Antonio Alfonso
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Antonio Alfonso has a total of 156 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pablo Brañas-Garza
Universidad Loyola Andalucía
9 shared publications - Alessandro Tavoni
Department of Economics, University of Bologna
3 shared publications - Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Department of Management, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1020 Vienna, Austria
3 shared publications - Angel Sánchez
Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Departamento de Matematicas, Leganés, Community of Madrid, 28903, Spain
3 shared publications - Diego Andrés Jorrat
Universidad Loyola Andalucía
3 shared publications - Filippos Exadaktylos
Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Four Directed Balance Rules In 215 Classroom Networks from Spain and El Salvador
How does accounting for differences in students' nominations change the evidence for structural balance? We study friendship-enmity networks in 137 Spanish classrooms (3,512 students) and 78 Salvadoran classrooms (1,830 students). For each of four directed rules, we measure how often the tie closing a two-step path has the predicted sign. We compare two benchmarks that keep the observed ties and redraw their signs, using either a common positive probability or probabilities matching, on average, each student's positive and negative nominations sent and received. Under degree adjustment, excess for a friend's friend falls from 13.43 to 2.68 percentage points in Spain and from 11.81 to 1.31 in El Salvador. The contrast for an enemy's enemy changes from deficit to excess. Both mixed-sign rules show positive adjusted mean excesses, but excess for an enemy's friend exceeds that for a friend's enemy by 4.24 points in Spain and 4.15 in El Salvador in paired comparisons. Refitting simulations produce departures under N4 itself, with EE departures reaching 14.71 points and negative FE-EF contrasts in known-probability scenarios on all 215 classroom supports. The empirical contrasts therefore describe benchmark-specific excesses. Assessing the four rules separately reveals rule-specific responses to degree adjustment that a single balance score conceals.
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFour Directed Balance Rules In 215 Classroom Networks from Spain and El Salvador
How does accounting for differences in students' nominations change the evidence for structural balance? We study friendship-enmity networks in 137 Spanish classrooms (3,512 students) and 78 Salvadoran classrooms (1,830 students). For each of four directed rules, we measure how often the tie closing a two-step path has the predicted sign. We compare two benchmarks that keep the observed ties and redraw their signs, using either a common positive probability or probabilities matching, on average, each student's positive and negative nominations sent and received. Under degree adjustment, excess for a friend's friend falls from 13.43 to 2.68 percentage points in Spain and from 11.81 to 1.31 in El Salvador. The contrast for an enemy's enemy changes from deficit to excess. Both mixed-sign rules show positive adjusted mean excesses, but excess for an enemy's friend exceeds that for a friend's enemy by 4.24 points in Spain and 4.15 in El Salvador in paired comparisons. Refitting simulations produce departures under N4 itself, with EE departures reaching 14.71 points and negative FE-EF contrasts in known-probability scenarios on all 215 classroom supports. The empirical contrasts therefore describe benchmark-specific excesses. Assessing the four rules separately reveals rule-specific responses to degree adjustment that a single balance score conceals.
- Open Access
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 125
Delay of gratification and performance in a creative task: Evidence from Spanish adolescents
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 125
Open AccessDelay of gratification and performance in a creative task: Evidence from Spanish adolescents
- Open Access
- 20 March 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (12)
The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- 20 March 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (12)
Open AccessThe private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a “private solution” such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- 27 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 118
The baking of preferences throughout the high school
- 27 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 118
The baking of preferences throughout the high school
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 33 (2) , 392-421
Voting with dissatisfaction: an analysis of the 2019 parliamentary election in Tunisia
- 19 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 33 (2) , 392-421
Voting with dissatisfaction: an analysis of the 2019 parliamentary election in Tunisia
- Open Access
- 3 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-7
Economic preferences and cognitive abilities among teenagers in Spain
This dataset originates from TeensLab, a consortium of Spanish Universities dedicated to behavioral research involving Spanish teenagers. The dataset contains data from 33 distinct educational institutions across Spain, accounting for a total of 5,890 students aged 10 to 23 (M = 14.10, SD = 1.94), representing various educational levels such as primary school, secondary school, sixth form and vocational training. The main dimensions covered in this dataset include (i) economic preferences, (ii) cognitive abilities and (iii) strategic thinking. Additionally, a range of supplementary variables is included alongside socio-demographic factors, capturing data on aspects like physical appearance, mood and expectations, among others.
- 3 January 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Data
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-7
Open AccessEconomic preferences and cognitive abilities among teenagers in Spain
This dataset originates from TeensLab, a consortium of Spanish Universities dedicated to behavioral research involving Spanish teenagers. The dataset contains data from 33 distinct educational institutions across Spain, accounting for a total of 5,890 students aged 10 to 23 (M = 14.10, SD = 1.94), representing various educational levels such as primary school, secondary school, sixth form and vocational training. The main dimensions covered in this dataset include (i) economic preferences, (ii) cognitive abilities and (iii) strategic thinking. Additionally, a range of supplementary variables is included alongside socio-demographic factors, capturing data on aspects like physical appearance, mood and expectations, among others.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Assessing private solutions to collective action problems in a 34-nation study
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change1–5. Individuals involved in collective action problems are often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose a third option of investing in a private solution such as local climate change adaptation6–8. Here we introduce a collective action game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck or merit and both public and private solutions with participants from 34 countries. We show that the joint existence of wealth inequality and private solutions has a consistent effect across countries: participants endowed with higher income choose the private solution almost twice as often as those endowed with lower income; and this finding cannot be explained by different sources of wealth (luck vs. merit) or by cultural or economic factors. We also show that preferences for private solutions undermine support for public solutions, resulting in wealth inequality increasing in every country. In contrast, we identify two universal pathways to successful public solution provision: early contributions to public solutions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the ‘private solution problem’ and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- 15 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessAssessing private solutions to collective action problems in a 34-nation study
Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change1–5. Individuals involved in collective action problems are often considered to have two options: contribute towards a public solution or free-ride. But they might also choose a third option of investing in a private solution such as local climate change adaptation6–8. Here we introduce a collective action game featuring wealth inequality caused by luck or merit and both public and private solutions with participants from 34 countries. We show that the joint existence of wealth inequality and private solutions has a consistent effect across countries: participants endowed with higher income choose the private solution almost twice as often as those endowed with lower income; and this finding cannot be explained by different sources of wealth (luck vs. merit) or by cultural or economic factors. We also show that preferences for private solutions undermine support for public solutions, resulting in wealth inequality increasing in every country. In contrast, we identify two universal pathways to successful public solution provision: early contributions to public solutions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the ‘private solution problem’ and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.
- Open Access
- 14 February 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 5 (1) , 015007
The complexity of climate change mitigation: an experiment with large groups
We have studied the problem of climate change mitigation in large groups by means of a series of experiments with 1785 people. Our participants included both young university students and people of relevance in different organizations, in particular, those attending the presentation of the annual report on innovation by Fundación COTEC (Spain). In the experiment, the participants, distributed in groups of more than 100 people, faced a dilemma: to avoid a global catastrophe that destroys any possibility of making profits, a certain collective sacrifice has to be made by contributing to reach a global threshold. When the threshold was low, the students reached the amount of overall contribution necessary to avoid it. But in the case of a high threshold, none of the populations reached the threshold. In fact, they were far from it. In this sense, the collective behavior of the students and of people of relevance was fundamentally the same. The majority of participants in the high-risk case fell into four categories: those who did not contribute (around 10%), those who contribute half of their means (15%) but less than the fair share required to reach the threshold, those who contributed the fair share (10%), and those who contributed everything they had, so that their personal benefit was zero. In the case of students this last percentage was 10%, but in the other sample it reached almost 30%. We also found that individuals could be classified as being optimistic or pessimistic, and in general they behaved accordingly with regard to their contributions. Our results highlight the complexity of mitigating climate change in large groups and specially the difficulty in communicating the issue to foster action in a general population.
- 14 February 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 5 (1) , 015007
Open AccessThe complexity of climate change mitigation: an experiment with large groups
We have studied the problem of climate change mitigation in large groups by means of a series of experiments with 1785 people. Our participants included both young university students and people of relevance in different organizations, in particular, those attending the presentation of the annual report on innovation by Fundación COTEC (Spain). In the experiment, the participants, distributed in groups of more than 100 people, faced a dilemma: to avoid a global catastrophe that destroys any possibility of making profits, a certain collective sacrifice has to be made by contributing to reach a global threshold. When the threshold was low, the students reached the amount of overall contribution necessary to avoid it. But in the case of a high threshold, none of the populations reached the threshold. In fact, they were far from it. In this sense, the collective behavior of the students and of people of relevance was fundamentally the same. The majority of participants in the high-risk case fell into four categories: those who did not contribute (around 10%), those who contribute half of their means (15%) but less than the fair share required to reach the threshold, those who contributed the fair share (10%), and those who contributed everything they had, so that their personal benefit was zero. In the case of students this last percentage was 10%, but in the other sample it reached almost 30%. We also found that individuals could be classified as being optimistic or pessimistic, and in general they behaved accordingly with regard to their contributions. Our results highlight the complexity of mitigating climate change in large groups and specially the difficulty in communicating the issue to foster action in a general population.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The baking of preferences throughout the high school
The purpose of this study is to examine whether girls and boys exhibit different risk and time preferences and how this difference evolves during the critical phase of adolescence. To achieve this, we use a large and powered sample of 4830 non-self-selected teenagers from 207 classes across 22 Spanish schools with very different socioeconomic backgrounds. Alongside time and risk preferences, we also collected additional information about class attributes, social network measures, students' characteristics, and the average level of economic preferences of friends. These measures enable us to account for potentially omitted variables that were not considered in previous studies. The results indicate that there are no significant gender differences in time and risk preferences, but older subjects exhibit more sophisticated time preferences and higher risk aversion. We also perform an exploratory heterogeneity analysis, which unveils two important results: first, cognitive abilities play a critical role in the development of time and risk preferences; second, interaction within the class social network does matter.
- 17 January 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe baking of preferences throughout the high school
The purpose of this study is to examine whether girls and boys exhibit different risk and time preferences and how this difference evolves during the critical phase of adolescence. To achieve this, we use a large and powered sample of 4830 non-self-selected teenagers from 207 classes across 22 Spanish schools with very different socioeconomic backgrounds. Alongside time and risk preferences, we also collected additional information about class attributes, social network measures, students' characteristics, and the average level of economic preferences of friends. These measures enable us to account for potentially omitted variables that were not considered in previous studies. The results indicate that there are no significant gender differences in time and risk preferences, but older subjects exhibit more sophisticated time preferences and higher risk aversion. We also perform an exploratory heterogeneity analysis, which unveils two important results: first, cognitive abilities play a critical role in the development of time and risk preferences; second, interaction within the class social network does matter.