Karthik Gopalakrishnan

Congestion pricing has long been hailed as a means to mitigate traffic congestion; however, its practical adoption has been limited due to the resulting social inequity issue, e.g., low-income users are priced out off certain roads. This issue has spurred interest in the design of equitable mechanisms that aim to refund the collected toll revenues as lump-sum transfers to users. Although revenue refunding has been extensively studied for over three decades, there has been no thorough characterization of how such schemes can be designed to simultaneously achieve system efficiency and equity objectives. In this work, we bridge this gap through the study of congestion pricing and revenue refunding (CPRR) schemes in non-atomic congestion games. We first develop CPRR schemes, which in comparison to the untolled case, simultaneously increase system efficiency without worsening wealth inequality, while being user-favorable : irrespective of their initial wealth or values-of-time (which may differ across users), users would experience a lower travel cost after the implementation of the proposed scheme. We then characterize the set of optimal user-favorable CPRR schemes that simultaneously maximize system efficiency and minimize wealth inequality. Finally, we provide a concrete methodology for computing optimal CPRR schemes and also highlight additional equilibrium properties of these schemes under different models of user behavior. Overall, our work demonstrates that through appropriate refunding policies we can design user-favorable CPRR schemes that maximize system efficiency while reducing wealth inequality.

Network routing problems are common across many engineering applications. Computing optimal routing policies requires knowledge about network demand, i.e., the origin and destination (OD) of all requests in the network. However, privacy considerations make it challenging to share individual OD data that would be required for computing optimal policies. Privacy can be particularly challenging in standard network routing problems because sources and sinks can be easily identified from flow conservation constraints, making feasibility and privacy mutually exclusive. In this paper, we present a differentially private algorithm for network routing problems. The main ingredient is a reformulation of network routing which moves all user data-dependent parameters out of the constraint set and into the objective function. We then present an algorithm for solving this formulation based on a differentially private variant of stochastic gradient descent. In this algorithm, differential privacy is achieved by injecting noise, and one may wonder if this noise injection compromises solution quality. We prove that our algorithm is both differentially private and asymptotically optimal as the size of the training set goes to infinity. We corroborate the theoretical results with numerical experiments on a road traffic network which show that our algorithm provides differentially private and near-optimal solutions in practice.

Data-driven methodologies offer many exciting upsides, but they also introduce new challenges, particularly in the realm of user privacy. Specifically, the way data is collected can pose privacy risks to end users. In many routing services, a single entity (e.g., the routing service provider) collects and manages user trajectory data. When it comes to user privacy, these systems have a central point of failure since users have to trust that this entity will not sell or use their data to infer sensitive private information. Unfortunately, in practice many advertising companies offer to buy such data for the sake of targeted advertisements. With this as motivation, we study the problem of using location data for routing services in a privacy-preserving way. Rather than having users report their location to a central operator, we present a protocol in which users participate in a decentralized and privacy-preserving computation to estimate travel times for the roads in the network in a way that no individuals' location is ever observed by any other party. The protocol uses the Laplace mechanism in conjunction with secure multi-party computation to ensure that it is cryptogrpahically secure and that its output is differentially private. A natural question is if privacy necessitates degradation in accuracy or system performance. We show that if a road has sufficiently high capacity, then the travel time estimated by our protocol is provably close to the ground truth travel time. We validate the protocol through numerical experiments which show that using the protocol as a routing service provides privacy guarantees with minimal overhead to user travel time.

Understanding the characteristics of air-traffic delays and disruptions is critical for developing ways to mitigate their significant economic and environmental impacts. Conventional delay-performance metrics reflect only the magnitude of incurred flight delays at airports; in this work, we show that it is also important to characterize the spatial distribution of delays across a network of airports. We analyze graph-supported signals, leveraging techniques from spectral theory and graph-signal processing to compute analytical and simulation-driven bounds for identifying outliers in spatial distribution. We then apply these methods to the case of airport-delay networks and demonstrate the applicability of our methods by analyzing U.S. airport delays from 2008 through 2017. We also perform an airline-specific analysis, deriving insights into the delay dynamics of individual airline subnetworks. Through our analysis, we highlight key differences in delay dynamics between different types of disruptions, ranging from nor’easters and hurricanes to airport outages. We also examine delay interactions between airline subnetworks and the system-wide network and compile an inventory of outlier days that could guide future aviation operations and research. In doing so, we demonstrate how our approach can provide operational insights in an air-transportation setting. Our analysis provides a complementary metric to conventional aviation-delay benchmarks and aids airlines, traffic-flow managers, and transportation-system planners in quantifying off-nominal system performance.

As the demand for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) operations increases, UAS Traffic Flow Management (UTFM) initiatives are needed to mitigate congestion, and to ensure safety and efficiency. Congestion mitigation can be achieved by assigning airborne delays (through speed changes or path stretches) or ground delays (holds relative to the desired takeoff times) to aircraft. While the assignment of such delays may increase system efficiency, individual aircraft operators may be unfairly impacted. Dynamic traffic demand, variability in aircraft operator preferences, and differences in the market share of operators complicate the issue of fairness in UTFM. Our work considers the fairness of delay assignment in the context of UTFM. To this end, we formulate the UTFM problem with fairness and show through computational experiments that significant improvements in fairness can be attained at little cost to system efficiency. We demonstrate that when operators are not aligned in how they perceive or value fairness, there is a decrease in the overall fairness of the solution. We find that fairness decreases as the air-ground delay cost ratio increases and that it improves when the operator with dominant market share has a weak preference for the fairness of its allocated delays. Finally, we implemented UTFM in a rolling-horizon setting with dynamic traffic demand, and find that efficiency is adversely impacted. However, the impact on fairness is varied and depends on the metric used.