G. Brandon Lockhart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
G. Brandon Lockhart has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thomas R. Kubick
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
3 shared publications - David C. Mauer
Belk College of Business University of North Carolina at Charlotte Charlotte North Carolina USA
2 shared publications - John R. Robinson
Texas A&M University
1 shared publication Thomas R. Kubick
School of Accountancy, College of Business University of Nebraska–Lincoln Lincoln Nebraska
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 738-775
CEO tax burden and debt contracting
- 20 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 30 (1) , 738-775
CEO tax burden and debt contracting
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1281-1321
Industry tournament incentives and debt contracting
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 63 (4) , 1281-1321
Industry tournament incentives and debt contracting
- 13 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (3) , 2034-2070
Internal Capital and Investment: Evidence from 2012 Pension Relief*
We use changes in mandatory pension funding to investigate the relation between internal financing constraints and incremental investment. Pension funding relief enacted in 2012 significantly reduced mandatory employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans. Prior to learning of the pension relief, firms disclosed their expected pension contributions under FAS 132R, which allows us to infer changes in investment plans in response to this unanticipated pension relief. Although our setting is pensions, our inferences contribute to the broader literature on how access to finance impacts the firm. We predict and find that pension relief resulted in increased nonpension investment in the year after enactment for financially constrained firms, and is stronger for constrained firms with greater pension underfunding. Our results are consistent with pension relief providing an important means of funding investment for financially constrained firms. Our identification strategy and results provide an important innovation to the literature examining the effect of financing constraints on investment.
- 13 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (3) , 2034-2070
Internal Capital and Investment: Evidence from 2012 Pension Relief*
We use changes in mandatory pension funding to investigate the relation between internal financing constraints and incremental investment. Pension funding relief enacted in 2012 significantly reduced mandatory employer contributions to defined benefit pension plans. Prior to learning of the pension relief, firms disclosed their expected pension contributions under FAS 132R, which allows us to infer changes in investment plans in response to this unanticipated pension relief. Although our setting is pensions, our inferences contribute to the broader literature on how access to finance impacts the firm. We predict and find that pension relief resulted in increased nonpension investment in the year after enactment for financially constrained firms, and is stronger for constrained firms with greater pension underfunding. Our results are consistent with pension relief providing an important means of funding investment for financially constrained firms. Our identification strategy and results provide an important innovation to the literature examining the effect of financing constraints on investment.
- 6 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Financial Management
- Vol. 50 (2) , 345-369
Industry tournament incentives and stock price crash risk
Theoretical and empirical studies argue that managerial hoarding of negative firm‐specific information can result in large negative stock price corrections once the accumulated information is revealed. A managerial labor market with tournament‐like progression provides managers with the incentive to withhold negative information. We find that chief executive officers with stronger incentives to progress in the managerial labor market tournament have significantly greater stock price crash risk, consistent with a greater propensity for these executives to withhold negative firm‐specific information. The empirical patterns that we document suggest a negative externality to the positive incentive effects provided by the managerial labor market.
- 6 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Financial Management
- Vol. 50 (2) , 345-369
Industry tournament incentives and stock price crash risk
Theoretical and empirical studies argue that managerial hoarding of negative firm‐specific information can result in large negative stock price corrections once the accumulated information is revealed. A managerial labor market with tournament‐like progression provides managers with the incentive to withhold negative information. We find that chief executive officers with stronger incentives to progress in the managerial labor market tournament have significantly greater stock price crash risk, consistent with a greater propensity for these executives to withhold negative firm‐specific information. The empirical patterns that we document suggest a negative externality to the positive incentive effects provided by the managerial labor market.