Katlijn Haesebrouck
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Katlijn Haesebrouck has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander Brüggen
Maastricht University
1 shared publication Alexandra G. H. L. Van Den Abbeele
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (K.U.Leuven)
1 shared publicationAlexandra Van Den Abbeele
1 shared publicationAndrew H. Newman
1 shared publication- Christoph Feichter
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
1 shared publication - Isabella Grabner
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Role of Accounting in Labor Exploitation: A Review, Framework and Future Directions
Labor exploitation, the unfair sacrifice of employee well-being in favor of organizational objectives, presents significant operational, financial, and ethical risks for employees, organizations, and the societies in which they function. This paper conceptualizes labor exploitation as a formal accounting construct by developing a multidimensional framework informed by a structured review of the accounting literature. Specifically, we analyze and classify prior research to identify three types of actors involved in the perpetuation of labor exploitation and to highlight how accounting practices can facilitate, detect, or mitigate exploitation across these actors. Based on this analysis, and incorporating insights from a survey of experienced professionals, we identify key gaps in the literature and outline a set of future research opportunities, with the primary goal of encouraging more accounting-based research on labor exploitation.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Role of Accounting in Labor Exploitation: A Review, Framework and Future Directions
Labor exploitation, the unfair sacrifice of employee well-being in favor of organizational objectives, presents significant operational, financial, and ethical risks for employees, organizations, and the societies in which they function. This paper conceptualizes labor exploitation as a formal accounting construct by developing a multidimensional framework informed by a structured review of the accounting literature. Specifically, we analyze and classify prior research to identify three types of actors involved in the perpetuation of labor exploitation and to highlight how accounting practices can facilitate, detect, or mitigate exploitation across these actors. Based on this analysis, and incorporating insights from a survey of experienced professionals, we identify key gaps in the literature and outline a set of future research opportunities, with the primary goal of encouraging more accounting-based research on labor exploitation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cultivating Auditors Who Are More Committed to and Better at Ensuring Audit Quality
We use a multi-method approach — semi-structured interviews (n=34) and a survey with an embedded experiment (n=399) — to examine a new audit input we term action-oriented skepticism, i.e., the extent to which auditors identify as being committed to taking action, when needed, to ensure audit quality. We identify an audit-process benefit of stronger action-oriented skeptics, as well as socialization and selection mechanisms by which audit firms may cultivate them. The audit-process benefit is better-calibrated professional judgments. Stronger actionoriented skeptics express greater concern about material misstatement risk when randomly manipulated evidence indicates that management's accounting is aggressive, without raising a false alarm when evidence indicates that management's accounting is neutral. Among socialization mechanisms, audit voice culture and resource facilitation are positively associated with stronger action-oriented skeptics, whereas value communication is negatively associated with it, consistent with a perceived disconnect between communicated values and their practical implementation. Among selection mechanisms, societal interest and truth-seeking are positively associated with stronger action-oriented skeptics, while professional pride is positively associated only among highly experienced auditors. Our theory and findings advance the academic literature and inform audit firms trying to build audit-quality cultures by distinguishing enacted from symbolic socialization mechanisms, and by identifying personal values relevant to selection.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCultivating Auditors Who Are More Committed to and Better at Ensuring Audit Quality
We use a multi-method approach — semi-structured interviews (n=34) and a survey with an embedded experiment (n=399) — to examine a new audit input we term action-oriented skepticism, i.e., the extent to which auditors identify as being committed to taking action, when needed, to ensure audit quality. We identify an audit-process benefit of stronger action-oriented skeptics, as well as socialization and selection mechanisms by which audit firms may cultivate them. The audit-process benefit is better-calibrated professional judgments. Stronger actionoriented skeptics express greater concern about material misstatement risk when randomly manipulated evidence indicates that management's accounting is aggressive, without raising a false alarm when evidence indicates that management's accounting is neutral. Among socialization mechanisms, audit voice culture and resource facilitation are positively associated with stronger action-oriented skeptics, whereas value communication is negatively associated with it, consistent with a perceived disconnect between communicated values and their practical implementation. Among selection mechanisms, societal interest and truth-seeking are positively associated with stronger action-oriented skeptics, while professional pride is positively associated only among highly experienced auditors. Our theory and findings advance the academic literature and inform audit firms trying to build audit-quality cultures by distinguishing enacted from symbolic socialization mechanisms, and by identifying personal values relevant to selection.
- Open Access
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 95-113
Home Office: Evidence on Location and Selection Effects of Telecommuting
Telecommuting has increased during recent years, and the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated its development even further. Despite various opinions, causal evidence about the effect of telecommuting remains scarce and the implications for management accounting are unclear. In a computerized experiment designed to distinguish between location and selection effects, we study individuals’ effort intensity and reporting. The results reveal no difference in effort intensity between the workplace and telecommuting, but individuals misreport more when telecommuting. This increased misreporting is due to a selection effect, where less honest individuals prefer to telecommute. A small-scale follow-up survey with practitioners corroborates our findings with respect to the reporting behavior. Moreover, although we again find no difference in effort intensity, the results provide preliminary evidence into location effects on other effort dimensions (duration, direction, and learning). Overall, our study shows that telecommuting has important implications for designing effective management control systems. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M4; M5.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 95-113
Open AccessHome Office: Evidence on Location and Selection Effects of Telecommuting
Telecommuting has increased during recent years, and the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated its development even further. Despite various opinions, causal evidence about the effect of telecommuting remains scarce and the implications for management accounting are unclear. In a computerized experiment designed to distinguish between location and selection effects, we study individuals’ effort intensity and reporting. The results reveal no difference in effort intensity between the workplace and telecommuting, but individuals misreport more when telecommuting. This increased misreporting is due to a selection effect, where less honest individuals prefer to telecommute. A small-scale follow-up survey with practitioners corroborates our findings with respect to the reporting behavior. Moreover, although we again find no difference in effort intensity, the results provide preliminary evidence into location effects on other effort dimensions (duration, direction, and learning). Overall, our study shows that telecommuting has important implications for designing effective management control systems. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M4; M5.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 93
Building trust through knowledge sharing: Implications for incentive system design
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 93
Open AccessBuilding trust through knowledge sharing: Implications for incentive system design
- Open Access
- 27 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 3085-3112
The Effects of Information Acquisition Effort, Psychological Ownership, and Reporting Context on Opportunistic Managerial Reporting*
Within the context of managerial reporting, the tasks of acquiring and reporting information are logically connected. Although the accounting literature acknowledges their importance, it often treats these tasks as distinct processes. I investigate how the effort exerted to acquire information influences managers' reporting. Managers' information acquisition effort can induce psychological ownership that can lead to a sense of deservingness that increases opportunistic reporting or to a sense of responsibility that reduces opportunism. I predict that the reporting context determines the ultimate effect of information acquisition effort on reporting behavior. I test this prediction with a 2×2 budget reporting experiment. Managers are either endowed with information to report or required to exert effort to earn it, with the latter expected to generate more psychological ownership. In addition, I manipulate the saliency of honesty in the reporting context by framing reporting in terms of a business dilemma (less salient honesty) or an ethical dilemma (more salient honesty). I find that when honesty is less salient, managers build more slack into their report under earned information than endowed information. In contrast, more salient honesty alleviates the effect of earned information on slack. In a supplemental experiment, I find similar results when all managers are endowed with information to report but psychological ownership is manipulated via different firm messaging. These results have important implications for theory and practice. For example, in a less salient honesty context, technological investments that reduce managers' effort needed to acquire information can also help decrease opportunistic reporting.
- 27 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 3085-3112
Open AccessThe Effects of Information Acquisition Effort, Psychological Ownership, and Reporting Context on Opportunistic Managerial Reporting*
Within the context of managerial reporting, the tasks of acquiring and reporting information are logically connected. Although the accounting literature acknowledges their importance, it often treats these tasks as distinct processes. I investigate how the effort exerted to acquire information influences managers' reporting. Managers' information acquisition effort can induce psychological ownership that can lead to a sense of deservingness that increases opportunistic reporting or to a sense of responsibility that reduces opportunism. I predict that the reporting context determines the ultimate effect of information acquisition effort on reporting behavior. I test this prediction with a 2×2 budget reporting experiment. Managers are either endowed with information to report or required to exert effort to earn it, with the latter expected to generate more psychological ownership. In addition, I manipulate the saliency of honesty in the reporting context by framing reporting in terms of a business dilemma (less salient honesty) or an ethical dilemma (more salient honesty). I find that when honesty is less salient, managers build more slack into their report under earned information than endowed information. In contrast, more salient honesty alleviates the effect of earned information on slack. In a supplemental experiment, I find similar results when all managers are endowed with information to report but psychological ownership is manipulated via different firm messaging. These results have important implications for theory and practice. For example, in a less salient honesty context, technological investments that reduce managers' effort needed to acquire information can also help decrease opportunistic reporting.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Great Effort, Some Concern. How Making Effort to Acquire Information Influences Managerial Reporting
I investigate if managers’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on their effort in acquiring the information they need to report. I develop and test theory positing that expending effort to acquire information can justify opportunistic behavior but also enhances a sense of responsibility discouraging unethical actions. I predict that the dominant effect depends on whether the reporting environment induces sufficient concerns for honesty. In my 2 × 2 experiment, managers are either endowed with information to report or required to expend intellectual effort to earn it. I also manipulate whether concerns about honesty are triggered by framing reporting in terms of profit allocation or an ethical dilemma. I find that when honesty is not triggered, managers report earned information more opportunistically than endowed information. However, when the reporting context triggers honesty concerns, the negative effect of earned information on opportunistic reporting is alleviated. These results have strong implications for theory and practice by showing the conditions under which acquiring information detrimentally affect reporting behavior.
- 11 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGreat Effort, Some Concern. How Making Effort to Acquire Information Influences Managerial Reporting
I investigate if managers’ tendency to report opportunistically depends on their effort in acquiring the information they need to report. I develop and test theory positing that expending effort to acquire information can justify opportunistic behavior but also enhances a sense of responsibility discouraging unethical actions. I predict that the dominant effect depends on whether the reporting environment induces sufficient concerns for honesty. In my 2 × 2 experiment, managers are either endowed with information to report or required to expend intellectual effort to earn it. I also manipulate whether concerns about honesty are triggered by framing reporting in terms of profit allocation or an ethical dilemma. I find that when honesty is not triggered, managers report earned information more opportunistically than endowed information. However, when the reporting context triggers honesty concerns, the negative effect of earned information on opportunistic reporting is alleviated. These results have strong implications for theory and practice by showing the conditions under which acquiring information detrimentally affect reporting behavior.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Status Differences and Knowledge Transfer: The Effect of Incentives
We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between group members with equal or different status who solve an interdependent task. In our experiment, group members receive group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job titles with corresponding role descriptions. Although all conditions require knowledge sharing to maximize payoffs, our results suggest that significantly more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across these incentive manipulations for equal-status groups. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that individual incentives can motivate knowledge sharing among equal-status groups, but cannot overcome the negative interactions that arise under status differences. Instead, group incentives are required to induce cooperative behavior that mitigates the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. We contribute to the literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the social context and that job titles can have unintended consequences.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStatus Differences and Knowledge Transfer: The Effect of Incentives
We examine how incentive systems influence knowledge transfer between group members with equal or different status who solve an interdependent task. In our experiment, group members receive group or individual incentives, while status is manipulated by assigning job titles with corresponding role descriptions. Although all conditions require knowledge sharing to maximize payoffs, our results suggest that significantly more knowledge is shared under group incentives relative to individual incentives when status differences are present, whereas the amount of knowledge shared does not differ across these incentive manipulations for equal-status groups. These findings are in line with theory suggesting that individual incentives can motivate knowledge sharing among equal-status groups, but cannot overcome the negative interactions that arise under status differences. Instead, group incentives are required to induce cooperative behavior that mitigates the negative effects of status differences on knowledge sharing. We contribute to the literature and practice by showing that the effect of incentives depends on the social context and that job titles can have unintended consequences.