BLBaile Lu

Baile Lu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Baile Lu has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The Interplay of Earnings, Ratings, and Penalties on Sharing Platforms: An Empirical Investigation

    by Yuqian Xu, Baile Lu, Anindya Ghose, Hongyan Dai, Weihua Zhou

    On-demand delivery through sharing platforms represents a rapidly expanding segment of the global workforce. The emergence of sharing platforms enables gig workers to choose when and where to work, allowing them to do so in a flexible manner. However, such flexibility brings notorious challenges to platforms in managing the gig workforce. Thus, understanding the incentive and behavioral issues of gig workers in this new business model is inherently meaningful. This paper investigates how the incentive mechanisms of sharing platforms—earnings, ratings, and penalties—affect the working decisions of gig workers and their nuanced relationships. To achieve this goal, we use data from one leading on-demand delivery platform with more than 50 million active consumers in China and implement a two-stage Heckman model with instrumental variables to estimate the impact of earnings, ratings, and penalties. We first show that better ratings motivate gig workers to work more. However, interestingly, when ratings are employed together with earnings, the two positive effects of ratings and earnings can be substitutes for each other. Second, we reveal that higher past penalties discourage workers from working more, whereas, interestingly, workers with higher past penalties tend to be more sensitive toward an increase in earnings. Finally, we conduct follow-up surveys to understand the underlying mechanisms of the observed moderating effects from both psychological and economic perspectives. The ultimate goal of this work is to provide managerial implications to help platform managers understand how earnings, ratings, and penalties work together to affect gig workers’ working decisions and how to manage high- and low-quality workers. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, entrepreneurship and innovation. Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72192823, 72172169, 71821002, 91646125, 72071206, 72231011, 72025405, and 72088101] and Program for Innovation Research at the Central University of Finance and Economics. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4761 .


  • Frontiers in Service Science: Fintech Operations—An Overview of Recent Developments and Future Research Directions

    by Baile Lu, Shuai Hao, Michael Pinedo, Yuqian Xu

    In this paper, we provide a survey of recent developments in the fintech (financial technology) industry, focusing on the operational structures, the technologies involved, and the operational risks associated with the new systems. In particular, we discuss payment systems, algorithmic trading, robo-advisory, crowdfunding, and peer-to-peer lending. In the conclusion section, we discuss various promising research directions.


  • Open Access

    How Do Ratings and Penalties Moderate Earnings on Crowdsourced Delivery Platforms?

    by Yuqian Xu, Baile Lu, Anindya Ghose, Hongyan Dai, Weihua Zhou

    Crowd-sourced delivery represents a rapidly rising segment of the global workforce. Crowd-delivery workers enjoy flexibility in choosing when and where to work. However, such flexibility brings notorious challenges to online platforms in managing the crowd-sourced workforce. Thus, understanding the behavioral and incentive issues of crowd workers in this new business model is inherently important. In this paper, we investigate how a baseline incentive effect of piece-rate earning is moderated by two unique features of online crowd-sourcing platforms, namely, ratings and penalties. Utilizing data from one leading crowd-sourced grocery delivery platform with more than 50 million active users in China, we implement a two-stage Heckman model together with instrumental variables to tackle this research question. We first show the baseline effect whereby higher piece-rate earning increases the workers' work time. Going one step further, we find this positive effect of piece-rate earning decreases when the percentage of five-star ratings increases (negative moderating effect); moreover, this positive effect increases when the monetary penalty increases (positive moderating effect). Finally, we show the magnitude of the negative (positive) moderating effect decreases when the percentage of five-star ratings (monetary penalty) increases. The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide guidelines to online platforms on the design of better incentive mechanisms with the interplay of piece-rate earning, rating, and penalty.


  • Open Access

    The Value of Personalized Promotion: Field Experiment on O2O Platform

    by Baile Lu, Yuqian Xu, Hongyan Dai, Weihua Zhou

    Personalized promotion through individual-based pricing and discounts has been widely employed in different industry practices. In this paper, we examine the economic value of personalized promotion with price discounts via a unique field experiment on one leading O2O platform with more than 50 million active users in China. In the design of our field experiments, we implement the personalized promotion algorithm with nine stores on our collaborated O2O platform, and control another two stores that do not have personalized promotion, controlling for the same promotion depth. Employing the difference-in-differences method together with matching, we find that personalized promotion leads to an increase of, on average, 1.6% in the monthly total transaction amount, 3.2% in the number of items purchased per order, and 2.2% in the probability of a 5-star rating, as compared to a regular mass promotion strategy with the same promotion depth. In addition, we find the personalized promotion can save, on average, 1.65 RMB in the promotion cost and generate an additional 1.56 RMB in revenue per consumer per month than a regular mass promotion strategy. We then go one step further to compare the effects of personalized promotion in the short and long run, and find the positive effects on revenue increase first and then decrease over time. On the other hand, the positive effects on consumer satisfaction become significant only after a sufficiently long time period. Finally, we study the heterogeneous effects of personalized promotion among consumers, and find the effects are greater for new consumers and less for frequent and high-value consumers. We also find that consumers with higher recency, frequency, and monetary value are more likely to redeem such personalized promotion.