and data. Our contributions are fourfold. First, we optimize the inefficient part of the previous attack. As a result, our ciphertext-only attack recovers the session key from multiple sets of 13 ciphertexts in less than 1 second and requires 400 MB of pre-computed data. Second, we propose novel memory-saving techniques. These techniques reduce the memory complexity to 216 ~ 289 MB without increasing the time and data complexity. Third, we present several time-memory-data tradeoff techniques. Using these techniques, we can present an attack that meets the desired conditions, such as memory minimization or data minimization. Furthermore, while the complexity of the previous attack is presented vaguely as โmultiple setsโ of 24 ciphertexts, these techniques allow us to accurately calculate the time, memory, and data complexity of the attack. Finally, we demonstrate that A5-GMR-1 can be attacked without frame numbers. To find out the frame number of each ciphertext, it is necessary to analyze and synchronize multiple channels. We present a plaintext recovery attack that does not require these processes.
- Open Access
- 8 November 2021
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 9, 150592-150607
A New Method for Designing Lightweight S-Boxes With High Differential and Linear Branch Numbers, and its Application
Bit permutations are efficient linear functions often used for lightweight cipher designs. However, they have low diffusion effects, compared to word-oriented binary and maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices. Thus, the security of bit permutation-based ciphers is significantly affected by differential and linear branch numbers (DBN and LBN) of nonlinear functions. In this paper, we introduce a widely applicable method for constructing S-boxes with high DBN and LBN. Our method exploits constructions of S-boxes from smaller S-boxes and it derives/proves the required conditions for smaller S-boxes so that the DBN and LBN of the constructed S-boxes are at least 3. These conditions enable us to significantly reduce the search space required to create such S-boxes. Using the unbalanced- Bridge and unbalanced- MISTY structures, we develop a variety of new lightweight S-boxes that provide not only both DBN and LBN of at least 3 but also efficient bitsliced implementations including at most 11 nonlinear bitwise operations. The new S-boxes are the first that exhibit these characteristics.
- 8 November 2021
- Published byย Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)ย inย IEEE Access
- Vol.ย 9, 150592-150607
Open AccessA New Method for Designing Lightweight S-Boxes With High Differential and Linear Branch Numbers, and its Application
Bit permutations are efficient linear functions often used for lightweight cipher designs. However, they have low diffusion effects, compared to word-oriented binary and maximum distance separable (MDS) matrices. Thus, the security of bit permutation-based ciphers is significantly affected by differential and linear branch numbers (DBN and LBN) of nonlinear functions. In this paper, we introduce a widely applicable method for constructing S-boxes with high DBN and LBN. Our method exploits constructions of S-boxes from smaller S-boxes and it derives/proves the required conditions for smaller S-boxes so that the DBN and LBN of the constructed S-boxes are at least 3. These conditions enable us to significantly reduce the search space required to create such S-boxes. Using the unbalanced- Bridge and unbalanced- MISTY structures, we develop a variety of new lightweight S-boxes that provide not only both DBN and LBN of at least 3 but also efficient bitsliced implementations including at most 11 nonlinear bitwise operations. The new S-boxes are the first that exhibit these characteristics.
- Open Access
The Switching Generator: New Clock-Controlled Generator with Resistance against the Algebraic and Side Channel Attacks
Since Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in stream modes, such as counter (CTR), output feedback (OFB) and cipher feedback (CFB), can meet most industrial requirements, the range of applications for dedicated stream ciphers is decreasing. There are many attack results using algebraic properties and side channel information against stream ciphers for hardware applications. Al-Hinai et al. presented an algebraic attack approach to a family of irregularly clock-controlled linear feedback shift register systems: the stop and go generator, self-decimated generator and alternating step generator. Other clock-controlled systems, such as shrinking and cascade generators, are indeed vulnerable against side channel attacks. To overcome these threats, new clock-controlled systems were presented, e.g., the generalized alternating step generator, cascade jump-controlled generator and mutual clock-controlled generator. However, the algebraic attack could be applied directly on these new systems. In this paper, we propose a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator, which has resistance to algebraic and side channel attacks. This generator also preserves both security properties and the efficiency of existing clock-controlled generators.
Open AccessThe Switching Generator: New Clock-Controlled Generator with Resistance against the Algebraic and Side Channel Attacks
Since Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in stream modes, such as counter (CTR), output feedback (OFB) and cipher feedback (CFB), can meet most industrial requirements, the range of applications for dedicated stream ciphers is decreasing. There are many attack results using algebraic properties and side channel information against stream ciphers for hardware applications. Al-Hinai et al. presented an algebraic attack approach to a family of irregularly clock-controlled linear feedback shift register systems: the stop and go generator, self-decimated generator and alternating step generator. Other clock-controlled systems, such as shrinking and cascade generators, are indeed vulnerable against side channel attacks. To overcome these threats, new clock-controlled systems were presented, e.g., the generalized alternating step generator, cascade jump-controlled generator and mutual clock-controlled generator. However, the algebraic attack could be applied directly on these new systems. In this paper, we propose a new clock-controlled generator: the switching generator, which has resistance to algebraic and side channel attacks. This generator also preserves both security properties and the efficiency of existing clock-controlled generators.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published byย SAGE Publicationsย inย International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
- Vol.ย 10 ย (1)
Related-Key Cryptanalysis on the Full PRINTcipher Suitable for IC-Printing
PRINTcipher-48/96 are 48/96-bit block ciphers proposed in CHES 2010 which support the 80/160-bit secret keys, respectively. In this paper, we propose related-key cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher. To recover the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, our attack requires 247 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of . In the case of PRINTcipher-96, we require 295 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of 2107. These results are the first known related-key cryptanalytic results on them.- 1 January 2014
- Published byย SAGE Publicationsย inย International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
- Vol.ย 10 ย (1)
Open AccessRelated-Key Cryptanalysis on the Full PRINTcipher Suitable for IC-Printing
PRINTcipher-48/96 are 48/96-bit block ciphers proposed in CHES 2010 which support the 80/160-bit secret keys, respectively. In this paper, we propose related-key cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher. To recover the 80-bit secret key of PRINTcipher-48, our attack requires 247 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of . In the case of PRINTcipher-96, we require 295 related-key chosen plaintexts with a computational complexity of 2107. These results are the first known related-key cryptanalytic results on them.