Daniel Liebau

We investigate the drivers of vote delegation in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs), using the Uniswap governance DAO as a laboratory. We show that parties with fewer self-owned votes and those affiliated with the controlling venture capital firm, Andreesen Horowitz (a16z), receive more vote delegations. These patterns suggest that while the Uniswap ecosystem values decentralization, a16z may engage in window-dressing around it. Moreover, we find that an active and successful track record in submitting improvement proposals, especially in the final stage, leads to more vote delegations, indicating that delegation in DAOs is at least partly reputation- or merit-based. Combined, our findings provide new insights into how governance and decentralization operate in DeFi.

This paper posits that distinguishing security token offerings (STOs) from initial coin offerings (ICOs) is important for the study of entrepreneurial finance. We first provide a working definition of a security token and present an overview of the STO market using a unique STO sample. The STO activity developed after the end of the ICO market bubble. The STO market is, however, still a nascent market. STOs are geographically dispersed but concentrated in jurisdictions with accommodating securities laws. Next, we explore STO success factors. We show that various issuer and offering characteristics traditionally used in the ICO literature also matter for STO success. We also find that success is associated with good governance practices, consistent with the corporate finance literature. We conclude by discussing the implications of native digital securities, the next generation of security tokens, for entrepreneurial finance.