AZAlessandro Zanardi

Alessandro Zanardi

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Alessandro Zanardi has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Game-Theoretic Energy Management Strategies With Interacting Agents in Formula 1

    by Giona Fieni, Marc-Philippe Neumann, Alessandro Zanardi, Alberto Cerofolini, Christopher H. Onder

    This paper presents an interaction-aware energy management optimization framework for Formula 1 racing. The scenario considered involves two agents and a drag reduction model. Strategic interactions between the agents are captured by a Stackelberg game in the form of a bilevel program. To address the computational challenges associated with bilevel optimization, the problem is reformulated as a single-level nonlinear program employing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The proposed framework contributes towards the development of new energy management and allocation strategies, caused by the presence of another agent. For instance, it provides valuable insights on how to redistribute the energy in order to optimally exploit the wake effect, showcasing a notable difference with the behavior studied in previous works. Robust energy allocations can be identified to reduce the lap time loss associated with unexpected choices of the other agent. It allows to recognize the boundary conditions for the interaction to become relevant, impacting the system's behavior, and to assess if overtaking is possible and beneficial. Overall, the framework provides a comprehensive approach for a two-agent Formula 1 racing problem with strategic interactions, offering physically intuitive and practical results.


  • Tactical Game-Theoretic Decision-Making With Homotopy Class Constraints

    by Michael Khayyat, Alessandro Zanardi, Stefano Arrigoni, Francesco Braghin

    We propose a tactical homotopy-aware decisionmaking framework for game-theoretic motion planning in urban environments. We model urban driving as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) with mixed-integer constraints and employ homotopic class constraints to tame the combinatorial aspect of motion planning. More specifically, by utilizing homotopy classes, we partition the high-dimensional solution space into finite, well-defined subregions. Each subregion (homotopy) corresponds to a high-level tactical decision, such as the passing order between pairs of players. The proposed formulation allows finding global optimal Nash equilibria in a computationally tractable manner by solving a mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP). Each homotopy decision is represented by a binary variable that activates different sets of linear collision avoidance constraints. By guiding the branch-and-bound solver, the introduction of homotopic constraints allows for a more efficient search, leading to faster solutions (on average, 5 times faster in roundabout scenarios). We experimentally validate the proposed approach on scenarios taken from the rounD dataset. Simulationbased testing in a Model Predictive Control (MPC) framework demonstrates the capability of the framework in achieving globally optimal solutions while yielding a 78% average decrease in the computational time with respect to an implementation without the homotopic constraints


  • How Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games

    by Alessandro Zanardi, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Nando Käslin, Saverio Bolognani, Andrea Censi, Emilio Frazzoli

    We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often impractical from a computational standpoint, in this work we study the (in)efficiency of any equilibrium players might agree to play. More specifically, we bound the equilibrium inefficiency by modeling driving games as particular type of congestion games over spatio-temporal resources. We obtain novel guarantees that refine existing bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a function of problem-dependent game parameters. For instance, the relative trade-off between proximity costs and personal objectives such as comfort and progress. Although the obtained guarantees concern open-loop trajectories, we observe efficient equilibria even when agents employ closed-loop policies trained via decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning.


  • Open Access

    How Bad is Selfish Driving? Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Urban Driving Games

    by Alessandro Zanardi, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Nando Käslin, Saverio Bolognani, Andrea Censi, Emilio Frazzoli

    We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most efficient equilibrium (in term of social cost) is often impractical from a computational standpoint, in this work we study the (in)efficiency of any equilibrium players might agree to play. More specifically, we bound the equilibrium inefficiency by modeling driving games as particular type of congestion games over spatio-temporal resources. We obtain novel guarantees that refine existing bounds on the Price of Anarchy (PoA) as a function of problem-dependent game parameters. For instance, the relative trade-off between proximity costs and personal objectives such as comfort and progress. Although the obtained guarantees concern open-loop trajectories, we observe efficient equilibria even when agents employ closed-loop policies trained via decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning.

  • Posetal Games: Efficiency, Existence, and Refinement of Equilibria in Games With Prioritized Metrics

    by Alessandro Zanardi, Gioele Zardini, Sirish Srinivasan, Saverio Bolognani, Andrea Censi, Florian Dorfler, Emilio Frazzoli

    Modern applications require robots to comply with multiple, often conflicting rules and to interact with the other agents. We present Posetal Games as a class of games in which each player expresses a preference over the outcomes via a partially ordered set of metrics. This allows one to combine hierarchical priorities of each player with the interactive nature of the environment. By contextualizing standard game theoretical notions, we provide two sufficient conditions on the preference of the players to prove existence of pure Nash Equilibria in finite action sets. Moreover, we define formal operations on the preference structures and link them to a refinement of the game solutions, showing how the set of equilibria can be systematically shrunk. The presented results are showcased in a driving game where autonomous vehicles select from a finite set of trajectories. The results demonstrate the interpretability of results in terms of minimum-rank-violation for each player.


  • Urban Driving Games With Lexicographic Preferences and Socially Efficient Nash Equilibria

    by Alessandro Zanardi, Enrico Mion, Mattia Bruschetta, Saverio Bolognani, Andrea Censi, Emilio Frazzoli

    We describe Urban Driving Games (UDGs) as a particular class of differential games that model the interactions and incentives of the urban driving task. The drivers possess a “communal” interest, such as not colliding with each other, but are also self-interested in fulfilling traffic rules and personal objectives. Subject to their physical dynamics, the preference of the agents is expressed via a lexicographic relation that puts as first priority the shared objective of not colliding. Under mild assumptions, we show that communal UDGs have the structure of a lexicographic ordinal potential game which allows us to prove several interesting properties. Namely, socially efficient equilibria can be found by solving a single (lexicographic) optimal control problem and iterated best response schemes have desirable convergence guarantees.