Tiago Heinrich
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Tiago Heinrich has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carlos Alberto Maziero
UFPR
5 shared publications - Rafael Rodrigues Obelheiro
UDESC
4 shared publications - Taha Albakour
Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany
4 shared publications - Newton Carlos Will
Federal University of Technology - Parana
3 shared publications - Alberto Dainotti
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
2 shared publications - Cecilia Testart
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 December 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 31-32
Towards Practical Layered Video Streaming with QoE-Aware Partial Delivery
- 6 December 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 31-32
Open AccessTowards Practical Layered Video Streaming with QoE-Aware Partial Delivery
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 742-760
The Internet’s Path MTUs: How Big Can You Go?
Efficient network transmission, especially in IPv6 since on-path fragmentation is not possible, depends on selecting the right packet size. The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) determines the largest packet size that can traverse a link and the Path MTU (PMTU) determines the size for an end-to-end path without fragmentation. Due to frequent failures in Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD), protocols must fall back to conservative packet sizes to ensure reachability, sacrificing potential throughput. This creates a need for inference-based approaches that estimate a suitable path size. Existing PMTU studies are outdated, limited in scope, and rely on indirect MSS inference or PMTUD-dependent signals, offering little insight into where MTU bottlenecks occur along the path. This paper presents a measurement study of PMTUs using RIPE Atlas to characterize their behavior in general, across protocol layers (IPv4/IPv6) and network locations thus covering 76,700 paths across access networks, the Internet core, and web-serving infrastructure. We observe 97 distinct PMTUs, though a small set:[1500 B (80.5%), 1492 B (11.7%), and 1480 B (1.5%)], dominates. PMTU distributions differ across IP versions: while 99% of IPv4 paths support at least 1420 B, IPv6 paths commonly operate at 1280 B. We further show that sub-1500 B PMTUs are primarily located near network edges, while core paths rarely exhibit such constraints. Finally, we measure PMTU vs. Maximum Segment Size (MSS)-inferred PMTU mismatches in 18.5% of paths.
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 742-760
Open AccessThe Internet’s Path MTUs: How Big Can You Go?
Efficient network transmission, especially in IPv6 since on-path fragmentation is not possible, depends on selecting the right packet size. The Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) determines the largest packet size that can traverse a link and the Path MTU (PMTU) determines the size for an end-to-end path without fragmentation. Due to frequent failures in Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD), protocols must fall back to conservative packet sizes to ensure reachability, sacrificing potential throughput. This creates a need for inference-based approaches that estimate a suitable path size. Existing PMTU studies are outdated, limited in scope, and rely on indirect MSS inference or PMTUD-dependent signals, offering little insight into where MTU bottlenecks occur along the path. This paper presents a measurement study of PMTUs using RIPE Atlas to characterize their behavior in general, across protocol layers (IPv4/IPv6) and network locations thus covering 76,700 paths across access networks, the Internet core, and web-serving infrastructure. We observe 97 distinct PMTUs, though a small set:[1500 B (80.5%), 1492 B (11.7%), and 1480 B (1.5%)], dominates. PMTU distributions differ across IP versions: while 99% of IPv4 paths support at least 1420 B, IPv6 paths commonly operate at 1280 B. We further show that sub-1500 B PMTUs are primarily located near network edges, while core paths rarely exhibit such constraints. Finally, we measure PMTU vs. Maximum Segment Size (MSS)-inferred PMTU mismatches in 18.5% of paths.
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 693-710
Endless Cookies: Exploring TCP Fast Open on the Internet
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 693-710
Open AccessEndless Cookies: Exploring TCP Fast Open on the Internet
- Open Access
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 4 (CoNEXT3) , 1-25
How Did You Find That Address? An In-Depth Investigation of Domain-Based IPv6 Scanners
IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
- Vol. 4 (CoNEXT3) , 1-25
Open AccessHow Did You Find That Address? An In-Depth Investigation of Domain-Based IPv6 Scanners
IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2165-2170
Lessons from an (Unsuccessful?) IPv6 Amplification Honeypot Deployment
While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.
- 11 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2165-2170
Open AccessLessons from an (Unsuccessful?) IPv6 Amplification Honeypot Deployment
While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.
- Open Access
- 19 July 2026
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 290-302
NetSecBed: A Container-Native Testbed for Reproducible Cybersecurity Experimentation
Cybersecurity research depends on reproducible evidence, traffic traces, logs, and labeled datasets, but public datasets are often static and difficult to re-execute, especially in heterogeneous multi-protocol environments. This paper presents NetSecBed, a container-native, scenario-oriented testbed for controlled generation of network evidence and execution artifacts in IoT, IIoT, and pervasive settings. NetSecBed integrates 60 attack scenarios, 9 target services, and benign traffic generators as single-purpose containers, with plug-and-play extensibility and traceability through declarative specifications. Its pipeline automates parameterized execution, packet capture, log collection, service probing, feature extraction, and dataset consolidation. The result is a repeatable, auditable, and extensible framework that reduces operational bias and supports continuous dataset renewal.
- 19 July 2026
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 290-302
Open AccessNetSecBed: A Container-Native Testbed for Reproducible Cybersecurity Experimentation
Cybersecurity research depends on reproducible evidence, traffic traces, logs, and labeled datasets, but public datasets are often static and difficult to re-execute, especially in heterogeneous multi-protocol environments. This paper presents NetSecBed, a container-native, scenario-oriented testbed for controlled generation of network evidence and execution artifacts in IoT, IIoT, and pervasive settings. NetSecBed integrates 60 attack scenarios, 9 target services, and benign traffic generators as single-purpose containers, with plug-and-play extensibility and traceability through declarative specifications. Its pipeline automates parameterized execution, packet capture, log collection, service probing, feature extraction, and dataset consolidation. The result is a repeatable, auditable, and extensible framework that reduces operational bias and supports continuous dataset renewal.
- Open Access
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Computer Science
- Vol. 7 (1) , 68
A Method for Detecting Anomalies in WebAssembly Using Categorical Data
The security of Web services for both users and developers is crucial; given that WebAssembly is an emerging format that has seen increasing attention in this environment over the years, new security measures are necessary. Despite this, intrusion detection solutions for WebAssembly applications are mostly confined to static binary analysis. We introduce an innovative method for dynamic WebAssembly intrusion detection through data categorization and machine learning. Our method analyzes communication data extracted from the WebAssembly sandbox to more effectively capture the behavior of applications. Our approach was validated through two strategies, both online and offline, to evaluate the effectiveness of categorical data for intrusion detection. The results obtained demonstrate that both strategies are viable for WebAssembly intrusion detection, showing a high detection rate with low false-negative and false-positive rates.
- 7 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in SN Computer Science
- Vol. 7 (1) , 68
Open AccessA Method for Detecting Anomalies in WebAssembly Using Categorical Data
The security of Web services for both users and developers is crucial; given that WebAssembly is an emerging format that has seen increasing attention in this environment over the years, new security measures are necessary. Despite this, intrusion detection solutions for WebAssembly applications are mostly confined to static binary analysis. We introduce an innovative method for dynamic WebAssembly intrusion detection through data categorization and machine learning. Our method analyzes communication data extracted from the WebAssembly sandbox to more effectively capture the behavior of applications. Our approach was validated through two strategies, both online and offline, to evaluate the effectiveness of categorical data for intrusion detection. The results obtained demonstrate that both strategies are viable for WebAssembly intrusion detection, showing a high detection rate with low false-negative and false-positive rates.
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1080-1081
Poster: Investigating the Survivability of the Experimental TCP Option
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1080-1081
Open AccessPoster: Investigating the Survivability of the Experimental TCP Option
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 775-776
Poster: An Investigation into Internet-facing Router Services
Routers are the core building block of the Internet infrastructure. Maintaining a secure router deployment is critical for protecting networks and providing uninterrupted, smooth operation. In this work, we take a first step toward analyzing routers' security on the Internet. We focus on the potential attack surface for routers, i.e., publicly exposed services. Specifically, we investigate what services are commonly running on known router IPv4 addresses. While exposed services may not pose an immediate risk, they do highlight failure to follow best practices, e.g., strict access control lists. We found that more than 40% of known router IPv4 addresses have at least one public-facing service. We also highlight the lack of consistency in applying network-wide security policies.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 775-776
Open AccessPoster: An Investigation into Internet-facing Router Services
Routers are the core building block of the Internet infrastructure. Maintaining a secure router deployment is critical for protecting networks and providing uninterrupted, smooth operation. In this work, we take a first step toward analyzing routers' security on the Internet. We focus on the potential attack surface for routers, i.e., publicly exposed services. Specifically, we investigate what services are commonly running on known router IPv4 addresses. While exposed services may not pose an immediate risk, they do highlight failure to follow best practices, e.g., strict access control lists. We found that more than 40% of known router IPv4 addresses have at least one public-facing service. We also highlight the lack of consistency in applying network-wide security policies.
- 12 September 2022
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 358-371
Um Estudo de Correlação de Ataques DRDoS com Fatores Externos Visando Dados de Honeypots
Nos últimos anos ataques DRDoS viraram notícia, considerando o volume de tráfego que atacantes conseguem gerar através de refletores. Os ataques exploram diferentes estratégias, com a possibilidade de utilizar muitos protocolos para a amplificação do tráfego. Visando estudar a influência de fatores externos em ataques DRDoS, este trabalho utiliza dados coletados por honeypots para identificar períodos de intensos ataques DRDoS e tenta associar fatores externos a esses períodos. Ao todo foram investigados 13 países que concentram mais ataques em cada continente, e para diversos períodos foi possível associar fatores externos, como eventos políticos e COVID-19.
- 12 September 2022
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 358-371
Um Estudo de Correlação de Ataques DRDoS com Fatores Externos Visando Dados de Honeypots
Nos últimos anos ataques DRDoS viraram notícia, considerando o volume de tráfego que atacantes conseguem gerar através de refletores. Os ataques exploram diferentes estratégias, com a possibilidade de utilizar muitos protocolos para a amplificação do tráfego. Visando estudar a influência de fatores externos em ataques DRDoS, este trabalho utiliza dados coletados por honeypots para identificar períodos de intensos ataques DRDoS e tenta associar fatores externos a esses períodos. Ao todo foram investigados 13 países que concentram mais ataques em cada continente, e para diversos períodos foi possível associar fatores externos, como eventos políticos e COVID-19.