Antonio Calcara
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Antonio Calcara has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Andrea Gilli
NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy
1 shared publication- Cosimo Melella
Università degli Studi di Catania
1 shared publication - Francesco Ferazza
Royal Holloway, University of London, London, UK
1 shared publication Ivan Zaccagnini
Department of Political Science, LUISS University, Rome, Italy
1 shared publication- Ivan Zaccagnini
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
1 shared publication - Konstantinos Mersinas
Royal Holloway University of London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 102 (6) , 2171-2191
Is this the end of armaments cooperation as we know it? Technological change and the rise of software
Armaments cooperation—where two or more participating countries jointly develop military equipment—is an inevitable choice if countries are to build advanced, technologically complex and expensive weapon systems. However, one factor that has received little consideration could have a substantial impact on armaments cooperation as we know it: technological change and, specifically, the increasing importance of software. Modern weapon systems rely heavily on software, which is widely considered to be the brain of such systems or, as some say, their ‘holy grail’. This article aims to address this gap by analysing how the rise of software is reshaping the organizational structure of armaments cooperation. The central argument is that software makes armaments cooperation easier at the organizational level but more difficult at the political level. Software lowers the barriers to contributing to cooperative programmes, rewarding the aggregation of data and knowhow between different countries. Consequently, armaments cooperation is becoming more symmetric in form, thereby overcoming the organizational asymmetry that previously generated significant distributional consequences—and winners and losers—among participating countries and firms. However, as software requires continuous updating, countries will need to share far more data and knowhow. Ultimately, a greater degree of trust will be required among participants than in the past, as they will need to share strategic resources. This makes software-led cooperative programmes more politically challenging to organize. This article examines how the distinctive features of software are transforming armaments cooperation, with a specific focus on collaboration in the fighter jets sector.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Affairs
- Vol. 102 (6) , 2171-2191
Open AccessIs this the end of armaments cooperation as we know it? Technological change and the rise of software
Armaments cooperation—where two or more participating countries jointly develop military equipment—is an inevitable choice if countries are to build advanced, technologically complex and expensive weapon systems. However, one factor that has received little consideration could have a substantial impact on armaments cooperation as we know it: technological change and, specifically, the increasing importance of software. Modern weapon systems rely heavily on software, which is widely considered to be the brain of such systems or, as some say, their ‘holy grail’. This article aims to address this gap by analysing how the rise of software is reshaping the organizational structure of armaments cooperation. The central argument is that software makes armaments cooperation easier at the organizational level but more difficult at the political level. Software lowers the barriers to contributing to cooperative programmes, rewarding the aggregation of data and knowhow between different countries. Consequently, armaments cooperation is becoming more symmetric in form, thereby overcoming the organizational asymmetry that previously generated significant distributional consequences—and winners and losers—among participating countries and firms. However, as software requires continuous updating, countries will need to share far more data and knowhow. Ultimately, a greater degree of trust will be required among participants than in the past, as they will need to share strategic resources. This makes software-led cooperative programmes more politically challenging to organize. This article examines how the distinctive features of software are transforming armaments cooperation, with a specific focus on collaboration in the fighter jets sector.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Crossing the Valley of Death: Why Some EU Technology Initiatives Fail Before Operationalisation
This article examines why some European Union (EU) technology initiatives fail to transition from policy announcement or pilot launch to durable operationalisation. Existing scholarship disproportionately focuses on successful or fully institutionalised initiatives, overlooking a substantial number of projects that stall after announcement or pilot launch. Drawing on innovation studies, the article adapts the concept of the ‘valley of death’ to explain this critical transition. It develops a theory‐building framework centred on three mutually reinforcing enabling conditions: institutional anchoring, sustained funding and stakeholder alignment. The framework is applied to three illustrative case studies – EU Voice/EU Video, the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure and Quaero – spanning different institutional settings and technological domains. The findings suggest that early‐stage policy attrition is consistently associated with the absence or only partial presence of these enabling conditions, whilst alternative explanations – including technological infeasibility, member state vetoes and low political salience – provide only partial accounts. The article contributes a theory‐building framework for analysing early‐stage policy attrition in EU technology policy and offers practical insights for the design of future European technology initiatives.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Open AccessCrossing the Valley of Death: Why Some EU Technology Initiatives Fail Before Operationalisation
This article examines why some European Union (EU) technology initiatives fail to transition from policy announcement or pilot launch to durable operationalisation. Existing scholarship disproportionately focuses on successful or fully institutionalised initiatives, overlooking a substantial number of projects that stall after announcement or pilot launch. Drawing on innovation studies, the article adapts the concept of the ‘valley of death’ to explain this critical transition. It develops a theory‐building framework centred on three mutually reinforcing enabling conditions: institutional anchoring, sustained funding and stakeholder alignment. The framework is applied to three illustrative case studies – EU Voice/EU Video, the European Blockchain Services Infrastructure and Quaero – spanning different institutional settings and technological domains. The findings suggest that early‐stage policy attrition is consistently associated with the absence or only partial presence of these enabling conditions, whilst alternative explanations – including technological infeasibility, member state vetoes and low political salience – provide only partial accounts. The article contributes a theory‐building framework for analysing early‐stage policy attrition in EU technology policy and offers practical insights for the design of future European technology initiatives.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 46 (4) , 1030-1054
Unpacking the target state response to wedging and binding strategies: The case of 5G
- 9 September 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 46 (4) , 1030-1054
Open AccessUnpacking the target state response to wedging and binding strategies: The case of 5G
- Open Access
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 49 (4) , 994-1018
European cloud computing policy: failing in Europe to succeed nationally?
- 30 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 49 (4) , 994-1018
Open AccessEuropean cloud computing policy: failing in Europe to succeed nationally?
- Open Access
- 27 December 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 26 (1)
Governments and Markets in the Digital Age
The academic literature has revamped its interest in economic statecraft, geoeconomics, geopoliticization of trade and technology sectors, and in the role of value chains as vectors for exerting control over critical technologies. However, there has been less reflection on state-market relations in the production of technological innovation and on the evolution of government business relations. Four recent books address these two important issues from different angles. Mazzucato and Mallaby’s books focus on the right mix of state and market needed to stimulate technological innovation, and they do so from opposite perspectives. Chen and Ripley’s books look, respectively, at the rise of Tencent as one of China’s major big tech companies and the rise of SpaceX as a key private player in the traditionally state-led US space market. These two books are therefore of interest to gauge the evolving relations between government and private businesses in two key areas of current geopolitical competition, the digital and the space sectors. The aim of this review essay is not only to briefly summarize the content of these books and their strengths and weaknesses, but also to use them as a starting point to reflect on the mix of state and market in the production of innovation, and on government-businesses relations in digital markets.
- 27 December 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 26 (1)
Open AccessGovernments and Markets in the Digital Age
The academic literature has revamped its interest in economic statecraft, geoeconomics, geopoliticization of trade and technology sectors, and in the role of value chains as vectors for exerting control over critical technologies. However, there has been less reflection on state-market relations in the production of technological innovation and on the evolution of government business relations. Four recent books address these two important issues from different angles. Mazzucato and Mallaby’s books focus on the right mix of state and market needed to stimulate technological innovation, and they do so from opposite perspectives. Chen and Ripley’s books look, respectively, at the rise of Tencent as one of China’s major big tech companies and the rise of SpaceX as a key private player in the traditionally state-led US space market. These two books are therefore of interest to gauge the evolving relations between government and private businesses in two key areas of current geopolitical competition, the digital and the space sectors. The aim of this review essay is not only to briefly summarize the content of these books and their strengths and weaknesses, but also to use them as a starting point to reflect on the mix of state and market in the production of innovation, and on government-businesses relations in digital markets.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 627-640
Divided We Hack: Exploring the Degree of Sino-Russian Coordination in Cyberspace During the Ukraine War
China and Russia are arguably NATO’s main strategic competitors and potential adversaries. Since 2017, Beijing and Moscow have conducted cyber-espionage operations against NATO members, and the two countries have also reportedly displayed more coordination in the cyber domain. These concerns have become more pressing since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, where multiple sources have shown alleged evidence of Chinese and Russian cyber-operations coordination. While it is commonly accepted that China and Russia cooperate at the strategic level in the cyber domain, this article aims at better understanding whether these two nation-states are also coordinating their affiliated cyber threat groups. We investigate this, drawing on multiple open-access data and sources. Specifically, we empirically examine the activity of three Chinese groups, Mustang Panda, Scarab and Judgment Panda, to assess the presence and degree of coordination with their Russian counterparts. Our analysis shows that, as far as the examined groups are concerned, there was no coordination between Russian and Chinese campaigns, and the latter group sometimes even targeted sensitive Russian civilian and military infrastructures.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 627-640
Open AccessDivided We Hack: Exploring the Degree of Sino-Russian Coordination in Cyberspace During the Ukraine War
China and Russia are arguably NATO’s main strategic competitors and potential adversaries. Since 2017, Beijing and Moscow have conducted cyber-espionage operations against NATO members, and the two countries have also reportedly displayed more coordination in the cyber domain. These concerns have become more pressing since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, where multiple sources have shown alleged evidence of Chinese and Russian cyber-operations coordination. While it is commonly accepted that China and Russia cooperate at the strategic level in the cyber domain, this article aims at better understanding whether these two nation-states are also coordinating their affiliated cyber threat groups. We investigate this, drawing on multiple open-access data and sources. Specifically, we empirically examine the activity of three Chinese groups, Mustang Panda, Scarab and Judgment Panda, to assess the presence and degree of coordination with their Russian counterparts. Our analysis shows that, as far as the examined groups are concerned, there was no coordination between Russian and Chinese campaigns, and the latter group sometimes even targeted sensitive Russian civilian and military infrastructures.
- 5 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defense & Security Analysis
- Vol. 39 (2) , 260-262
Military drones, air defence, and the hider-finder competition in air warfare
Have drones revolutionised war? This is an important question, for academics and policy makers alike. Many analysts and observers have looked at the role of military drones in recent conflicts such...
- 5 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Defense & Security Analysis
- Vol. 39 (2) , 260-262
Military drones, air defence, and the hider-finder competition in air warfare
Have drones revolutionised war? This is an important question, for academics and policy makers alike. Many analysts and observers have looked at the role of military drones in recent conflicts such...
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (2) , 439-457
From quiet to noisy politics: Varieties of European reactions to 5G and Huawei
5G networks are at the center of geopolitical competition. The United States has denounced market leader Huawei's ability to break into allies' sensitive networks and it has tried to convince Europeans to ban the Chinese group from their 5G markets. How are European governments and industries reacting to 5G politicization? This article argues that government‐industry interactions in the handling of politically salient issues are mediated by the country's political system. In executive‐dominated countries, the government would centralize policymaking. In parliament‐dominated countries, the government would delegate politically salient issues to the industry to bypass diffuse power‐sharing and fragmented coalition‐building. The article adds that political economy acts as an intervening variable. In public governance ecosystems, governments and industries interact through informal coordination; in private governance ecosystems, the two actors rely on formal contracting. The empirical analysis focuses on British, Dutch, French, and Italian reactions to 5G politicization, yielding favorable results to the hypotheses.
- 19 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (2) , 439-457
From quiet to noisy politics: Varieties of European reactions to 5G and Huawei
5G networks are at the center of geopolitical competition. The United States has denounced market leader Huawei's ability to break into allies' sensitive networks and it has tried to convince Europeans to ban the Chinese group from their 5G markets. How are European governments and industries reacting to 5G politicization? This article argues that government‐industry interactions in the handling of politically salient issues are mediated by the country's political system. In executive‐dominated countries, the government would centralize policymaking. In parliament‐dominated countries, the government would delegate politically salient issues to the industry to bypass diffuse power‐sharing and fragmented coalition‐building. The article adds that political economy acts as an intervening variable. In public governance ecosystems, governments and industries interact through informal coordination; in private governance ecosystems, the two actors rely on formal contracting. The empirical analysis focuses on British, Dutch, French, and Italian reactions to 5G politicization, yielding favorable results to the hypotheses.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Small Wars & Insurgencies
- Vol. 33 (1-2) , 250-271
Contractors or robots? Future warfare between privatization and automation
Contemporary warfare is increasingly shaped by the complex relationship between the privatization of security and technologically driven automation. On the one hand, there is a growing tendency to employ private military and security companies for a range of military support tasks. On the other hand, the growing automation of security technologies is bound to make war less manpower intensive. Combat systems will have much more autonomy and humans will be working more closely with machines than they do today. The article provides an original analysis on the interplay between the privatization of security tasks and technologically driven automation and investigates their impact on the defence industry and the armed forces. These two sets of actors are arguably among the most impacted by the multi-faceted relations between privatization and automation. Technological progress creates the need for contractors to maintain and operate platforms that militaries do not have expertise to run. However, technologically driven automation - often developed in value chains far removed from the military-industrial pipeline - might also replace private contractors in non-core security tasks. The possibility to employ automated and autonomous systems will hence impact on the already delicate balance between private contractors and publicly-funded armed forces.
- 5 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Small Wars & Insurgencies
- Vol. 33 (1-2) , 250-271
Contractors or robots? Future warfare between privatization and automation
Contemporary warfare is increasingly shaped by the complex relationship between the privatization of security and technologically driven automation. On the one hand, there is a growing tendency to employ private military and security companies for a range of military support tasks. On the other hand, the growing automation of security technologies is bound to make war less manpower intensive. Combat systems will have much more autonomy and humans will be working more closely with machines than they do today. The article provides an original analysis on the interplay between the privatization of security tasks and technologically driven automation and investigates their impact on the defence industry and the armed forces. These two sets of actors are arguably among the most impacted by the multi-faceted relations between privatization and automation. Technological progress creates the need for contractors to maintain and operate platforms that militaries do not have expertise to run. However, technologically driven automation - often developed in value chains far removed from the military-industrial pipeline - might also replace private contractors in non-core security tasks. The possibility to employ automated and autonomous systems will hence impact on the already delicate balance between private contractors and publicly-funded armed forces.
- 19 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 29 (4) , 1237-1262
State-industry relations and cybersecurity governance in Europe
Recent analyses of international affairs highlight that states are increasingly exploiting the key position of some private industries in critical hubs of global economic networks to gain an advantage over their competitors. The key role of private companies in international competition has also significant implications in the cyber-domain, where private actors are the main owners of data and digital infrastructures. In contrast to those who see a transformative effect of cyber, this article draws on comparative political economy and defense policy to identify two different models of state-industry relations in the governance of cybersecurity. The theoretical framework distinguishes between public and private governance ecosystems and identifies different hypotheses on how states and industries interact in cybersecurity governance in France and in the UK. The French public governance is characterized by the presence of formal and informal relations between state and industries, a high degree of public investment in the private sector and centralized institutions. France has also used the EU mainly to advance its industrial interests. In contrast, the UK private governance is characterized by more arm's length relations between the state and industries and a less centralized system. Moreover, the UK, differently to France, has not used the EU channel to advance its industry-related preferences. These results confirm the macro-differences between public and private governance ecosystems and open new relevant avenues to investigate the interplay between political economy structures and European and international pressures in policy-areas with both economic and security implications.
- 19 April 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Review of International Political Economy
- Vol. 29 (4) , 1237-1262
State-industry relations and cybersecurity governance in Europe
Recent analyses of international affairs highlight that states are increasingly exploiting the key position of some private industries in critical hubs of global economic networks to gain an advantage over their competitors. The key role of private companies in international competition has also significant implications in the cyber-domain, where private actors are the main owners of data and digital infrastructures. In contrast to those who see a transformative effect of cyber, this article draws on comparative political economy and defense policy to identify two different models of state-industry relations in the governance of cybersecurity. The theoretical framework distinguishes between public and private governance ecosystems and identifies different hypotheses on how states and industries interact in cybersecurity governance in France and in the UK. The French public governance is characterized by the presence of formal and informal relations between state and industries, a high degree of public investment in the private sector and centralized institutions. France has also used the EU mainly to advance its industrial interests. In contrast, the UK private governance is characterized by more arm's length relations between the state and industries and a less centralized system. Moreover, the UK, differently to France, has not used the EU channel to advance its industry-related preferences. These results confirm the macro-differences between public and private governance ecosystems and open new relevant avenues to investigate the interplay between political economy structures and European and international pressures in policy-areas with both economic and security implications.