Yi Liu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Yi Liu has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Qi Wang
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, National Center for Applied Mathematics Shenzhen, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China
6 shared publications - Anjia Yang
Jinan University
5 shared publications - Jian Weng
Guangzhou University
5 shared publications Siu-Ming Yiu
The University of Hong Kong
4 shared publications- Junzuo Lai
Jinan University
3 shared publications - Huang Zeng
Early Warning College
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (5) , 11658-11670
Verifiable Encrypted Timed Signature Scheme and Its Application in Blockchains
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (5) , 11658-11670
Verifiable Encrypted Timed Signature Scheme and Its Application in Blockchains
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 13, 12333-12348
GMHL: Generalized Multi-Hop Locks for Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Networks
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 13, 12333-12348
GMHL: Generalized Multi-Hop Locks for Privacy-Preserving Payment Channel Networks
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-159
Zero-Knowledge Protocols with PVC Security: Striking the Balance Between Security and Efficiency
- 23 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 141-159
Zero-Knowledge Protocols with PVC Security: Striking the Balance Between Security and Efficiency
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 577-589
Publicly Auditable Federated Learning With Privacy and Byzantine Robustness
Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning paradigm that can break the data silo effect, and it has been applied by lots of enterprises to train models that are deployed in inference services. However, existing FL schemes hardly support users who purchase inference services in auditing the training process, as the requirements for privacy and robustness restrict the realization of public auditability. This makes it difficult to allay users' doubts about whether the model is trained correctly. In this paper, we propose a publicly auditable and secure federated learning, which enables anyone to audit the correctness of model training securely. Specifically, we design a series of algorithms for generating the multiplication-related random vector, based on which we design a protocol that can generate the training record with masked privacy information for Byzantine-robust FL. The service provider can disclose the training record when the model is outputted, enabling users to reproduce the training process for auditing purpose without the need to know the privacy data of all parties involved in the FL. Meanwhile, to ensure model accuracy, we design an auditable incentive mechanism and a privacy-preserving federation member selection protocol to motivate workers to execute model training correctly. We analyze the security of our scheme and evaluate its efficiency. Compared to existing schemes requiring $O(R)$ smart contract calls, our scheme requires only 3 calls. Also, experimental results under different settings show that the scheme is efficient and Byzantine-robust.
- 12 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 577-589
Publicly Auditable Federated Learning With Privacy and Byzantine Robustness
Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning paradigm that can break the data silo effect, and it has been applied by lots of enterprises to train models that are deployed in inference services. However, existing FL schemes hardly support users who purchase inference services in auditing the training process, as the requirements for privacy and robustness restrict the realization of public auditability. This makes it difficult to allay users' doubts about whether the model is trained correctly. In this paper, we propose a publicly auditable and secure federated learning, which enables anyone to audit the correctness of model training securely. Specifically, we design a series of algorithms for generating the multiplication-related random vector, based on which we design a protocol that can generate the training record with masked privacy information for Byzantine-robust FL. The service provider can disclose the training record when the model is outputted, enabling users to reproduce the training process for auditing purpose without the need to know the privacy data of all parties involved in the FL. Meanwhile, to ensure model accuracy, we design an auditable incentive mechanism and a privacy-preserving federation member selection protocol to motivate workers to execute model training correctly. We analyze the security of our scheme and evaluate its efficiency. Compared to existing schemes requiring $O(R)$ smart contract calls, our scheme requires only 3 calls. Also, experimental results under different settings show that the scheme is efficient and Byzantine-robust.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 2372-2386
Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Ride Matching Over Road Networks Against Malicious ORH Server
Online ride-hailing (ORH) services have become indispensable for our travel needs, offering the convenience of easily locating the nearest driver for riders through ride matching algorithms. However, existing ORH systems, such as Lyft and Didi, require users (both riders and drivers) to disclose their real-time location information during the matching process, thus giving rise to serious privacy concerns. Despite the proposal of various privacy-preserving ride-matching schemes, they remain insufficient in addressing potential malicious behaviors from the ORH server, such as colluding with designated drivers and deviation from computation protocols to interfere with the matching process. These behaviors lead to non-optimal matching results for riders. To address these issues, we present EMPRide, an efficient and privacy-preserving ride-matching scheme resistant to malicious ORH server. In EMPRide, we design an efficient and accurate computation of distances between users protocol, which integrates road network embedding and secure two-party computation. Additionally, we design a verification protocol that allows riders to verify the correctness of computed distances and matching results. Crucially, the communication overhead for riders in EMPRide remains constant, irrelevant to the number of available drivers. Our evaluation using real-world datasets demonstrates that EMPRide significantly outperforms existing solutions. Specifically, under identical conditions, in EMPRide, the computation speed on the ORH server is 19.22× faster and the communication cost is 8.08× less than state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover, riders experience a speed improvement of 4.84 orders of magnitude with 1.30× less communication, while drivers benefit from a 4.79 orders of magnitude speed increase with 1.45× less communication.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 2372-2386
Efficient and Privacy-Preserving Ride Matching Over Road Networks Against Malicious ORH Server
Online ride-hailing (ORH) services have become indispensable for our travel needs, offering the convenience of easily locating the nearest driver for riders through ride matching algorithms. However, existing ORH systems, such as Lyft and Didi, require users (both riders and drivers) to disclose their real-time location information during the matching process, thus giving rise to serious privacy concerns. Despite the proposal of various privacy-preserving ride-matching schemes, they remain insufficient in addressing potential malicious behaviors from the ORH server, such as colluding with designated drivers and deviation from computation protocols to interfere with the matching process. These behaviors lead to non-optimal matching results for riders. To address these issues, we present EMPRide, an efficient and privacy-preserving ride-matching scheme resistant to malicious ORH server. In EMPRide, we design an efficient and accurate computation of distances between users protocol, which integrates road network embedding and secure two-party computation. Additionally, we design a verification protocol that allows riders to verify the correctness of computed distances and matching results. Crucially, the communication overhead for riders in EMPRide remains constant, irrelevant to the number of available drivers. Our evaluation using real-world datasets demonstrates that EMPRide significantly outperforms existing solutions. Specifically, under identical conditions, in EMPRide, the computation speed on the ORH server is 19.22× faster and the communication cost is 8.08× less than state-of-the-art approaches. Moreover, riders experience a speed improvement of 4.84 orders of magnitude with 1.30× less communication, while drivers benefit from a 4.79 orders of magnitude speed increase with 1.45× less communication.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Vol. 25 (9) , 12800-12817
MTDCAP: Moving Target Defense-Based CAN Authentication Protocol
The convenience behind modern intelligent vehicles is simply that a group of intelligent electronic control units (ECUs) connected to controller area network (CAN) work in concert. However, quite a lot of studies have shown their security concerns about CAN. In this era of rampant cyberattacks, due to the broadcast mechanism of CAN and the lack of necessary security mechanisms such as encryption and authentication, ECUs are easily disturbed by various cyberattacks, thus leading to vehicle failures. To solve this problem, we propose a novel security authentication protocol based on the core concept of moving target defense, namely MTDCAP, which utilizes MaskedID and hash chains to maintain anonymity externally and ensure the authentication of the sender internally. Unlike general hash chain-based authentication, our protocol creatively incorporates a self-renewal mechanism into the hash chain, which effectively reduces the time overhead and security risk of negotiating the update of the hash chain between both communicating parties. In addition, AES serves to encrypt CAN message payload so as to prevent adversaries from eavesdropping. The theoretical analysis for the security against four kinds of attacks (i.e., eavesdropping, impersonation, replay, and bus-off attacks) in MTDCAP is detailed. Afterwards, a series of protocol evaluations are conducted on two kinds of typical hardware platforms, including T-Box from real vehicle supported by XPeng, and the results reveal that the proposed protocol significantly outperforms the existing protocols in the robustness, bus load, and time overhead. In particular, the authentication overhead on T-Box is only 0.18 ms for MTDCAP.
- 16 April 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Vol. 25 (9) , 12800-12817
MTDCAP: Moving Target Defense-Based CAN Authentication Protocol
The convenience behind modern intelligent vehicles is simply that a group of intelligent electronic control units (ECUs) connected to controller area network (CAN) work in concert. However, quite a lot of studies have shown their security concerns about CAN. In this era of rampant cyberattacks, due to the broadcast mechanism of CAN and the lack of necessary security mechanisms such as encryption and authentication, ECUs are easily disturbed by various cyberattacks, thus leading to vehicle failures. To solve this problem, we propose a novel security authentication protocol based on the core concept of moving target defense, namely MTDCAP, which utilizes MaskedID and hash chains to maintain anonymity externally and ensure the authentication of the sender internally. Unlike general hash chain-based authentication, our protocol creatively incorporates a self-renewal mechanism into the hash chain, which effectively reduces the time overhead and security risk of negotiating the update of the hash chain between both communicating parties. In addition, AES serves to encrypt CAN message payload so as to prevent adversaries from eavesdropping. The theoretical analysis for the security against four kinds of attacks (i.e., eavesdropping, impersonation, replay, and bus-off attacks) in MTDCAP is detailed. Afterwards, a series of protocol evaluations are conducted on two kinds of typical hardware platforms, including T-Box from real vehicle supported by XPeng, and the results reveal that the proposed protocol significantly outperforms the existing protocols in the robustness, bus load, and time overhead. In particular, the authentication overhead on T-Box is only 0.18 ms for MTDCAP.
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 272-301
Robust Publicly Verifiable Covert Security: Limited Information Leakage and Guaranteed Correctness with Low Overhead
- 18 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 272-301
Robust Publicly Verifiable Covert Security: Limited Information Leakage and Guaranteed Correctness with Low Overhead
- 25 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 424-443
Towards Practical Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles: Applicability and Verifiability
- 25 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 424-443
Towards Practical Homomorphic Time-Lock Puzzles: Applicability and Verifiability
- 27 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 349-378
Making Private Function Evaluation Safer, Faster, and Simpler
- 27 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 349-378
Making Private Function Evaluation Safer, Faster, and Simpler
- 18 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 281-298
Improved Zero-Knowledge Argument of Encrypted Extended Permutation
- 18 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 281-298
Improved Zero-Knowledge Argument of Encrypted Extended Permutation